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71. The Structural Deficiencies of the 
 Hungarian Ex Officio Appointed 
 Defense Counsel System
1.1. Legal framework: international and constitutional law 
Access to justice for indigent criminal defendants1 is a crucial safeguard in criminal 
procedural law. Ensuring free and eﬀective defense for indigent defendants is a 
state responsibility, which stems from international law and also derives from the 
Hungarian Constitution. 
In addition to Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,2 Article 6(3)(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights3 also provides 
that everyone charged with a criminal oﬀense has the right to “defend himself in 
person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not suﬃcient 
means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so 
require.”
The European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) has expanded the above 
provision with the criteria of eﬀectiveness, when in the case of Artico v. Italy 4 it 
ruled that the state does not fulﬁll its obligations under the Convention simply by 
1 The term “defendant” (in Hungarian: terhelt) will be used to refer to the subject of the criminal procedure 
irrespective of the actual phase of the procedure: i.e. to both the suspect, the accused and the convict.
2 Promulgated in Hungary by Law Decree 8 of 1976 
3 Promulgated by Hungary by Act XXXI of 1993
4 6694/74, Judgment of 13/05/1980
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providing an ex oﬃcio defense counsel, as the defense counsel’s performance has 
to be eﬀective as well. Although in Kamasinski v. Austria5 the Court elaborated this 
position by stating that the state cannot be held responsible for all the failings of 
the system of ex oﬃcio appointed defense counsels, the Court also made it clear 
that if the ex oﬃcio defense counsel had obviously failed to perform his duties, or 
his omission had been duly brought to the attention of the authorities, the state 
can be held to be in breach of the Convention. The Court’s ruling in the case of 
Czekalla v. Portugal 6 has demonstrated the costs that the state must bear if it found 
the Court to be in violation of the above provision. In Czekalla, the applicant’s ex 
oﬃcio appointed defense counsel failed to submit an appeal that met all formal 
requirements against the judgment convicting the applicant; hence the Portuguese 
second instance court rejected the appeal without an examination of its merits. The 
Court found a violation of Article 6(3)(c) and ordered Portugal to pay EUR 3,000 
as damages and EUR 11,000 as costs and expenses to the applicant.
The criterion of eﬀectiveness is not only contained in the ECHR’s case-law 
but in European Union law as well. Article 4 of the European Commission’s Proposal 
for a Council framework decision on certain procedural rights in criminal proceedings 
throughout the European Union7 (submitted on 3 May 2004) (“Proposal”) bears the 
title “Obligation to ensure eﬀectiveness of legal advice” and provides that “Member 
States shall ensure that a mechanism exists to provide a replacement lawyer if the 
legal advice given is found not to be eﬀective.” The Explanatory Memorandum of 
the Proposal stresses that “[s]ince the suspect is not always in a position to assess the 
eﬀectiveness of his legal representation, the onus must be on the Member States to 
establish a system for checking this.”
Quality assurance of the system evidently requires evaluation and assessment. 
According to Article 15 of the Proposal, Member States shall facilitate the collection 
of the information necessary for the evaluation and monitoring of the system. In 
this regard, the Proposal contains a wide range of duties for Member States to collect 
data. As per Article 16, in order that evaluation and monitoring of the provisions 
of the Framework Decision may be carried out, Member States shall ensure that 
5 9783/82, Judgment of 19/12/1989
6 38830/97, Judgment of 10/10/2002
7 A framework decision shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is 
addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. 
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data such as relevant statistics are kept and made available, including on whether 
legal advice (the services of an ex oﬃcio defense counsel) was given and in what 
percentage of cases it was given free or partly free. 
We need not turn only to international legal instruments or community law 
in order to show that the Hungarian government is obliged to establish and maintain 
an eﬀective ex oﬃcio appointment system. This responsibility also stems from such 
constitutional principles and rights as the rule of law,8 equality before the courts9 as 
well as the right to defense.10 
In Decision No. 6/1998 (III.11.), the Constitutional Court ruled that 
eﬀectiveness of the right to defense is a conditio sine qua non of the constitutionality 
of the criminal justice system: “The Constitutional Court has already dealt with 
the issue of the right to defense and any restrictions thereof […] in its Decision no. 
25/1991 (V.18.) (“Decision”). In that Decision, the Constitutional Court was not 
satisﬁed that the right to defense be formally guaranteed; instead, it demanded eﬀective 
implementation of the right to defense as well as expanded this right to encompass 
the right of the defendant and counsel to appropriate preparation and to exercise 
their rights. […] The Constitutional Court has already recognized in another case 
how signiﬁcant the eﬀectiveness of the right to defense is. Thus in Decision no. 
1320/B/1993. the Constitutional Court has already held that restricting the right 
of the defendant to make decisions about his case is constitutional in the interest of 
ensuring that the defense counsel may exercise his rights in the course of carrying 
out his duties,”11
1.2. The functioning of the Hungarian ex officio appointment system 
The basic criteria regarding the functioning of an ex oﬃcio appointment system 
were described in the foregoing section. This section will ﬁrst introduce the legal 
framework of the Hungarian ex oﬃcio appointment system, and then review – based 
8 Act XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the republic of Hungary (Constitution), Art. 2 Par. (1)
9 Constitution, Art. 57 Par. (1)
10 Constitution, Art. 57 Par. (3) 
11 Italics by the author
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on empirical studies and the experiences of participants in criminal procedures – 
whether the present solution in Hungary meets these criteria and whether the system 
is able to ensure eﬀective defense for defendants. 
1.2.1. Brief description of the ex oﬃcio appointment system 
The Hungarian ex oﬃcio appointment system is primarily based on the principle 
of “the interests of justice,” while indigence only plays a secondary role. Act XIX of 
1998 on the criminal procedure (“CCP”) diﬀerentiates between the investigation 
and the judicial phase regarding the cases and content of mandatory defense. The 
most important rules in the investigation phase are set out below. 
The participation of defense counsel is mandatory (i) if the criminal oﬀense 
the defendant is suspected or accused of is punishable by a sentence of imprisonment 
of ﬁve years or more; or if the defendant is (ii) detained; (iii) deaf, blind or suﬀering 
from a mental disorder (regardless of his/her mental capacity); (iv) unfamiliar with 
the Hungarian language or the language of the procedure; (v) unable to defend him/
herself in person for any other reason;12 (vi) a juvenile;13 (vii) beneﬁting for personal 
cost exemption and requests a defense counsel to be appointed.14 In the latter case, 
the state will cover the appointed defense counsel’s fees and documented costs, while 
in all other cases these costs are only advanced by the state. 
The authority entitled to appoint a defense counsel (i.e. the investigating 
authority or the prosecutor in the investigation phase) will appoint a defense counsel 
if defense is mandatory but the defendant has not retained a lawyer.15 In general, it 
is irrelevant whether the defendant has no defense counsel because he/she is indigent 
or because he/she does not wish to retain a defense counsel for any other reason. 
Indigence only plays a role in case of personal cost exemption. The basic principle of 
the Hungarian system holds that in the interest of justice, a defense counsel should 
participate in the procedure in all cases where the defendant is “vulnerable” for some 
reason, i.e. either due to his situation (e.g. detention) or a personal characteristic (e.g. 
minor age, lack of language) he is restricted in his abilities to defend himself. 
12 CCP, Art. 46
13 CCP, Art. 450
14 CCP, Art. 48. Par. (2) and Art. 74. Par (3) a)
15 CCP, Art. 48. Par. (1)
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Furthermore, the CCP also provides that the appointing authority may 
consider whether the principle of a fair trial requires the appointment of a defense 
counsel: the court, the prosecutor or the investigating authority may appoint a 
defense counsel at the defendant’s request or ex oﬃcio if this is necessary in the 
interest of the defendant.16
Immediately after the suspicion has been communicated, the defendant has 
to be informed of his right to choose or to request the appointment of a defense 
counsel. If the participation of the defense counsel is mandatory in the procedure, the 
defendant also has to be informed that unless he retains a defense counsel in 3 days, 
the prosecutor or the investigating authority will appoint a counsel for him. If the 
defendant declares that he does not wish to retain a defense counsel, the prosecutor 
or the investigating authority will appoint a defense counsel immediately.17 If 
defense is mandatory because the defendant is detained, the defense counsel has to 
be appointed before his ﬁrst interrogation at the latest.18
A further safeguard is that following the appointment of the defense counsel, 
the defendant has to be informed of the counsel’s name; if the defendant is detained, 
the appointing authority also has to inform the facility where detention is carried out 
about the name of the ex oﬃcio defense counsel.19
A further signiﬁcant factor in the Hungarian ex oﬃcio appointment system is 
that the mandatory nature of the defense counsel’s participation in the investigation 
phase does not require the presence of the defense counsel at individual procedural 
actions. While the CCP prescribes that the defense counsel should contact the 
defendant without delay and to use all lawful means and methods of defense at the 
appropriate times in the defendant’s interests20 (which of course include participation 
of the defense counsel at all investigative actions open to him/her), if the defense 
counsel fails to fulﬁll these obligations, he/she will commit an ethical misdemeanor 
at most, but will not prevent the investigative authority from interrogating the 
defendant or confronting him/her with any witnesses testifying against him/her. 
The situation is diﬀerent in the judicial phase: if defense is mandatory, no 
hearings may be held without the defense counsel’s presence.
16 CCP, Art. 48 Par. (3)
17 CCP Art. 179 Par. (3)
18 CCP, Art. 48 Par. (1)
19 CCP, Art. 48 Par. (1) and (8)
20 CCP, Art. 50 Par. (1)
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The scenarios of mandatory defense are wider in scope in the judicial phase. 
In addition to the grounds listed above, the presence of the counsel is mandatory at 
the hearing if (i) the case is before the county court acting as court of ﬁrst instance; 
(ii) if an auxiliary private prosecutor presses charges;21 (iii) if the prosecutor takes part 
at the hearing and the defendant who had not retained a defense counsel previously 
requests the appointment of an ex oﬃcio defense counsel.22 
If the prosecutor takes part at the hearing, the presiding judge may appoint 
a defense counsel at his/her discretion if the defendant does not make such a request 
but the judge deems the participation of counsel necessary for some reason.23
Defense is also mandatory in certain special procedures, such as ‘taking 
before the court’24 (a fast-track simpliﬁed procedure for minor oﬀenses) as well as 
procedures carried out in absentia.25 
Ex oﬃcio appointed defense counsels are entitled to a fee for appearing 
when summoned or notiﬁed before the court, the prosecutor and the investigating 
authority, for examining the ﬁles and for consultations with the detained defendant 
in the detention facility, as well as reimbursement of documented expenses.26 Decree 
no. 7/2002 (III. 30.) of the Minister of Justice on the fees and expenses of ex oﬃcio 
appointed patron lawyers and defense counsels contains detailed rules on the fees, 
while the law on the annual budget sets fee levels.27
As of 1 July 2006 slight changes were introduced and the regulation includes 
additional safeguards. Taking up contact between the defendant and the ex oﬃcio 
defense counsel is facilitated by a new provision in terms of which, following the 
appointment of an ex oﬃcio defense counsel, the defendant has to be informed of the 
appointed defense counsel’s contact information in addition to his/her name, and the 
decision on appointment shall contain information on the detention facility where 
the defendant is held, as well as scheduled date and place of the interrogation. 
 
21 CCP, Art. 242 Par. (1)
22 CCP, Art. 242 Par. (2)
23 CCP, Art. 242 Par. (2)
24 CCP, Art. 518
25 CCP, Art. 527
26 CCP, Art. 48 Par. (9)
27 See: Act CXXVII of 2006 on the 2007 Budget of the Republic of Hungary, Art. 58 Par. (4): “The hourly fee set 
forth in Art. 131 Par (2) of Act XI of 1998 on Attorneys, shall be HUF 3,000 (EUR 12) in the year 2007.”
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1.2.2. Empirical studies on the functioning of the ex oﬃcio 
 appointment system 
A review of empirical studies on the functioning of the Hungarian ex oﬃcio 
appointment system or of the general experiences of the system’s actors corroborates 
that Hungary, in fact, fails to comply with its international and constitutional 
obligations described in Section 1.1.
It is a problem that dates back to the times before the political transition, 
as it is shown by a study conducted by the Metropolitan Chief Public Prosecutor’s 
Oﬃce in 1988 on the basis of 130 one-defendant cases selected randomly.28 In 70 
out of the 130 cases defense was provided by an ex oﬃcio appointed lawyer. In the 
majority of these cases (63) defense was mandatory due to the pre-trial detention of 
the defendant. Out of the 70 appointed lawyers, 55 did practically nothing during 
the investigation – it was impossible to even ﬁnd out their names – and out of the 
remaining 15, eleven only attended the presentation of the case ﬁles. As only six did 
so at the same time with the defendant, and only one of all the lawyers took part 
in the preceding interrogation of the defendant, it seemed justiﬁed to presume that 
less than 10 percent of the ex oﬃcio appointed counsels had met their clients in the 
investigation phase. As opposed to this, in 80 percent of the cases in which defense 
was provided by a retained lawyer, the counsel attended the interrogations, and more 
than third of the retained lawyers put forth diﬀerent motions. 
As it was shown by the study carried out by the Ombudsperson in 1996, 
the political transition did not solve the problem of detained defendants with 
ex oﬃcio appointed lawyers. According to the research results, in Zala County 
“ex oﬃcio appointed defense counsels were only present on an exceptional basis at 
investigative actions apart from the judicial hearings preceding pre-trial detention.”29 
Ex oﬃcio appointed defense counsels only took part in a mere 18.7 percent of 
witness testimonies. Out of 18 cases examined in Borsod–Abaúj–Zemplén County, 
the appointed defense counsel was present at procedural actions in only 3 cases. 
In Pest County, 5 out of 12 detainees were unfamiliar with their appointed defense 
28 Mihály Tóth: Nyomozás és védelem (A fal lehet üveg is) (Investigation and defense – the wall may be made of 
glass). In: Magyar Jog (Hungarian Law Review), 1989/3, pp. 350–355.
29 See: A kirendelt védővel rendelkező fogvatartott személyek védelemhez való jogának érvényesülése a 
büntetőeljárás nyomozási szakaszában. (The realization of the right to defense of detained persons with 
appointed defense counsels in the investigative phase of the criminal procedure), Budapest, Oﬃce of the 
Ombudspersons, 1996 (hereinafter: Ombudsman Report 1996). p. 7.
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counsels.30 The Ombudsperson’s report concluded sadly “in our justice system, the 
procedures of appointed defense counsels are unable to provide protection against 
abuses and mistakes of the authorities.”31
In the course of a study carried out in 1996–1997, the Hungarian Helsinki 
Committee (“HHC”) found that out of 340 detained defendants, only 198 (58.1 
percent) had ex oﬃcio appointed defense counsels. While 45 percent of detainees with 
retained defense counsels could contact their lawyers prior to the ﬁrst interrogation, 
this rate was only 15 percent among detainees with appointed defense counsels. At 
the time of the HHC’s interviews, 43.7 percent of detainees with appointed defense 
counsels had not even met their lawyers. In contrast, this rate was only 8.1 percent 
among detainees with retained defense counsels.32 
Professor Csaba Fenyvesi carried out an empirical study in 1998–1999 on 
the activities of defense counsels in criminal proceedings. The study was based on an 
analysis of 1,273 case ﬁles as well as interviews with judges, prosecutors, attorneys, 
police oﬃcers, pre-trial detainees and persons convicted of a criminal oﬀense. Below 
are quotes showing various actor’s opinions on the ex oﬃcio appointment system:
 Judges: “The majority of [judges] saw a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the 
activities of the two types of defense counsels [i.e. retained and ex oﬃcio 
appointed defense counsels] with retained counsels performing better.”33 
 Prosecutors: “They deﬁnitely perceive retained counsels as better, more 
active and better prepared. [...] One-third of them think that the system of 
appointed defense counsels is adequate.”34  
 Attorneys: “They completely agree [...] that the work of retained counsels 
is higher quality than that of ex oﬃcio appointed defense counsels. [...] 
Consequently the majority do not consider the system of appointed defense 
counsels itself as good.”35 
30 Ombudsman Report, pp. 17. and 22.
31 Ombudsman Report, p. 32.
32 Punished before Sentence: Detention and Police Cells is Hungary. Constitutional and Legal Policy Institute 
– Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Budapest, 1998. (hereafter: Punished before Sentence). p. 86.
33 Csaba Fenyvesi: A védőügyvéd: a védő büntetőeljárási szerepéről és jogállásáról (The defense counsel: about 
the defense counsel’s role and status in the criminal procedure) Dialóg Campus Kiadó, 2002, Budapest–Pécs, 
(hereafter: Fenyvesi), p. 118.
34 Fenyvesi, p. 120.
35 Fenyvesi, p. 122.
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 Police oﬃcers: “Similarly, police oﬃcers (85%) noted a diﬀerence in the work 
of retained and appointed defense counsels, the former being substantially 
more active, and better representing their clients’ interests.”36
The questionnaire-based study with 500 pre-trial detainees, carried out in 
2003 in the course of the HHC’s Police Jail and Prison Monitoring Program, showed 
that while 40 percent of retained defense counsels had contacted their client before 
the ﬁrst interrogation, this rate was only 24 percent among ex oﬃcio appointed 
defense counsels. As reasons beyond the control of the defense counsel can also 
partly explain this (e.g. delayed notiﬁcations sent by the authorities), other data are 
more revealing. In cases where the ﬁrst hearing had not been held (i.e. the appointed 
defense counsel was not obliged to appear in court), the rate of detainees who had 
had retained defense counsels but had not met their lawyer until the time of the 
HHC’s interview was only 5 percent. This rate was 31 percent among detainees with 
ex oﬃcio appointed defense counsels. Thus, almost every third indigent detainee was 
lacking eﬀective assistance from his/her defense counsel in the investigative phase of 
the criminal proceedings carried out against him/her. The HHC met a respondent 
who had not been contacted by his appointed defense counsel even once during the 
one year of pre-trial detention.37 
The questionnaire-based study revealed further ﬂaws in the functioning 
of ex oﬃcio appointment system, particularly concerning the activities of defense 
counsels. In contrast to 70 percent of defendants who had retained counsels, less 
than one-third of defendants with appointed defense counsels stated that the defense 
counsel had participated at a procedural action in the investigative phase. Moreover, 
even presence at a procedural action is no guarantee that the defense counsel would 
perform substantive activities: several respondents stated that the appointed defense 
counsels had not said a word during the interrogation or hearing. Once respondent 
told the HHC that when he had questioned his appointed defense counsel about the 
lawyer’s passivity in the courtroom, the lawyer replied “I would not start getting into 
an argument with the judge.”38
36 Fenyvesi, p. 126.
37 András Kádár: Presumption of Guilt: Injurious Treatment and the Activity of Defense Counsels in Criminal 
Proceedings against Pre-trial Detainees. Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2004, Budapest. (Hereafter: 
Presumption of Guilt), pp. 127–129. 
38 Presumption of Guilt, p. 145.
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The profound crisis and the severe lack of trust in the system of ex oﬃcio 
appointed defense counsels are corroborated by statements to the eﬀect that a number 
of appointed defense counsels are only willing to perform substantive defense work 
if the defendant pays fees “into the pocket” in addition to the fees received from the 
state budget.39 Other defendants presumed that ex oﬃcio appointed defense counsels 
are in fact working for the investigation authorities that had appointed them, and are 
only interested in persuading defendants to confess their crime.40
The dysfunctional nature of the system may be best illustrated by a 
survey carried out by the Crime Investigation Department of the National Police 
Headquarters. The survey involved the 23 regional investigation units of the 
National Police (the county headquarters, the Budapest headquarters, the National 
Investigation Oﬃce, the Highway Police and the Airport Security Service) and was 
based on targeted data collection carried out during June and July 2006 (hereafter: 
NPH survey).41
According to the NPH survey, in relation to ex oﬃcio appointments 
performed due to the detention of the defendant, “on a national level, the number 
of cases when the appointed counsel does not attend the interrogation of his/her 
client signiﬁcantly exceeds the number of those when the counsel is present. The 
percentages vary between 4.54% (Komárom County) and 77 % (Csongrád County), 
so it is not possible to trace tendencies. However, it can be stated that in 14 [out of 
the 23] regional investigation units, the percentage is below 50%, and only in 9 does 
it reach or exceed 50%.”42 The results of the survey are summarized in Table 1.
39 Presumption of Guilt, p. 132.
40 Presumption of Guilt, p. 146.
41 The results of the survey are presented by: Zsolt Szabó–Sándor Szomor: Fegyveregyenlőség (Equality of Arms) 
(hereafter: Equality of Arms). In: Rendészeti szemle (Law Enforcement Review), issue 2007/3., pp. 19–41.
42 Equality of Arms, p. 35.
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Table 1: The participation of the ex officio appointed counsel in the first interrogation 
 of detained defendants in the % of all appointments based on detention43
Regional investigation unit Participation in the % of all 
appointments based on detention
Budapest Police Headquarters 7,45
Baranya County Police Headquarters 25
Bács–Kiskun County Police Headquarters 16,36
Békés County Police Headquarters 44
Borsod–Abaúj–Zemplén County Police Headquarters 50
Csongrád County Police Headquarters 77
Fejér County Police Headquarters 29,29
Győr–Moson–Sopron County Police Headquarters 70
Hajdú–Bihar County Police Headquarters 11,42
Heves County Police Headquarters 23
Jász–Nagykun–Szolnok County Police Headquarters 11,76
Komárom–Esztergom County Police Headquarters 4,54
Nógrád County Police Headquarters 50
Pest County Police Headquarters no data
Somogy County Police Headquarters 34,78
Szabolcs–Szatmár–Bereg County Police Headquarters 30
Tolna County Police Headquarters 62,5
Vas County Police Headquarters 12,5
Veszprém County Police Headquarters 31,25
Zala County Police Headquarters 50
National Investigation Oﬃce 22,22
Highway Police 70
Airport Security Service no data
43 Equality of Arms, p. 36.
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According to the NPH survey, with regard to the quality of the lawyers’ 
work, “the general experience [of the police] is [...] that the level of eﬃciency of 
appointed counsels is generally below that of retained counsels, and the work they 
perform is of poorer quality. Retained lawyers appear at procedural acts and put 
forth motions more frequently than their appointed colleagues.”44 Although there 
are certain headquarters that do not see any diﬀerence between the two types of 
counsels, others “for instance, the Pest County Headquarters, reported that ex oﬃcio 
appointed counsels often do not show up at the time indicated to them via fax, 
normal mail or telephone. They often refer to other obligations to be excused on 
such occasions. The Szabolcs–Szatmár–Bereg County Headquarters reported that 
the headquarters located at the county seat do not sense such diﬀerences, whereas 
the local stations are of the view that in the investigation phase appointed counsels 
practically do not perform any work.”45
1.3. On the causes of the Hungarian ex officio appointment system’s 
 dysfunctions
The causes of the above outlined problems are multi-layered. The most obvious 
and most frequently mentioned criticism concerns the fees of ex oﬃcio appointed 
counsels. One of the problems is that the legal provisions allow the payment of fees 
for only certain activities. As it was already mentioned, ex oﬃcio appointed defense 
counsels are entitled to a fee for appearing when summoned or notiﬁed before the 
court, the prosecutor and the investigating authority, for examining case ﬁles and 
for consultations with the detained defendant in the detention facility. For other 
activities, such as the writing of petitions or consulting with a client who is not 
detained, no payment is allowed. 
The ex oﬃcio appointed counsel is also entitled to be reimbursed for 
expenses emerging in connection with the case. In terms of Decree 7/2002. (III.30.) 
of the Minister of Justice, the counsel has to put forth a motion requesting such a 
reimbursement. The costs that may be reimbursed include postal expenses, telephone, 
travel, parking and accommodation costs, as well as the costs of copying (in fact, 
44 Equality of Arms, p. 38.
45 Equality of Arms, p. 39.
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travel costs can only be reimbursed if the attorney participates in a procedural act 
that takes place outside the settlement where he/she lives or where his/her oﬃce is 
seated). The amount to be reimbursed is established by the court (or the authority 
conducting the actual phase of the procedure: the investigating authority or the 
prosecutor) based on a detailed statement submitted by the attorney. If the attorney 
fails to submit such a detailed account and the documentation substantiating the 
costs, the court establishes the amount of reimbursement on the basis of the available 
data.
With regard to the fees, the most sensitive issue is of course the amount of the 
hourly fee. In terms of the regulation in eﬀect,46 the hourly fee is HUF 3,000 (EUR 
12), with the exception of consultation with a detained defendant for which the 
counsel receives half of this amount per hour. If he/she requests, the defense counsel 
shall be paid the hourly appointment fee for every 100 pages of case documentation 
studied, however, the total amount paid for this activity may not exceed the fees 
payable for 30 hours.
According to the attorneys, this amount (which is way below the level of 
market prices) is the main reason why in the investigation phase (when the defense 
counsel’s presence is not mandatory) the majority of counsels fails to perform their 
tasks, although – due to the characteristics of the Hungarian criminal procedure – the 
investigation is of key importance from the point of view of the eventual establishment 
of criminal liability, and the omissions committed during the investigation are very 
diﬃcult to remedy in the subsequent phases.
In a 2005 article, dr. János Bánáti, President of the Hungarian Bar Association 
stated the view that at least a fee of HUF 5,000 (EUR 20) per hour would be necessary 
to make sure that taking ex oﬃcio appointment cases would be worth for a lawyer.47 
In the same article, dr. Bánáti listed other factors that hinder the contact between the 
lawyer and the client. One of these is the fact that the penitentiary institutions where 
the defendants are detained are sometimes 100 kilometers away from the place where 
the procedure is conducted and where the counsel’s oﬃce is located. Since in some 
penitentiaries there is only one room for consultation between the lawyers and their 
clients, it may happen that the counsel traveling substantial distances and waiting for 
46 Act CXXVII of 2006 on the 2007 Budget of the Republic of Hungary, Art. 58 Par. (4) 
47 János Bánáti: Szabadságkorlátozások (Forms of detention) In: Fundamentum – issue 2005/2 (hereafter: 
Bánáti), p. 51.
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hours will have to leave without being able to talk to his/her client. Furthermore, in 
Hungary, at the moment, it is not possible for the counsel to initiate a telephone call 
into the penitentiary to be able to consult the defendant this way.48 
We are, however, of the opinion that besides the low fees and the undeniable 
infrastructural deﬁciencies, the incoherence and scattered nature of the functions and 
responsibilities related to the running of the system (which are also acknowledged 
by the president of the Hungarian Bar Association) play a role in the dysfunctional 
operation of the Hungarian ex oﬃcio appointment system.
In order to provide indigent defendants with eﬃcient defense, four functions 
need to be performed eﬃciently: 1) the appointment of defense counsels in cases 
when defense is mandatory or otherwise necessary (management function); 2) the 
monitoring of the performance of ex oﬃcio appointed counsels (individual quality 
assurance); 3) the monitoring and evaluation of the system as a whole (general quality 
assurance), 4) the planning and implementation of the system’s budget (budgetary 
function). The performance of these functions can only be truly satisfactory if either 
the same entity is responsible for all of them, or they are distributed between entities 
which are interested in its smooth operation. 
Below we wish to examine what problems arise in connection with the 
performance of each function, with special focus on the actual practice of the 
management function.
1.3.1. The management function
From the point of view of both the individual defendant and the system as a whole, 
the management function is of crucial importance. The appointment of the defense 
counsel, or in other words, the selection of the individual attorney who will provide 
defense, is the most important function within the system: it is both the basis and 
the purpose of all the other functions.
Under Article 35 of Act XIX of 1998 on Attorneys (Attorneys Act), the 
bar association keeps a register of those attorneys who can be appointed as defense 
counsels. “The Attorneys Act [...] does not contain guidelines as to how the register 
should be put together, it simply obliges the bars to create a register that ensures 
48 Bánáti, pp. 50–51.
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the undisturbed course of the criminal proceeding. The bars use this ‘freedom’, and 
apply diﬀerent methods in compiling the register. The most frequently used method 
is that all members of the given bar association are included in the list. Some bars 
mark in the list those who expressly ask to be appointed by the authorities. In larger 
bar associations and in the county seats – where the number of lawyers is relatively 
high – it is possible to compile the list of protector attorneys and ex oﬃcio appointed 
counsels on the basis of voluntary enrolment.”49 
However, in terms of the CCP,50 from this register, the actual attorney is selected 
by the authority conducting the actual phase of the procedure (the investigating 
authority, the prosecutor or the court). This means that in the investigation phase, 
the defense counsel is selected by the investigating authority, i.e. an entity which 
– due to its procedural role – is not interested in eﬃcient defense work. For the 
investigator it is undoubtedly easier to deal with a defense counsel who is not too 
agile, who does not bombard him/her with questions, remarks and motions, or may 
not even show up. If we put aside the traditions of the Hungarian penal system for a 
moment, and try to look at the situation with a fresh insight, it is in fact absolutely 
incomprehensible why it is the “prosecution” that picks the “defense.”
The research results presented under Section 1.2.2. clearly show that this 
structural problem has far reaching practical consequences. And this is not only the 
defendants’ opinion: the experiences of other participants of the criminal procedure 
support the statement. In his comments to the report summarizing the results of 
the HHC’s 2003 questionnaire-based survey, dr. István Lakatos, the Head of the 
Penitentiary and Rights Protection Unit of the Tolna County Chief Prosecutor’s 
Oﬃce, wrote the following: “The mentioned problems of establishing contacts with 
the ex oﬃcio appointed defense counsel make the exercise of the right to defense 
according to the experiences of penitentiary supervision prosecutors. In this regard 
neither the new CCP nor the amended legal framework has brought along positive 
changes. Remand prisoners often ask to be heard by the prosecutor, because they 
49 Bánáti, p. 52. The solutions applied by the bars are sometimes criticized. In the Closing Conference of the 
Model Legal Aid Board Program (held on 30 November–1 December 2006), one of the participating attorneys 
claimed that by making it possible for some attorneys to “buy themselves out” from the list, it places a great 
burden on those who choose to be included, as due to the great number of appointments, they are not able 
to appear at all procedural acts in all cases. On the same occasion, dr. Árpád Erdei, university professor and 
constitutional judge pointed out that the possibility for opting out is to be welcome, since if lawyers not 
specialized in criminal law provide defense, that will deﬁnitely be a mere formality.
50 CCP, Art. 48 Par. (1)
H u n g a r i a n  H e l s i n k i  C o m m i t t e e      W i t h o u t  D e f e n s e
22
believe that the prosecutor will be able to help them to establish contacts with the 
counsel, or often simply to be provided with information on their procedural rights 
and the way to assert them, although the provision of this information would be the 
task of the defense counsel. We often have to phone the ex oﬃcio appointed counsels 
to make sure that they visit their clients in the jail or in the penitentiary institution.
The investigating authority may make sure that no defense counsel is present 
at the ﬁrst interrogation not only by appointing a passive attorney, but also by 
manipulating the time of notifying the counsel.
As it was outlined above, the CCP contains some provisions aimed at 
guaranteeing that the ex oﬃcio appointed defense counsel be present at the ﬁrst 
interrogation, however, in the practice, these are not always implemented properly. 
The defendant has to be informed of his/her right to choose or to request the 
appointment of a defense counsel. If the participation of the defense counsel is 
mandatory in the procedure, and the defendant declares that he/she does not wish to 
retain a defense counsel, the prosecutor or the investigating authority will appoint a 
defense counsel immediately. In practice these warnings are communicated after the 
interrogation has been started, and it is not prescribed that the interrogation shall 
be suspended until the immediately appointed counsel arrives. One of the remand 
prisoners interviewed in the HHC’s 2003 questionnaire-based survey said that when 
after the warning he had expressed his wish to call his lawyer, the detective told him 
that they were not obliged to guarantee that the counsel be present, and that after the 
interrogation he could call the lawyer.51
With regard to defendants in an especially vulnerable position, the CCP 
contains some additional safeguards, when it sets out that if defense is mandatory 
because the defendant is detained, the defense counsel has to be appointed before 
his ﬁrst interrogation at the latest. This provision is obviously aimed at making sure 
that the defense counsel has a fair chance to appear at the interrogation. However, 
the survey showed that the investigating authority often notiﬁes the defense counsel 
at a time, which formally meets the legal requirement (i.e. precedes the beginning 
of the interrogation), but practically makes it impossible for the lawyer to make it. 
A surprising evidence that this practice does exist and that prosecutors (who are 
vested with the task of supervising the lawfulness of investigations) do not ﬁnd it 
51 Presumption of Guilt, p. 126.
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problematic was provided by the comments dr. László Hegedűs, prosecutor of the 
Vas County Chief Prosecutor’s Oﬃce made concerning the report summarizing the 
results of the HHC’s 2003 questionnaire-based survey.
Although the interviewees’ names were not displayed in the report, one 
of the Vas county defendants who claimed to have been psychologically pressured 
by the investigators, could be identiﬁed from the circumstances of the case. The 
HHC received an indignant letter from the Vas County Chief Prosecutor’s Oﬃce, 
in which the author criticized the HHC for discrediting oﬃcials based on one-sided 
accounts which had not been properly checked. In order to refute the accusation of 
psychological pressure, dr. László Hegedűs gave a detailed description of how the 
police conducted the investigation in the particular case. His account of the events ran 
as follows: the defendant (let us call him B) was arrested at 6.40 p.m. on 5 February, 
“a defense counsel was appointed for him, who was notiﬁed at 00.10 a.m. on 6 
February that B. would be interrogated on the same day. The investigating authority 
interrogated B at 00.23 a.m. on 6 February. B refused to testify. The interrogation 
ended at 01.18 a.m., the defense counsel did not participate in the procedural act.” 
The prosecutor’s account of the events actually seems to support the 
defendant’s claims of psychological pressure. B was arrested at 18.40 p.m., at a time 
when – if notiﬁed right away – there still would have been a real chance for the 
appointed defense counsel to attend the interrogation (even if that was scheduled 
for late at night). However, it seems from the prosecutor’s letter that the counsel was 
notiﬁed about the late night interrogation on an absurdly short notice: less than 15 
minutes before the beginning.
This manner of handling the case constitutes a severe breach of the right 
to defense, although it formally meets the legal requirements (as the appointment 
and notiﬁcation of the counsel took place before the start of the interrogation). 
Obviously it is possible that the success of the interrogation requires the immediate 
interrogation of the defendant, and therefore the investigating authority cannot aﬀord 
to allow the defense counsel to arrive to the premises; however, in this particular case 
this could not be the reason, since more than 5 hours passed between B’s arrest and 
his interrogation. In terms of Article 179 of the CCP, the detained defendant shall 
be interrogated within 24 hours from the beginning of the detention, which means 
that the investigators would have had almost 18 hours to interrogate B. If they had 
scheduled the interrogation for the morning of 6 February, or notiﬁed the appointed 
counsel shortly after the arrest, the attorney would have had a chance to take part 
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in the procedural act, in which case the suspicion of psychological pressure may not 
have been raised at all.
The results of the NPH survey also show that there are regions where the 
timing of notiﬁcations leaves much room for improvement. “In so-called urgent 
cases, when for instance the perpetrator is taken to the police station after being 
caught red-handed, 16 out of the 23 regional investigation departments leave at least 
an hour between the appointment and notiﬁcation of the counsel and the beginning 
of the interrogation. In the case of 11 units this time may be up to many hours 
– depending on the distance between the police station and the lawyer’s oﬃce as 
well as the time of the day. All units follow the same practice in the sense that they 
notify the defense counsel via fax or phone and if the counsel indicated that he/she 
wishes to attend the interrogation, its commencement is scheduled ﬂexibly so that 
the counsel have time to arrive. Only Somogy County reported that the average 
time passing between notiﬁcations and the beginning of interrogation is 30 minutes, 
which – taking into account the size and structure of the county – may not always be 
suﬃcient for the lawyer to attend. The Tolna County Police Headquarters reported 
that in the period examined it had happened in Dombóvár on one occasion that the 
counsel was notiﬁed right before the beginning of the interrogation, which obviously 
excludes the possibility of attending the hearing.”52 
At a professional meeting, dr. Ágnes Frech, Head of the Criminal Board of 
the Metropolitan Court, expressed her opinion that in such cases (i.e. when the time 
between the notiﬁcation of the counsel and the interrogation is not long enough), the 
testimony made at the interrogation shall not be taken into consideration as lawful 
evidence, since such evidence is obtained by the investigating authority by severely 
restricting the defendant’s procedural rights, which constitutes a breach of Article 
78 Paragraph (4) of the CCP. She also added that if there was an adequate feedback 
between the judicial decisions and the practice of the investigating authority, the 
lawful action of the latter could be enforced. This feedback could be provided by the 
prosecutor, but as the above case from Vas County illustrates, prosecutorial control 
is not always a guarantee for lawful action.
The new Article 179 Paragraph (4) of the CCP may play an important role 
in raising the authorities’ awareness concerning the unlawfulness of only formally 
meeting the conditions of ex oﬃcio appointment. This provision claims that the 
52 Equality of Arms, p. 35.
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investigating authority shall schedule the time of the interrogation in a way that 
enables the defendant to exercise his/her right to defense. 
The above examples show that the appointment practice of investigating 
authorities is far from unproblematic, and in most cases it does not enhance the full 
implementation of the right to defense. Due to the procedural tasks and the obvious 
interests of the investigating authorities this cannot be realistically expected either.
The situation stems from a structural problem, the solution of which requires 
the radical reform of the system. The function of appointment has to be placed with 
another organization in a way that the investigating authority only indicates the 
need for a lawyer, and the actual appointment (selection and notiﬁcation) of the 
defense counsel is performed by an entity that is not interested in the outcome of the 
procedure in any way. 
1.3.2. Individual and general quality assurance
By individual quality assurance we mean the examination of a particular defense 
counsel’s performance in a particular case. The main problem in this regard is that 
while in the case of a retained lawyer the client exercises control over the attorney’s 
performance (if he/she is not satisﬁed, he/she can terminate the retainer and retain 
someone else), such a direct control mechanism does not exist in the case of ex oﬃcio 
appointment. A special tripartite relationship is established, in which the lawyer’s fee 
is not paid by the client, whereas the entity that pays the counsel’s work does not 
have an insight into and – due to the principle of the attorneys’ independence – may 
not have an inﬂuence on the lawyer’s work.
Individual quality assurance should be performed by the bar associations, in 
an indirect manner, through their disciplinary tasks. It is primarily the bar association’s 
right and duty to call its members to account for not abiding by professional rules set 
by the laws and the professional code of ethics.53
According to the CCP, the defense counsel shall be obliged to contact the 
defendant without delay,54 while Section 8/4 of the Code of Conduct prescribes 
that following the receipt of the appointing decision, the counsel shall immediately 
53 Attorneys Act, Art. 37
54 CCP, Art. 50 Par. (1) (a)
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report to the appointing authority, request information about the case and contact 
the client in pre-trial detention personally.55 But, as noted above, most appointed 
counsels often fail to abide by this obligation. However, disciplinary proceedings are 
very rarely initiated on this account, which – again – has structural reasons. 
In the investigative phase, the investigating authority and the defendant are 
primarily in the position to judge the performance of the counsel. Neither the one 
nor the other can realistically be expected to ﬁle a complaint with the bar association. 
The former is not really interested in eﬀective defense work, whereas the latter is in a 
very vulnerable situation (especially when detained). 
Those defendants who cannot aﬀord to retain a lawyer usually come from 
indigent, uneducated segments of society, with a limited capacity to assert their 
interests. Furthermore, they do not have a guaranteed right to request the appointment 
of a new defense counsel. According to the Attorneys Act, the authority may (but 
is not obliged to) withdraw the appointment if the defendant makes the request on 
reasonable grounds.56 The CCP practically repeats this provision when it prescribes: 
“there is no remedy against the appointment of the defense counsel, but the defendant 
may – in a reasoned motion – request the appointment of another defense counsel. 
The request is decided upon by the court or prosecutor or investigating authority 
before which the procedure is in progress.”57 Thus, it may happen that the defendant 
requests a new defense counsel, the authority rejects the request, and the defendant 
is forced to continue the procedure with a counsel against whom he/she has ﬁled a 
complaint. It is not surprising that practically no defendants risk this possibility. 
Due to these circumstances, eﬀective individual quality assurance is lacking 
from the Hungarian system, although – as it was shown in Section 1.1. – this may 
have detrimental ﬁnancial eﬀects on the Hungarian state if someone ﬁles a complaint 
with the ECHR in connection with the negligence of his/her ex oﬃcio appointed 
defense counsel.
General quality assurance means the constant monitoring of the system, 
the systemic collection and analysis of data regarding its operation, and the regular 
assessment of its functioning. Although this function could make it possible to assess 
55 Regulation 8/1999 (III.22.) of the Hungarian Bar Association on the Ethical Rules and Principles of the Legal 
Profession
56 Attorneys Act, Art. 34 Par. (3)
57 CCP, Art.§ 48 Par (5)
T h e  S t r u c t u r a l  D e f i c i e n c i e s  o f  t h e  H u n g a r i a n  E x  O f f i c i o  A p p o i n t e d  D e f e n s e  C o u n s e l  S y s t e m
27
whether the ex oﬃcio appointment system fulﬁlls the role it is supposed to (i.e. to 
guarantee the right to fair trial and defense to those defendants who are vulnerable 
for some reason), there is no entity in Hungary that would perform this function. 
Neither the bar associations, nor the Ministry of Justice, nor the National Justice 
Council have coherent data about the number, ratio and results of cases taken by ex 
oﬃcio appointed defense counsels. Neither of the above entities have commissioned 
surveys aimed at the examination of the system’s eﬃciency, and neither operate 
institutionalized mechanisms to monitor and assess the system’s functioning. 
The coming into force of the framework decision outlined under Section 1.1. 
will make a reform of this function inevitable. As it was mentioned, the framework 
decision obliged the member states to collect information (including statistical data) 
making it possible to monitor and evaluate the criminal legal aid system.
1.3.3. Budgetary function
No consistent structure exists with regard to functions related to the budget of the ex 
oﬃcio appointment system either. As it was mentioned above, the Minister of Justice 
determines the detailed rules on the fees, while the law on the annual budget sets fee 
levels. Those organs which decide on the system’s budget lack the tools to monitor the 
quality of the service they pay for, while the entity which performs the most functions 
related to the operation of the system (the bar association) has only a limited say with 
regard to budgetary issues.58 In addition, diﬀerent organizations make the actual 
payments to each procedural phase, therefore there are no aggregated annual data 
on the amounts paid on fees and expenses of ex oﬃcio appointed defense counsels 
in the whole criminal system (including the investigation, the prosecutorial and the 
judicial phase). In addition, in the course of the organization of the Model Legal 
Aid Board Program’s (hereafter: Program) closing conference held on 30 November 
and 1 December 2006 (hereafter: Closing Conference), it also became clear that, 
not even the individual organizations playing a role in the criminal procedure keep 
a transparent and updated record regarding the payments they make to ex oﬃcio 
58 The President of the Hungarian Bar Association is a member of the National Justice Council, which prepares 
and submits to the Government the draft budget of the judicial chapter (this budgetary chapter contains the 
bulk of the money to be spent on legal aid).
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appointed defense counsels, and the breaking down of costs to fees and reimbursing 
expenses (travel, copying, and so on) are close to impossible. 
As dr. János Bánáti pointed out at the Closing Conference, even if these 
costs were known, it would be insuﬃcient in itself, since the State only pays the costs 
of indigent (and acquitted) defendants, in all other cases the defendant is obliged 
to pay back the advanced fees and costs as part of the criminal costs. No separate 
information is available of what percentage of the costs advanced this way is paid 
back, so the actual total budget of the system is impossible to estimate and plan.
Furthermore, the acting participants of the system sometimes arbitrarily 
overrule the budgetary provisions formulated by those organs, which are – from 
the point of view of the criminal procedure – outsiders but are vested with the 
task of determining the ﬁnancial framework of the system. For instance, based 
on an agreement between the Budapest Bar Association and the Budapest Police 
Headquarters, ex oﬃcio appointed counsels receive more than HUF 3,000 per hour, 
because when ﬁlling out the payment form, the police oﬃcers automatically add a 
30% lump sum for expenses. Hence, the hourly fee of appointed defense counsels is 
actually HUF 3,900 (plus VAT), even if the counsel had no expenses in the particular 
case. A lump sum for the expenses is a ﬂexible solution, which is advantageous for 
the attorneys, however, it is not fully in line with Decree 7/2002. (III.30.) of the 
Ministry of Justice, which (as it was outlined above) prescribes that the lawyer shall 
submit a detailed statement on his/her expenses, and the authority shall establish the 
reimbursable expenses on the basis of this statement. The only exception allowed 
by the Decree is that if the attorney fails to submit such a detailed account and 
the documentation substantiating the costs, the authority establishes the amount of 
reimbursement on the basis of the available data.
This provision means a legal gap through which the lump sum solution can 
be “smuggled” into the system, however it is obvious that the fundamental idea is to 
reimburse expenses on the basis of a detailed statement. Despite this fact, the practice 
based on an agreement of two actors of the system (the bar and the police) prevails 
over the provisions of the Decree and functions relatively smoothly.
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2. A Brief Description of the 
 Model Legal Aid Board Program
The experiences concerning the Hungarian ex oﬃcio appointment system show that 
its fundamental purpose (i.e. the provision of eﬀective defense in cases when it is 
deemed important in the interest of justice and/or due to special circumstances of 
the defendant) is not fulﬁlled in most cases. And if a dysfunction becomes “normal” 
practice, it means that the problems are of a systemic nature, and not caused by 
individual negligence.
This realization led the HHC to launch its Model Legal Aid Board Program 
with the ﬁnancial support of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs and the 
European Commission in cooperation with the Netherlands Helsinki Committee. 
The aim of the Program is to design and test a model, which – in the long run – could 
replace the ex oﬃcio appointment system and eliminate its systemic shortcomings.
2.1 Cooperation between the police and HHC 
The Program was based on the Agreement of Cooperation signed by Major General 
Péter Gergényi on behalf of the Budapest Police Headquarters (BPH) and Ferenc 
Kőszeg on behalf of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee (HHC) on 13 July 
2004. Originally the 6–7th District Police Headquarters, the 8th District Police 
Headquarters and the Department of Inquiry of the BPH took part in the Program, 
however, later it became necessary to extend the scope of the Program to the 13th 
District Police Headquarters and the Department of Investigation of the BPH (more 
details below). 
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The basic concept of the Program was that within a certain period (until the 
number of the cases taken up into the Program reaches 120) in each case when in 
terms of the CCP defense would be otherwise mandatory and the defendant does 
not retain a attorney, police organs participating in the Program shall inform the 
defendant about the Program, hand over written information about the Program, 
and ask the defendant whether he/she wishes to be provided with a free defense 
counsel by the HHC. 
If the defendant wishes to participate in the Program and consents to the 
forwarding of his/her personal data to the round-the-clock dispatcher service set up 
by the HHC, the investigator shall fax a notiﬁcation to the service, which – based on 
a pre-set duty schedule – sends an attorney contracted with the HHC to the police 
premises. The fax shall contain information about the following: against whom 
and for what criminal oﬀense the criminal procedure was launched, and at which 
member of the police organ’s staﬀ the Attorney shall present him/herself. In the fax 
statement it shall also be indicated if the defendant is juvenile, blind, deaf, mute, 
mentally disabled, or does not speak Hungarian. Furthermore, the fax shall indicate 
what language the defendant speaks or if sign-language interpretation is needed. In 
the fax the police organ shall also indicate the time of the DS’s notiﬁcation and the 
scheduled time of the interrogation. 
Upon arrival to the police, the attorney helps the defendant to ﬁll out the 
means test, and if the defendant meets the indigence criteria set up by the Program, 
the attorney takes up the defendant’s case. From the point of view of criminal proce-
dural law, being involved in the Program means that the defendant formally retains 
the HHC’s lawyer, who therefore oﬃcially qualiﬁes as a retained and not as an ex 
oﬃcio appointed lawyer. The specialty of the retainer given by the defendant is that 
the lawyer’s fee is paid by the HHC and not the client, in return for which the client 
(the defendant) exempts the counsel from his/her obligation of conﬁdentiality vis a 
vis the HHC and the board monitoring the work of the attorneys (hereafter: Board). 
The notiﬁcation of the dispatcher service, the arrival of the attorney, the 
ﬁlling out of the means test and other documents (retainer, power of attorney, the 
defendant’s application to the HHC) undoubtedly take up a lot of time. In order 
to spare the investigating authority from not being able to abide by its obligations 
stemming from the CCP (e.g. the obligation to appoint a defense counsel in due 
time), the lawyers participating in the Program undertook that if the defendant turns 
out to be not indigent or refuses to participate in the Program the investigating 
authority can appoint them on the premises to be ex oﬃcio defense counsels.
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The above described scheme (the so-called “urgent notiﬁcation”) was applied 
in cases when the defendant was at the police station (in most cases because he/she 
was detained) and the investigator was preparing to hold the ﬁrst interrogation 
within a short period of time. In terms of the Agreement of Cooperation, in such 
cases the notiﬁcation had to be performed immediately but at least three hours 
before the commencement of the interrogation, whereas the dispatcher service was 
obliged to inform the investigator within 45 minutes about which attorney was sent 
to the premises. If the dispatcher service informed the police that it could not ﬁnd 
an available attorney (this happened in only four cases during the ﬁve months of 
the Program), the investigator appointed a defense counsel in accordance with the 
general rules of ex oﬃcio appointment.
Under the Agreement of Cooperation, there were only two cases in 
which the investigator was allowed to forbear from notifying the dispatcher service: if 
the inmate said that he/she did not wish to Participate in the Program (and therefore 
gave no permission for the forwarding of his/her data), and if immediate interroga-
tion was necessary for of the success of the criminal procedure. In such cases the 
oﬃcer was obliged to appoint an ex oﬃcio attorney in accordance with the general 
rules, but also to inform the dispatcher service – within 24 hours – about the 
interrogation and the reason for the omission of preliminary notiﬁcation (“Information 
about the omission of notiﬁcation” – hereafter: subsequent notice). 
Furthermore, by providing the defendant with the Program’s information 
leaﬂet, the police was obliged to inform the defendant that if he/she is indigent, 
he/she has the possibility to apply for admission into the Program. (Obviously this 
was so only with regard to cases when the urgency of the interrogation was the reason 
for not notifying the dispatcher service.) 
A second type of cases was when the defendant was not detained, so 
the police issued a summoning order for the purpose of carrying out the ﬁrst 
interrogation of the defendant. If – according to information at the Police’s disposal 
– the appointment of an ex oﬃcio defense counsel was likely to be mandatory based 
on another reason (e.g. from the already available data, the investigator knew that 
the person to be summoned was juvenile or a foreigner), the police organ – when 
posting the summons – had to notify the dispatcher service – without disclosing the 
name or any other personal data of the defendant – about the scheduled time of the 
procedural action and about which member of the police organ’s staﬀ the attorney 
shall present him/herself at (“preliminary notiﬁcation”). 
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The dispatcher service then informed the police organ about which attorney 
of the Program would appear at the interrogation. If in such cases in the period 
between the notiﬁcation of the dispatcher service and the procedural act the police 
were informed that the defendant had retained an attorney, the police had to inform 
the dispatcher service that the attorney provided in the framework of the Program 
does not have to appear at the procedural act. If the scheduled time of the procedural 
act changed for any reason, the police organ also had the obligation to notify the 
dispatcher service in due time.
In the case of preliminary notiﬁcations the same rule applied: if the attorney 
sent by the HHC appears at the procedural act but the retainer is not signed (e.g. 
because the defendant does not meet the criteria of indigence), the police organ may 
ex oﬃcio appoint the attorney, which the attorney must accept. 
In theory there was a third possibility, namely that a circumstance making 
defense mandatory emerges only after the ﬁrst interrogation (e.g. the pre-trial 
detention of the defendant is ordered only later in the procedure). In such cases 
the police was supposed to appoint an ex oﬃcio attorney in accordance with the 
general rules but also to notify the dispatcher service – within 24 hours – about 
the interrogation (“Information about the omission of notiﬁcation”). Furthermore, 
by providing the defendant with the Program’s information leaﬂet, the Police was 
supposed to inform the defendant that if he/she is indigent, he/she has the possibility 
to apply for admission into the Program. There was no example of this third type of 
notiﬁcation throughout the project. 
2.2. Cooperation between the HHC and the attorneys
The attorneys participating in the Program (originally 43 of them) were selected 
through a tender. In the Framework Agreement of Cooperation concluded with the 
HHC, the attorneys undertook to be on duty on previously set days of the week 
(duty day) so that, based on a notiﬁcation from the dispatcher service run by the 
HHC, they would be able to immediately proceed to the police premises designated 
by the dispatcher service, assess the indigence of the defendant, inform him/her 
about the details of the program, conclude a retainer with indigent defendants and 
provide them with defense (formally as retained counsels). They also undertook the 
obligation that if the defendant is not indigent, they will act as ex oﬃcio appointed 
counsels, in the event that the case oﬃcer chooses to appoint them on the premises.
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Since one of the main objectives of the Program was to model how the 
performance of defense counsels may be monitored by a professional body for 
the purposes of quality assurance, the attorneys participating in the Program also 
undertook to submit on a case-by-case basis monthly reports to the Program’s Board 
consisting of representatives of the Budapest Bar Association, The Ministry of Justice, 
the HHC, university professors and acknowledged practicing attorneys. 
Attorneys are obliged to attach to the report the copies of those minutes 
and other important case documents that are necessary for the monitoring of 
Attorney’s performance. Furthermore, Attorney shall indicate how many hours 
he/she spent on the cases (e.g. consultation with defendant, writing petitions, etc.). 
As it was mentioned above, one of the conditions of a defendant’s participation in 
the Program was that he/she had to exempt the defense counsel from the obligation 
of conﬁdentiality vis a vis HHC personnel and the Board. 
Furthermore, attorneys shall also attach invoices verifying expenses that 
emerged in connection with the cases. They also undertook to visit their detained 
clients as often as necessary but at least once per month. 
Based on the attorney’s report and the attached documents, the Board 
decides whether to allow the payment of the fees and the reimbursement of the costs 
as requested by the lawyer. Taking into consideration the additional tasks undertaken 
by the attorneys, the Board raised the hourly fee from HUF 5,000 (EUR 20) to 
HUF 7,500 (EUR 30). The maximum amount payable for one case is HUF 200,000 
(EUR 800). Under exceptional circumstances – taking into account the complexity 
of the particular case – the Board may increase this limit. 
Among the activities that can be paid in the Program, there are some which 
are not payable under the rules pertaining to ex oﬃcio defense counsels (e.g. the 
preparation of petitions, travel during the night, preparation for a trial and so on), 
at the same time however, with regard to certain activities the Board maximized the 
number of payable hours: for example, no more than one hour can be requested 
for waiting before a procedural act. The Board qualiﬁed postal and copying costs as 
well as the costs of travel outside the seat of the lawyer’s oﬃce as acceptable, with 
the addition that under exceptional circumstances, and on the basis of a justiﬁed 
request, the Board may on an individual basis allow divergence from the general 
rules pertaining to fees and costs. The HHC undertook to provide an interpreter to 
make consultation between the lawyers and foreign defendants possible, so no costs 
emerged on the attorneys’ side in this regard.
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Originally the retainer of the attorneys participating in the Program was 
valid for the ﬁrst instance procedure (and to advice on potential appeal against the 
ﬁrst instance decision), because it was not sure that the ﬁnancial and temporal limits 
of the Program will allow that defense be provided until the second instance decision 
in all cases. Later, upon the explicit request of the attorneys, the HHC modiﬁed the 
conditions: attorneys can carry on with the cases until the span of the program which 
ends in June 2007.
 
 
2.3. The relation between the HHC and the defendants
As it was outlined above, there is a special, tripartite relationship between the HHC, 
the defense counsel and the defendant, which serves to model the connection 
between the defendant, the ex oﬃcio defense counsel and the state organs providing 
the remuneration of the counsel.
Although – as it was mentioned – the Hungarian ex oﬃcio appointment 
system is not based on indigence, the Program made the provision of defense 
conditional upon this factor, which has many reasons. The HHC is of the view that 
the indigence threshold of personal exemption of costs in criminal procedures is 
low, and therefore – among other things – the Program was aimed at mapping up 
where the ﬁnancial limit beyond which the defendants (or their families) can aﬀord 
to retain a lawyer is, where the threshold which should serve as the basis of personal 
exemption is.
Furthermore – in the light of the relevant international standards – it seemed 
reasonable that only those should be provided with the advantage of completely free 
and professionally controlled defense who could not aﬀord to retain a lawyer anyway. 
To make sure that special individual circumstances can be taken into account, the 
attorneys had the possibility to request a permission from the Board to take up the 
case of defendants who did not meet the Program’s indigence criteria provided that 
there was some special circumstance that seemed to make this necessary. 
The limit was HUF 50,000 (EUR 200) per person per household (this 
was the oﬃcial poverty line for 2003) and assets not exceeding the worth of HUF 
300,000 (EUR 1,200).
At the same time, due to the fact that the Program also serves to prepare 
a potential reform of the ex oﬃcio appointment system, the HHC also took into 
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account the Hungarian provisions on mandatory defense. Therefore, we applied 
a rule that if a defendant is admitted to the Program during the time of the 
72-hour detention,59 but his/her pre-trial detention60 is not ordered by the court 
(and detention is the only reason for mandatory defense in his/her case), the attorney 
should terminate the retainer and dismiss the defendant from the program (as with 
the termination of the detention, defense is not mandatory any more). This rule was, 
however, applied in a ﬂexible manner.
As it was outlined above, the attorneys assessed the defendant’s ﬁnancial 
situation before the ﬁrst interrogation, and based on this assessment they decided 
whether to admit the defendant into the Program or not. If the decision was positive, 
they concluded a retainer, parallel to which the defendant also signed an application 
addressed to the HHC. This application conﬁrmed that the defendant exempted 
the attorney from his/her obligation of conﬁdentiality, but it also contained the 
acknowledgment that if it is proven that the defendant had made a false declaration on 
his/her ﬁnancial situation, the HHC would reclaim the attorney’s fee and reimbursed 
expenses that emerged during the criminal procedure. So far this provision has not 
been applied in the program.
59 The longest deprivation of liberty possible without a judicial decision. It may be ordered by the investigating 
authority or the prosecutor upon a reasonable suspicion that the defendant has committed a criminal oﬀense 
subject to imprisonment, provided that a probable cause exists to believe that the defendant’s pre-trial deten-
tion will be ordered.
60 In the case of an oﬀense punishable with imprisonment the defendant may be subjected to pre-trial detention 
if (i) he/she has escaped or hidden from the court, the prosecutor or the investigative authority; he/she has 
attempted to escape, or during the procedure another criminal procedure is launched against him/her for an 
oﬀense punishable with imprisonment; (ii) taking into account the risk of his/her escape or hiding, or for any 
other reason, there are well-founded grounds to presume that his/her presence at the procedures may not be 
secured otherwise; (iii) there are well-founded grounds to presume that if not taken into pre-trial detention, 
he/she would – through inﬂuencing or intimidating the witnesses, eliminating, forging or hiding material 
evidence or documents – frustrate, hinder or threaten the procedure; (iv) there are well-founded grounds to 
presume that if not taken into pre-trial detention, he/she would accomplish the attempted or prepared oﬀense 
or would commit another oﬀense punishable with imprisonment. Pre-trial detention is ordered by a judge 
upon the motion of the prosecutor. Its longest possible term is three years, and needs to be prolonged and 
reviewed at intervals deﬁned by the law.
H u n g a r i a n  H e l s i n k i  C o m m i t t e e      W i t h o u t  D e f e n s e
36
2.4. Procedural elements to be modeled by the Program
To summarize, the Program strived to examine the possible solutions for the structural 
problems outlined in Section 1. in the following ways.
By setting up and operating the dispatcher service, the HHC wished to 
examine how, with what degree of eﬃciency and for what costs it would be possible 
to establish a system in which the investigating authority only indicates the necessity 
of appointment, but the selection and notiﬁcation of the lawyer is performed by 
another organ.
 The program also wished to test how the eﬃciency of the defense is impacted 
if it is guaranteed that the defense counsel is present at all procedural acts where this 
is allowed by the CCP.
With regard to the quality of defense work we also wished to see how a 
professional board may monitor the activity of individual lawyers, under what 
conditions and within what framework can such a body perform a kind of quality 
assurance function, and whether such professional monitoring is acceptable for the 
lawyers participating in the Program.
In connection with the fees of counsels we attempted to assess what 
remuneration can be regarded as fair, how much on average a criminal case costs with 
such a remuneration, what costs need to be taken into consideration, and whether 
the system of hourly fees can be maintained even if instead of the authorities in 
charge of the criminal procedure, a central authority makes the payments. 
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3. The Program’s Practical Operation
3.1. Cooperation with the police
The objective of the Program is to create a model that promotes the equality of 
opportunities in the ﬁeld of criminal law and is capable of eliminating the systemic 
shortcomings of the ex oﬃcio appointment system. When we were considering the 
possible methods of taking up cases, one of the options was to call on ex oﬃcio 
appointed lawyers to join the Program and conclude an agreement with them that 
they would continue the cases they started as ex oﬃcio appointed lawyers as retained 
lawyers in the framework of the Program for more generous remuneration. This 
however could not have served as a real model, since the cases would have been taken 
into the Program on a rather arbitrary basis (it could have been quite accidental 
whether a certain lawyer is informed about this possibility or not), and almost all 
the cases would have been included in the Program only after the ﬁrst interrogation, 
which is often of crucial importance. This is why (in spite of all the foreseeable 
diﬃculties) we decided to attempt to include all the mandatory defense cases which 
are commenced within a particular time period by particular police organs. This 
could have guaranteed a close to representative sample if in all (or almost all) the 
mandatory defense cases initiated by the police organs participating in the Program 
the HHC’s attorneys had provided defense. 
In the preparation phase of the Program – back in 2003 – we requested 
information about the annual number of ex oﬃcio appointment by certain Budapest 
police organs. We were informed by the police that in 2002 the aggregate number 
of such appointments by three organs (the 6–7th District Police Headquarters, the 
8th District Police Headquarters and the Department of Inquiry of the BPH) was 
905, which on average means 75 appointments per month. We thought that if these 
three police organs participate in the Program, 120 cases could be taken within two 
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months. However, to be on the safe side, in the grant application submitted to the 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs we requested an amount that would enable us to 
operate the round-the-clock dispatcher service for three months.
In his letter of 10 March 2003, Commander of the National Police 
Headquarters, dr. László Salgó gave his permission to the Program, based on which 
the HHC started discussions with the oﬃcials of the BPH. The draft of the agreement 
of cooperation was also commented on by the Chief Public Prosecutor and the 
President of the Budapest Bar Association. Based on the discussion, in October 2003 
the agreement was ready to be signed. The signing however had to be postponed, 
because oﬃcially the HHC was notiﬁed about the success of its grant application 
only in March 2004.
In the meantime there was a change in the leadership of the BPH, so the 
discussions had to be restarted. The new draft proposed by the BPH ran as follows: 
In each case when in terms of point a) of Article 46 of the CCP legal defense is 
mandatory and the defendant does not retain an attorney, Police organs participating 
in the Program shall – if possible – notify the HHC’s dispatcher service within the 
shortest possible time.”  
This provision would have made the BPH’s obligation to notify the HHC 
accidental. The stipulation “if possible” would have made it completely impossible 
to ﬁgure out why or why not the HHC was notiﬁed in a particular case. Since 
this formulation would have made the police’s obligation non-enforceable, we 
suggested further negotiations, and ﬁnally a compromise was reached. We returned 
to the agreement of the previous year with two important diﬀerences. The ﬁrst one 
was that before the investigator notiﬁes the dispatcher service, he/she asks for the 
defendant’s permission. The other amendment authorized the investigator to forbear 
from notifying the dispatcher service “if immediate interrogation is essential for the 
interest of the success of the criminal procedure.”
Since it seemed quite unlikely that a properly informed defendant would 
reject the opportunity to be defended by a free lawyer who is 100 percent sure to 
be present at the interrogation, we thought that a safeguard against abuses may 
only be necessary with regard to the second option, so Point 7 of the agreement of 
cooperation was formulated as follows: “In the event that [...] the dispatcher service 
was not notiﬁed due to the urgency of the interrogation of the detained defendant, 
the police shall appoint an ex oﬃcio attorney in accordance with the general rules. 
In such cases the police shall notify the dispatcher service – within 24 hours – about 
the interrogation. Furthermore, by providing the defendant with the Program’s 
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information leaﬂet, the Police shall inform the defendant that if he/she is indigent, 
he/she has the possibility to apply for admission into the Program.” 
The phase of taking up cases started on 1 September 2004, and after the ﬁrst 
6 weeks it seemed logical to examine whether the cases admitted into the Program 
indeed constitute a representative sample, whether they cover an adequately large 
portion of the procedures launched by the participating police organs, and if not, 
what the possible causes are and how these causes can potentially be eliminated. 
To this end, before the meeting scheduled for 18 October 2004, we requested the 
oﬃcials of the participating police organs to provide us with data on the following: 
on count of what criminal oﬀenses were procedures launched in the period starting 
with 1 September; in how many cases investigators appointed as ex oﬃcio counsels 
attorneys do not participate in the Program; in how many cases did this happen due 
to the fact that the defendant did not wish to take part in the Program.
To our great surprise the answers showed that at the 8th District Police 
Headquarters between 1 September and 18 October altogether 34 defendants 
refused to take part in the Program, thus rejecting free legal aid that could have been 
provided within a very short period of time. In the same period, the personnel of the 
headquarters sent only 19 (urgent or preliminary) notiﬁcations, 4 information sheets 
on the omission of notiﬁcation due to the urgency of the interrogation and 1 due to 
the defendant’s wish not to take part in the Program. In 3 other cases the defendant 
could not be admitted into the program due to other reasons (in one instance for 
example the reason was that the attorney sent to the premises had to ﬁnd out on the 
spot that the defendant had had a retained lawyer for two years).
The large number of defendants refusing participation seemed all the more 
strange because within the same time span nobody at the 6–7th District Police 
Headquarters chose not to take part in the Program (at the same time this police 
organ sent 45 notiﬁcations to the dispatcher service, and only 1 information sheet on 
the omission of notiﬁcation). In the HHC’s view this striking diﬀerence would have 
been diﬃcult to explain with objective factors, as neither the crime structure nor the 
perpetrators’ social background diﬀers signiﬁcantly in the two neighboring districts.
In the framework of the HHC’s Police Jail Monitoring Program, we visited 
the jail of the 8th District Police Headquarters on 27 October. In the course of the 
visit it became clear that the personnel keep a separate record of those defendants who 
are informed about the Program. The book contains the time of the interrogation 
and the defendant’s name. On the top of the sheet, the following could be read: 
“I was informed about the Model Legal Aid Board Program. I wish to take part in it. 
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I consent to the forwarding of my data to the HHC”. The defendant expressed his/
her consent or the lack of it by writing “yes” or “no” into this column, and veriﬁed 
the statement by putting his/her signature into the next one. Upon our request, the 
guards on duty provided us with a copy of the sheets.
From the record it seemed that between 1 September and 26 October, out 
of the 53 defendants, 39 (73%!) said “no,” 13 said “yes,” and in 1 case the “yes” was 
crossed out. Out of those who said no, 14 were still detained at the time of our visit: 
7 of them had been transferred to the Gyorskocsi street Central Holding Facility of 
the BPH, 1 juvenile had been transferred to a reformatory institution, and 2 persons 
to respective penitentiaries. Four of the defendant refusing to participate were still 
at the 8th District Police Headquarters, We talked to them and a few days later we 
managed to talk to two other concerned defendants at the Gyorskocsi street jail. 
All of them claimed that they had not been properly informed about the program. 
As one of them put it: if I had been informed that within one and a half hours the 
HHC’s lawyer would be here and would participate in my interrogation, I deﬁnitely 
would not have said no. Out of the six persons, only one had met his ex oﬃcio 
appointed lawyer (and only at the second interrogation). When four of them asked 
to be included into the Program, with the exception of one person (whose case 
started before 1 September) the Board accepted this request.
Although the agreement of cooperation only stipulated the obligation of 
subsequent information on the omission of notiﬁcation for cases when the dispatcher 
service was not notiﬁed because of the urgency of the interrogation, based on this 
experience we requested the competent oﬃcials of the participating police organs 
to instruct the personnel to provide information also if the reason for the lack of 
urgent notiﬁcation is the unwillingness of the defendant to participate. Furthermore, 
regarding the general problem and certain individual cases, we turned to Péter 
Gergényi, Commander of the BPH and signatory of the agreement of cooperation. 
He had the cases examined but concluded that our complaint was unfounded as 
“the 8th District Police Headquarters’ practice concerning the information of the 
defendants is appropriate, the organ is not at fault in this regard.”
Acknowledging that with regard to some of the individual complaints, the 
BPH’s ﬁndings were indeed acceptable, not all the results of the examination seemed 
convincing to the HHC. 
For example, one of the interviewed defendants (T. R.) said after we had 
showed him the police register that he indeed remembered having signed something 
in this booklet at the time of his interrogation, but as far as he recalled he had had 
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to make a statement about whether he was willing to testify even in the absence of 
a defense counsel. He could not accurately recall the events because he was drunk 
during the interrogation. He admitted that he had not been forced to sign the sheet, 
but he had no clue what he had actually signed. He claimed that our visit was the ﬁrst 
time he had heard about the Program. He knew that an ex oﬃcio defense counsel 
had been appointed, but since his arrest on 22 September 2004, the counsel had not 
contacted him, and he had no idea about the name and availability of the counsel 
(the interview was conducted more than a month later, on 27 October).
With regard to this individual complaint, the BPH’s answer was the following: 
“T. R. was informed about the Program by the head of guards at the time of his 
arrest on 22 September 2004, at 00.20 a.m., in the jail of the headquarters. Another 
member of the personnel was also present. His statement concerning the Program 
was recorded in the aforementioned booklet [see above]. This was done completely 
independently from his ﬁrst interrogation. T. R.’s account of being drunk during the 
interrogation is also highly questionable, considering the fact that his interrogation 
took place 14 hours after his arrest, and also that 26 days after his ﬁrst interrogation 
he conﬁrmed the testimony he made there.”
However, the entries in the booklet recording the provision of information to 
defendants about the Program refute the BPH’s version concerning the chronology of 
the events. Next to T. R.’s name only the date when he was informed is indicated, but 
not the exact time. But the entries in the booklet follow each other in a chronological 
order, and next to the name of B. J., who was informed about the Program before 
T. R., the exact time is also indicated. B. J. was – according to the police’s own 
record – informed about the Program on 22 September, at 12.30 p.m., which means 
that the next person, T. R. could only have been informed later than that. This 
undoubtedly refutes the BPH’s statement that T. R. was informed about the Program 
upon his arrest or not much later than that.
In this particular case, there are two directly contradictory statements – one 
by the defendant and one by the police –, which usually makes it very diﬃcult to 
ﬁnd out the truth. It seems however that in this case there is an objective piece of 
evidence (and it is exactly the own documentation of the police) that refutes the 
police’s version and substantiates what the defendant said.
Furthermore, the booklet also proves that the police organ did not abide 
by the provisions of the agreement of cooperation. In terms of Point 5 (c) of the 
agreement, “the police organs shall endeavor to ensure that the notiﬁcation of 
dispatcher service take place at least three hours before the ﬁrst interrogation.” 
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 According to the Commander’s letter, T. R.’s interrogation was performed 
14 hours after his arrest, i.e. around 14.20. Based on the booklet it can be established 
that he was informed about the Program later than 12.30, i.e. less than 2 hours 
before the interrogation was started. Although the agreement says that the police 
organ shall only endeavor to send a timely notiﬁcation, the reason for this is that due 
to the features of investigation work, it is not always possible to wait for three hours 
before the interrogation starts. However, since T. R. had been detained for 14 hours 
before his interrogation started, this reason for exemption obviously did not prevail. 
If T. R. had happened to opt for participating in the Program, the police organ could 
not have met its duty to perform the dispatcher service’s notiﬁcation three hours 
in advance.
We called Péter Gergényi’s attention to these circumstances in another letter, 
however, we never received any concrete reply concerning these observations.
By the end of October it had become obvious that we would fall short of 
the originally planned 120 cases around the end of November. This was partly due 
to the rule that defendants released after 72 hours were excluded from the program, 
but partly because the HHC received much less than the previously indicated 75 
notiﬁcations per month. Therefore it became necessary to involve two other police 
organs, for which the Commander of the BPH gave his permission. We picked the 
13th District Police Headquarters (due to its size and criminological characteristics), 
and the Department of Investigation of the BPH. The reason for choosing the latter 
was that some oﬃcials from the Department of Inquiry called our attention to the 
fact that since the Department of Investigation investigates the cases of unidentiﬁed 
perpetrators, if they manage to identify and arrest the defendant, they also often 
perform the ﬁrst interrogation before handing over the case to the Department 
of Inquiry or another police organ. If therefore we insist that the defense counsel 
should be able to be present from the ﬁrst interrogation, it is inevitable to involve the 
Department of Investigation as well. 
Eventually, the phase of taking up cases had to be prolonged until 31 January 
2005. With the purpose of evaluating the results we requested further data from the 
participating police organs. We wanted to see that in the project period (1 September 
2004–31 January 2005) out of all the cases in which defense was mandatory, how 
many retained lawyers, how many HHC lawyers and how many ex oﬃcio appointed 
lawyers provided defense, and if defense was not provided by one of the HHC’s 
lawyers, what was the reason for that. When receiving the police statistics, we had to 
realize that the Program’s implementation was even more problematic than we thought.
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According to information by the police, in the reference period the 8th 
District Police Headquarters launched 121 criminal procedures in which defense was 
mandatory. 27 defendants had a retained lawyer, so there were 94 cases that would 
have fallen under the scope of the Program. However only in 29 cases (31%) was an 
HHC lawyer retained, on 58 instances the defendant did not wish to participate in 
the Program and in the 7 remaining cases there was another (not speciﬁed) reason 
for not notifying the dispatcher service.
In the 6–7th District, the HHC lawyers provided defense in 26 and 23 cases 
in September and October respectively. These numbers were reassuring, considering 
the fact that in 2002 the average monthly number of ex oﬃcio appointment was 32 
at this police headquarters. In the ﬁrst two months, the dispatcher service received 
only one subsequent notiﬁcation, so it seemed that the police oﬃcers in these two 
district apply the agreement of cooperation in truly good faith. The picture seemed 
less bright in the following months: in November only 13, while in January and 
December altogether only 12 notiﬁcations were sent from this organ, with no 
subsequent notiﬁcations at all. The statistics received from the 6–7th District were 
quite inaccurate (although we admit that we could not specify in advance what kind 
of data we would like to receive at the end of the phase for the taking up of cases), 
therefore, also relying on our own data, we could only estimate what percentage 
of defendants eligible to participate in the Program were actually admitted at this 
headquarters. Based on this estimate, it seems that out of the 109, whose case would 
otherwise have required the appointment of a defense counsel, 57 (52%) were 
defended by attorneys participating in the project. This is obviously a much better 
result than in the 8th District, however hardly more than half of the cases still not 
seem enough to constitute a representative sample.
In relation to the 6–7th District, the reason for the omission of notiﬁcations 
seemed peculiar. Data provided by the police revealed that in 37 cases the investigators 
working here had decided not to notify the dispatcher service due to the urgent nature 
of the interrogation. It is not clear why in this district there were so many cases in 
which interrogations were so urgent, whereas in the 8th District (which has similar 
criminological characteristics) there was no such case, and at the Department on 
Inquiry where more severe oﬀenses are investigated, there were only 8 such instances. 
A possible explanation is that since most defendants at the latter two organs did 
not want to participate in the Program in the ﬁrst place, the investigators of these 
organs did not have to make a decision on whether an interrogation is urgent or not, 
because they could appoint an ex oﬃcio defense counsel anyway.
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It was however deﬁnitely a violation of the agreement of cooperation that 
the dispatcher service was not informed about these urgent interrogations, although 
as it was mentioned above, Point 7 of the agreement clearly prescribed that if the 
dispatcher service was not notiﬁed due to the urgency of the interrogation of the 
detained defendant, the police shall appoint an ex oﬃcio attorney in accordance 
with the general rules and notify the dispatcher service – within 24 hours – about the 
interrogation. Hence, the Headquarters’ notiﬁcation practice was clearly in breach 
of the agreement.
At the Department of Inquiry of the BPH the ratio of participating 
defendants was just as low as in the 8th District. Defense was mandatory in the case 
of 105 defendants. 27 of them had a retained counsel, while out of the 78 remaining 
defendants, 25 were defended by an HHC lawyer, as opposed to 53 persons for 
whom the investigating authority appointed an ex oﬃcio defense counsel. This means 
that the Program covered only 32% of the cases that would have fallen under its 
scope. Based on the preliminary discussions we thought that the highest number of 
urgent cases will be handled by the Department of Inquiry, but – as it was indicated 
above – this happened in only 8 cases. On the other hand, more than half of those 
defendants who were charged with severe crimes but were not able to retain a lawyer 
(45 persons, or 58%) chose not to participate in the Program. In the period of 
reference, the Department of Inquiry investigated 4 cases of accomplished and 8 
cases of attempted homicide. Nine of the defendants had ex oﬃcio appointed defense 
counsels and we presume that two defendants retained a lawyer, since the dispatcher 
service received only one notiﬁcation (and one subsequent notiﬁcation referring to 
the urgency of the interrogation). It does not sound likely that 8 persons charged 
with homicide refused to have a defense counsel who is sure to be present at the 
interrogation. It seems more likely that the information they received was not adequate.
The request that we put forth in early November, after our experiences with 
the 8th District Police Headquarters (namely that we would like to be notiﬁed about 
defendants not wishing to take part in the Program, in spite of the fact that this is 
not foreseen by the agreement of cooperation) was practically ignored by all three 
police organs.
The participation of the 13th District greatly contributed to the fact that we 
could ﬁnally close down the phase of taking up cases at all. The statistics from this 
organ were rather inaccurate, but it is a fact that in 3 months as many defendants 
(32) were taken up into the Program in 3 months as from the 8th District in 5 
months. Furthermore, the headquarters regularly sent subsequent notiﬁcations to 
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the dispatchers (also in cases when the reason was the defendant’s unwillingness to 
participate). 
 In contrast to the 13th District Police Headquarters’ positive example, the 
Department of Investigation of the BPH was conspicuously reluctant to participate. 
In three months, the Department sent only one notiﬁcation to the dispatcher 
service, and no subsequent notiﬁcation at all. Their statistics show that altogether 
16 defendants refused to participate in the Program. Furthermore, they claim that 
in the period of reference, they had interrogated 99 defendants whose defense would 
have been mandatory. Out of this number, 24 had their own retained lawyers, and 
another six were defended by appointed lawyers not participating in the Program. 
The Department claimed that the HHC provided defense to three defendants, 
however in fact this only happened in one case. It is unclear what happened to the 
other 66 defendants interrogated by the Department of Investigation in cases requiring 
mandatory defense, it is however certain that from this police unit the HHC received 
only 1% (!) of all those cases that would have fallen under the scope of the Program.
When after the period for taking up the cases was ﬁnished, HHC President 
Ferenc Kőszeg summarized the above facts in a letter addressed to Peter Gergényi. 
The Commander of the BPH sent the following reply: “the investigating authority 
may not be held liable if the interviewed defendant did not wish to accept the services 
of the HHC’s lawyer. The BPH may not force anyone to do so. I do not share your 
negative opinion concerning the Program’s implementation, in my view the organs 
of the BPH complied with the provisions of the agreement of cooperation. Your 
conclusions are not based on facts, they stem from – as you yourself put it – ‘personal 
disappointment’. Your assumption that the investigating authorities had a negative 
attitude, they were reluctant to implement its rules, put aside the more sever cases 
and provided inaccurate data are based on ‘logical arguments’ instead of facts. I do 
not agree with these assumptions, and since they do not rely on facts, I do not wish 
to react to them. The majority of the concrete individual cases described in your 
summarizing letter, have already been examined by the BPH’s criminal unit.”
Although we do not wish to argue at length with the statements of the 
Commander, it is worth noting that the striking result of the Department of 
Investigation (out of 99 defendants only one notiﬁcation in three months) is a fact 
for the evaluation of which no sophisticated logical tricks are needed. It is also a hard 
fact that only about one third of all the defendants who should have fallen under the 
scope of the agreement signed by the Commander ended up with an HHC lawyer as 
their defense counsel. And Péter Gergényi must know that investigators themselves 
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use logical arguments when assessing the credibility of witness testimonies, and they 
also use the concept of plausibility, which is also related to the realm of logic. And it 
seems less than plausible that after being properly informed that his/her interrogation 
will not start until the arrival of an attorney (who works free of charge and whose 
performance is under close professional control), a defendant of average intelligence 
would go for the ex oﬃcio appointed counsel, about whom it is widely known (at 
least in the circles of criminals) that in most cases he/she will not appear until the 
trial phase. We would not have expected the police organs to force the defendants to 
choose the Program: fair information would have suﬃced. 
Our doubts were not fully settled by the investigations into our concrete 
complaints either. Above we described in detail the case of T. R., in which we 
received no reply to the questions we formulated after the BPH informed us about 
the results of its examination. After the closing down of the phase of taking up 
cases we continued to hear stories suggesting that defendants (or their families) were 
not properly informed. When we sent out the questionnaire aimed to survey the 
defendants’ opinion about the Program (for the details see Section 5.3.), by mistake 
we also mailed it to a juvenile defendant whose parents retained another lawyer after 
the ﬁrst interrogation at which the Program’s attorney was present (and therefore the 
case was subsequently excluded from the Program). After receiving the questionnaire 
the defendant’s mother called and told us that although her son was satisﬁed with 
the counsel the HHC sent to the premises, the investigator informed her that this 
lawyer was an ex oﬃcio appointed counsel, and suggested that she should retain a 
lawyer, since ex oﬃcio appointed counsels are well-known for not being too eﬃcient. 
They did so, which meant a heavy ﬁnancial burden for the family, and in addition 
they were not fully satisﬁed with the work of the retained lawyer. She realized her 
mistake when she went to the HHC’s website and understood what the Program was 
all about after receiving our letter.
In connection with this subject we would also like to underline that 
according to the own statistics of the police, in the 8th District, only 32% of the 
ex oﬃcio defense counsels appointed for the defendants who refused to take part in 
the Program actually appeared at the ﬁrst interrogations (21 attorneys out of 61). 
At the Department of Inquiry the ratio was even worse: 22% (12 lawyer our of 53). 
The majority of the defendants who were not willing to take part remained without 
professional help in a crucial phase of the criminal procedure.
It is possible that the cooperation of the police and the HHC in the framework 
of the program will remain the subject of debate for a long time. We know that the 
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Program put an extra burden on the personnel of the organs participating therein. 
Informing the defendants about the Program, ﬁlling out and faxing the forms – these 
are all time consuming tasks, not to mention that the obligation to wait for the 
lawyer must have made the organization of work more diﬃcult and must have meant 
a delay compared to the usual practice (although we believe that 1 or 2 hours of 
waiting for the defense counsel should be normal practice in order to make sure 
that the lawyer has a real chance to arrive to the scene and perform his/her duties in 
accordance with the right to defense – see the relevant parts of Section 1.3.1.). We 
are grateful to those members of the personnel who performed these extra duties in 
good faith.
We also do not presume that the police organs intentionally sabotaged the 
Program. For the purposes of evaluating the Program, the HHC prepared a separate 
questionnaire for attorneys, police organs and defendants participating in it. The aim 
of the survey was to map up the Program’s advantages and disadvantages compared 
to the ex oﬃcio appointment system, and also to see what modiﬁcations should be 
made to the model tested in the Program if it was to be introduced on a national 
scale (the questionnaires will hereinafter be referred to as attorneys’ questionnaire, 
police questionnaire and defendants’ questionnaire, for their detailed analysis see 
Section 5). In their replies to the attorneys’ questionnaire, the participating lawyers 
gave mixed accounts of the authorities’ willingness to cooperate. Seven out of 20 
lawyers (35%) thought that the authorities took the HHC lawyers more seriously 
than their ex oﬃcio appointed colleagues, 4 attorneys (20%) experienced a directly 
negative attitude, 5 lawyers (25%) said that their experiences were mixed, and 4 
(20%) believed that the authorities’ behavior was not inﬂuenced by the fact that the 
lawyers act in the framework of the Program.
Most of those with a positive experience claimed that the authorities treated 
them as if they were “ordinary” retained lawyers. 
“With regard to the cases I took within the program, my experience was that 
I was taken more seriously, in spite of the fact that I am trying to act in the same 
manner in all the cases I am taking.” 
“My experience was that the fact that the Program runs under the aegis of the 
Helsinki Committee, lends a certain moral weight to it. This imposed a certain 
degree of discipline on both the investigating authorities and the defendants.”
“The behavior and attitude of the police, the prosecutor and the courts is as if 
the lawyer was a retained counsel.”
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“I always do my best as an ex oﬃcio appointed lawyer too, but the authorities 
have a diﬀerent attitude towards retained lawyers. The causes of this 
phenomenon may be found in the degree of preparation, knowledge, reliability 
and assertiveness.” 
“I think the police acts as if we were retained lawyers.”
“The attitude of the police and the prosecutor is diﬀerent in these cases. They 
act with a greater degree of responsibility [...].”
“My experience was that the Hungarian Helsinki Committee has a serious 
prestige among clients, the police and courts. To sum it up, I think that in 
the framework of the program, both the police and the participating attorneys 
performed their tasks quickly, thoroughly and in a professional manner.”
On the other hand, there were attorneys who gave accounts of indeed bad 
experiences with the police.
“I have heard police complaints that the Program is hindering their work 
because they have to wait for the defense counsel before the ﬁrst procedural 
action.”
“The HHC lawyers were not welcome at the police. It happened that the ﬁrst 
interrogation was intentionally scheduled for the night hours, which makes no 
sense, since the lawyer, the police oﬃcer and the defendant are equally tired. 
Since in terms of the CCP the defendant shall be interrogated within 24 hours 
from his/her arrest, it is not necessary to “torture” for hours during the night. [...] 
The police’s attitude was diﬀerent. They scheduled the time of the notiﬁcation 
and the interrogation with the intention to make it as disadvantageous as 
possible. As an ex oﬃcio appointed lawyer I can always agree on the time of the 
interrogation with the case oﬃcer.”
“Unfortunately I sensed a certain aversion or discrimination from the police 
compared to the ex oﬃcio appointment system: police oﬃcers prefer to appoint 
cooperating lawyers who do not bother them with motions and questions. As 
opposed to that we are interested in solidly founding the defense already in 
the investigation phase, as testimonies withdrawn at the court hearing are not 
credible.”
“I sensed a deﬁnite aversion on the part of police oﬃcers vis a vis the HHC 
lawyers. They constantly made remarks concerning the system that we had 
to consult with the client before submitting the retainer. This was previously 
unknown to them and meant a delay in their work.”
Some of the attorneys regarded the authorities’ attitude as mixed. One of 
them said that “members of the authority seem to prefer the HHC lawyers to ex oﬃcio 
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appointed defense counsels. Consequently, they better perform their obligation to 
inform the participants of the procedure, making it easier to get fully prepared for 
the case.” At the same time, the very same called attention to abuses as well: “I ﬁnd 
it absolutely necessary to stipulate in the agreement of cooperation the intention to 
avoid abuses on the part of the authorities. I think of cases when during the weekend 
the lawyer is summoned for 14.00 o’clock but the interrogation starts only at 16.30.” 
This is not the only such account.
“In the beginning I experienced aversion, especially from the police and the 
prosecutor’s oﬃce. Later on however I managed to establish a good relation 
with them, when they saw that I simply wanted to provide my client with fair 
defense.”
“My work as an ex oﬃcio appointed counsel is not diﬀerent from my work in the 
framework of the HHC program, but the police oﬃcers seemed more helpful. 
I presume that this is due the orders of their superiors and the agreement of 
cooperation with the Hungarian Helsinki Committee. However, on a number 
of occasions in the course of the ﬁrst interrogation, they clearly emphasized that 
they would have ﬁnished long ago if the had not had to wait for the lawyer. They 
regarded the participation of the defense counsel completely unnecessary. Some 
of them felt that the high-level agreement meant an unnecessary interference 
with their work.”
“Since the authorities are not used to that lawyers retained through an NGO 
perform this job, some distrust can be sensed, a feeling that the authorities’ 
work is under additional monitoring.”
“I had mixed experience with the authorities, especially with the investigating 
authority. At some headquarters they were helpful, at others I sensed tension 
and confusion, and on certain occasions hostility. It was clear, however, that 
I was treated diﬀerently from an ordinary ex oﬃcio appointed defense counsel: 
the authority’s attitude was similar to when I act as a retained lawyer.”
Some attorneys drew our attention to the fact that the persons acting on 
behalf of the authorities did not always seem fully informed about the Program.
 “With regard to the police and the court may experience was that they were not 
properly informed about the program by their superiors. (E.g. It was written 
in the records that I was an ex oﬃcio appointed lawyer, the two systems were 
mixed up, they did not know that indigence is a precondition of eligibility, 
and did not know that if the client is not indigent they can still appoint me 
ex oﬃcio, and so on.)”
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Taking the attorneys’ opinions into consideration, it seems that the police 
leadership did not succeed in making sure that their subordinates fully comply with 
the provisions of the agreement of cooperation. This is contrary to the obligation to 
implement agreements in good faith and negatively inﬂuenced the representative 
nature of the Program’s sample and thus endangered the Program’s main purpose 
(the modeling of a new system). In addition we believe that if all persons acting on 
behalf of the police had fully (and not only formally) complied with the agreement 
of cooperation, the 120 cases would have been taken up in a much shorter period 
of time, and the whole Program would have caused less work and diﬃculties to the 
police than it eventually did.
3.2. Cooperation with the attorneys
While our cooperation with the attorneys may not be termed as entirely ﬂawless, it 
was far less problematic than the relations between the HHC and the police.
Participating attorneys were selected for the Program through an open tender. 
The criteria for selection included being registered in the Budapest Bar’s register for 
attorneys available for appointment as criminal defense lawyers as well as having 
experience in criminal law.
Each applicant had to state the duration of his/her criminal practice, average 
number of criminal cases handled per year, whether he/she has any special expertise 
within the ﬁeld of criminal law, as well as knowledge of foreign languages. Furthermore, 
a short description of the infrastructural framework of each applicant was requested 
(whether a solo lawyer or a member of a law ﬁrm, how many attorneys are in the 
ﬁrm, whether he/she employs a trainee lawyer as well as computer equipment and 
internet access etc.).
It was considered an advantage if the applicant was also involved in educational 
or scientiﬁc activities or had published in substantive or procedural criminal law.
Eventually 43 attorneys were selected to take part in the program, but in the 
meantime a few attorneys dropped out. In terms of the framework contract between 
the HHC and the attorneys, the attorneys undertook to be on duty 24-hours on 
pre-agreed dates (duty day) in the interest of being able to contact the defendant 
without delay, at the place and time indicated by the dispatcher service, following 
notiﬁcation. The framework contract stipulated that on duty days the attorney could 
only refuse taking a case for serious and later documented reasons. In exceptional 
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cases (if no one among the attorneys scheduled to be on duty on a particular day is 
available), the dispatcher service could notify an attorney beyond duty days as well 
– however in such cases the attorneys were not obliged to fulﬁll the request. 7–8 
attorneys were on duty each day of the week and each attorney would be on duty 1 
week per day on average (and twice every three weeks).
One attorney decided already on the second week into the Program that he 
is unable to be on duty under the above conditions and terminated the framework 
contract. Other attorneys chose the (less correct) solution to never be available for 
the dispatchers and thus had no cases in the Program. 
Another attorney decided to quit the Program when, at the end of October 
2005 he realized the administrative burden that the reporting requirements posed. 
He handed over the pending case to another colleague in accordance with the formal 
procedure, and although in accordance with the terms of the framework contract he 
had oﬀered to reimburse half of the legal fees paid to him so far, the Board did not 
make such a request. It was agreed with another attorney that he would withdraw 
from the duty system but would carry on with cases he had undertaken until then 
under the general rules.
Certain attorneys decided to withdraw from the Program due to cases 
unrelated to the Program. Therefore only 33 attorneys had eﬀectively taken part in 
the entire Program. 
While it occasionally happened that based on the reports and other 
documents submitted by attorneys the Board called the attention of a few attorneys 
to particular professional problems, serious concerns relating to the general quality of 
defense activities were not found with respect to any of the attorneys.
Concerns with respect to the majority of attorneys centered on failures or 
delays in reporting, which resulted in serious problems for the HHC in overseeing 
and planning the Program’s budget. As the Dutch donor had determined a ﬁxed 
amount for the legal fees, which was in turn transferred to the HHC in installments, 
the HHC had to ensure that there would not be overspending of the budget – neither 
for the full project duration nor for the given reporting period. The whole budget 
may become unbalanced if an attorney submits an invoice one year later than when 
the given activity had been carried out (and this indeed arose on more than one 
occasion). In order to prevent such situations, the HHC requested attorneys to 
notify developments in cases dealt with on a monthly basis even if there were no 
new billable actions in that particular month. This request however was met with 
great resistance from most attorneys. In fact, as attorneys who had previously been 
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failing to fully comply with all reporting requirements continued to not comply with 
monthly reporting obligations, the HHC reconsidered the system and adapted it to 
a quarterly system of reporting (see more on this below).
The Board did not experience attempts at overbilling compared to realistic 
amounts of time spent on work. It was only with one particular Program participant 
that the Board had found on several occasions unrealistic the length of time the 
attorney wished to charge to the Program; in these cases the Board instructed the 
HHC to pay less than the amount originally indicated by the attorney.
There was only a single case of an attorney whose conduct and cooperation 
presented truly serious problems. While the attorney was extremely active in the 
period of taking up cases (she included 7 defendants in the Program), she failed to 
fulﬁll reporting obligations from November 2004 in spite of repeated requests (by 
telephone, fax and letter) from the HHC staﬀ member. On 3 February 2005 the 
HHC indicated that unless the attorney fulﬁls all reporting requirements within 5 
working days, the framework contract would be terminated by the HHC. However 
she did not comply with this deadline. The Chair of the Board requested the HHC 
not to terminate the attorney’s contract and he called her in person to remind her of 
her reporting obligations. The attorney promised to do so, however, the deadline to 
which they had agreed to over the telephone again passed without any results. 
Hence on 22 March 2005 the HHC terminated the contract and demanded 
that (in accordance with Point 24 of the framework contract) she submit all 
documents of the criminal cases to the HHC and to consult with the new attorneys 
to which these cases had been handed over. Again, the attorney failed to comply 
with these requirements. As a last warning, the HHC called on her to cooperate on 
20 April 2005 citing that the organization would initiate a disciplinary action at the 
Budapest Bar. Nevertheless the deadline set for performing her obligations passed 
again without results. 
Finally on 5 May 2005 the HHC turned to the Budapest Bar as the Board 
had no knowledge about the developments of any of the cases that the attorney 
had undertaken in the course of the Program. We did not have any information 
whether she had been present at procedural actions, as foreseen under the framework 
contract, and the Board was unable to assess her performance without the proper 
documentation. This in turn meant that we did not know whether the defendants 
had been provided adequate and eﬀective defense, thereby jeopardizing the ultimate 
goal of the Program itself.
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Five months later, on 17 October 2005 the Budapest Bar held a disciplinary 
hearing (at which the attorney failed to appear). The disciplinary council established 
that a disciplinary oﬀense had been committed and ﬁned the attorney HUF 100,000 
(EUR 400). The disciplinary council had found it an aggravating circumstance that 
the attorney had failed to fulﬁll her obligations over a protracted period, thereby 
damaging the trust of society in the Bar. 
Although the disciplinary council’s decision became ﬁnal in December 
2005, the HHC still was unable to gain information about the seven cases handled 
by the attorney who had been excluded from the Program. In order to contact the 
defendants concerned, the HHC turned to the police organs that were dealing with 
their cases. However, the investigating authority was unaware of the defendants’ 
telephone numbers and none of the defendants had replied to the HHC’s letters, so 
the cases fell out of the Program.
3.3. The current status of the Program 
Since some cases that were originally included in the Program fell out of the system 
due to diﬀerent reasons – e.g. retainer was given to another lawyer, the reason for 
mandatory defense ceased to be in place, etc. – altogether 121 cases remained in the 
Program. At the time of writing this study, 44 cases are still in progress, so 77 have 
come to some conclusion. Table 2 provides an overview of these cases.
(Considering that originally the Program was intended to cover cases until 
the delivery of the ﬁrst instance court judgment, certain cases where a ﬁrst instance 
judgment has already been delivered are also included here, although – due to an 
amendment of the Program’s rules – the attorneys have been instructed to continue 
to provide defense counsel work under the Program in the second instance procedure 
as well.) 
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0901/01 juvenile 2 counts of bribery reprimand (ﬁnal)
0901/04 mental disorder damage to property reprimand
0902/01 detained robbery suspended sentence of 
imprisonment (ﬁnal)
0903/08 juvenile seduction of a minor investigation terminated due to 
lack of private motion 
0907/01 detained misdemeanor of theft acquitted, as the act is only a 
petty oﬀense
0909/01 does not speak 
Hungarian
assault against a person 
fulﬁlling a public duty 
waiver of trial: ﬁne (ﬁnal) 
0911/03 detained aggravated assault imprisonment in medium-
security prison for 1 year and 
3 months, 2 years ban on 
taking part in public aﬀairs 
0911/05 does not speak 
Hungarian
minor drug abuse and 
forgery of oﬃcial documents 
proceeding suspended
0911/06 does not speak 
Hungarian
minor drug abuse and 
forgery of oﬃcial documents 
proceeding suspended
0916/01 juvenile abuse of prohibited 
pornographic recordings 
prosecutorial reprimand
1002/03 detained robbery imprisonment in high-security 
prison for 5 years and a 5-year 
ban on taking part in public 
aﬀairs (ﬁnal)
1003/01 does not speak 
Hungarian
trading of stolen goods proceedings terminated in the 
investigation phase due to lack 
of evidence
1005/01 detained causing public danger compulsory medical treatment
1006/02 juvenile misdemeanor of theft proceedings terminated in the 
prosecutorial phase due to lack 
of evidence
1009/03 juvenile false accusation and forgery 
of oﬃcial documents and 
abuse of documents
imprisonment in low-security 
juvenile prison for 7 months 
suspended for 2 years







1010/01 detained 6 counts of robbery and 
2 counts of abuse of oﬃcial 
documents
imprisonment in medium-
security prison for 4 years and 
6 month and a 5-year ban on 
taking part in public aﬀairs 
(ﬁnal)
1012/01 does not speak 
Hungarian
attempted taking of a 
vehicle without permission 
ﬁned by the ﬁrst instance 
court, decision abolished by 
court of second instance, 
repeated ﬁrst instance 
proceeding suspended
1013/05 detained oﬀense of aggravated 
assault and 3 counts of 
misdemeanor of rowdiness 
imprisonment in high-security 
prison for 2 years and 
8 months, and a 3-year ban 
on taking part in public aﬀairs 
(ﬁnal)
1021/01 detained homicide imprisonment in high-security 
prison for 10 years and 
expulsion for 10 years (ﬁnal)
1023/01 detained attempted causing of bodily 
harm resulting in threat to 
life 
suspended imprisonment
1024/01 juvenile forgery of oﬃcial documents reprimand
1026/03 detained oﬀense of theft imprisonment in medium-
security prison for 1 year (ﬁnal)
1030/02 juvenile causing of bodily harm 
resulting in threat to life
imprisonment in low-security 
prison for 1 year and 6 months 
suspended for 3 years (ﬁnal)
1102/01 juvenile misdemeanor of theft prosecutorial reprimand
1102/02 juvenile misdemeanor of theft and 
robbery 
imprisonment in low-security 
juvenile prison for 6 months 
(ﬁnal)
1102/03 juvenile misdemeanor of theft and 
abuse of document
proceeding terminated in 
investigation phase due to lack 
of evidence
1104/01 does not speak 
Hungarian
rowdiness reprimand
1104/02 does not speak 
Hungarian
rowdiness reprimand







1105/01 detained oﬀense of theft imprisonment in medium-
security prison for 3 years 
6 months and a 4-year ban on 
taking part in public aﬀairs 
1106/01 detained causing public danger proceedings terminated due to 
the death of defendant
1107/01 juvenile misdemeanor of theft reprimand
1108/01 detained violation of ban on entry 
and stay 
imprisonment in low-security 
prison for 6 months suspended 
for 1 year (ﬁnal)
1111/03 does not speak 
Hungarian
aggravated assault terminated (unknown 
perpetrator)
1113/01 juvenile taking of a vehicle without 
permission
waiver of trial: probation for 
1 year and 3 months under 




attempt of violent assertion 
of claim, attempt of 
aggravated assault, 
2 counts of abuse of oﬃcial 
document and 3 counts of 
damage to property
imprisonment in medium-
security prison for 1 year and 
6 months and a 2-year ban on 
taking part in public aﬀairs
1115/01 detained robbery imprisonment in medium-
security prison for 2 years and 
6 months and a 3-year ban on 
taking part in public aﬀairs 
(ﬁnal)
1116/03 detained robbery imprisonment in medium-
security prison for 4 years and 
a 4-year ban on taking part in 
public aﬀairs (ﬁnal)
1116/04 juvenile attempt of blackmail, 
promotion of prostitution
imprisonment in low-security 
juvenile prison for 11 months 
suspended for 3 years
1118/01 detained robbery, aggravated assault, 
2 counts of rowdiness, 
4 counts of theft, 4 counts 
of forgery of oﬃcial 
documents
imprisonment in medium-
security prison for 5 years and 
a 5-year ban on taking part in 
public aﬀairs (ﬁnal)







1118/02 does not speak 
Hungarian
misdemeanor of theft reprimand
1122/03 detained robbery imprisonment in medium-
security prison for 3 years and 
6 months and a 4-year ban on 
taking part in public aﬀairs
1123/01 juvenile rowdiness imprisonment in low-security 
juvenile prison for 6 months 
suspended for 1 year under 
monitoring by probation 
oﬃcer (ﬁnal)
1123/03 detained theft, abuse of document terminated by the prosecutor
1125/01 detained robbery imprisonment in medium-
security prison for 2 years and 
2 months and a 2-year ban on 
taking part in public aﬀairs
1127/01 does not speak 
Hungarian
damage to property reprimand
1128/01 detained robbery imprisonment in medium-
security prison for 6 years and 
a 6-year ban on taking part in 
public aﬀairs (ﬁnal)
1129/02 juvenile misdemeanor of theft prosecutorial reprimand
1201/03 juvenile misdemeanor of theft probation
1201/04 does not speak 
Hungarian
forgery of oﬃcial documents reprimand
1206/02 detained seduction imprisonment in medium-
security prison for 3 years and 
6 months and a 5-year ban on 
taking part in public aﬀairs, 
compulsory treatment of 
alcoholism, ban on exercising 
parents rights (ﬁnal)
1206/04 detained robbery acquittal 
1207/01 detained and 
does not speak 
Hungarian
misdemeanor of theft fast track procedure: 
imprisonment in low-security 
prison for 10 months, 
expulsion of 3 years (ﬁnal)







1209/02 detained robbery imprisonment in medium-
security prison for 1 year and 
10 months and a 3-year ban 
on taking part in public aﬀairs 
(ﬁnal)
1211/01 detained assault resulting in threat 
to life 
investigation terminated due to 
lack of evidence of a criminal 
act 
1214/01 does not speak 
Hungarian
misdemeanor of theft imprisonment in low-security 
prison for 10 months suspended 
for 1 year and expulsion of 2 
years (ﬁnal)
1218/02 juvenile misdemeanor of theft reprimand
1219/02 detained aggravated assault suspended imprisonment
1222/02 juvenile theft reprimand
1222/03 juvenile theft reprimand
0104/01 juvenile robbery imprisonment of 1 year and 
2 months suspended for 3 years 
0105/02 detained and 
mental disorder 
rowdiness proceedings terminated due to 
defendant’s mental disorder
0106/01 detained violation of ban on entry 
and stay
5 years expulsion
0107/02 detained oﬀense of theft proceeding terminated in 
investigation phase because it 
could not be established that 
oﬀense was committed by 
suspects 
0112/01 detained and 
does not speak 
Hungarian
forgery of oﬃcial 
documents, violation of ban 
on entry and stay 
fast track procedure: expulsion 
and suspended imprisonment
0112/02 juvenile forgery of oﬃcial document 35 days of compulsory public 
beneﬁt work 
0116/01 detained oﬀense of theft imprisonment in medium-
security prison for 1 year and 
2 months and a 2-year ban on 
taking part in public aﬀairs 







0118/01 juvenile rowdiness probation
0118/02 juvenile rowdiness probation
0120/01 detained theft imprisonment in medium-
security prison for 1 year and 
4 months and a 2-year ban on 
taking part in public aﬀairs 
(acquittal with regard to one 
accusation)
0120/02 detained theft imprisonment in medium-
security prison for 1 year and 
4 months and a 2-year ban on 
taking part in public aﬀairs 
(acquittal with regard to one 
accusation) (ﬁnal)
0126/01 juvenile misdemeanor of theft case terminated as criminal act 
is qualiﬁed as a petty oﬀense
0129/01 detained drug abuse imprisonment in medium 
security prison for 3 years and 
6 months and a 4-year ban on 
taking part in public aﬀairs 
0130/01 juvenile trading of stolen goods terminated in the investigation 
phase
0130/02 detained trading of stolen goods imprisonment in medium 
security prison for 1 year and 




4. The Program Results
4.1. Evidence of structural problems in the ex officio appointment 
 system 
Although it is aimed at preparing the reform of the ex oﬃcio appointment system, 
and its very goal is to test a system that in most respect diﬀers from the ex oﬃcio 
appointment system, in the course of implementing the Program the HHC has 
gained experience that corroborate the existence of structural problems outlined 
under Section 1.3. 
A discussion that took place in February 2005 between Dutch legal aid experts 
and representatives of ﬁve police units from Budapest participating in the Program 
underlined the need to ensure the independence of the function of appointment from 
the investigating authority. Senior level police oﬃcials strengthened the view that 
while in most cases (according to one head of department, in about 90–95 percent of 
the cases) ex oﬃcio appointed defense counsels failed to appear at procedural actions, 
the attorneys taking part in the HHC’s Program had always taken part at the ﬁrst 
interrogation. When the Dutch delegation asked if in view of this the police believe 
that the HHC’s initiative is useful, one of the police oﬃcials stated outright that this 
question should be posed to defendants as the presence of the defense counsel is far 
more beneﬁcial for this group.
The same conclusion may be drawn from the NPH survey mentioned 
under Section 1.2. The survey contains a peculiar contradiction. Although it has 
proved that all over the country, in the majority of cases, the ex oﬃcio appointed 
counsel does not attend the ﬁrst interrogation of the suspect (the percentages being 
extremely low in Budapest and Komárom–Esztergom County: 7.45 and 4.54% 
respectively). The police units interviewed “almost unanimously claimed [...] that 
there is no need to change the time honored system of appointments. According 
to the majority of the respondents, if the lawyers were appointed by another entity, 
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that would complicate the procedure, increase the administrative burdens, have a 
negative inﬂuence on the timing of the investigation and would therefore lead to 
processes that are disadvantageous from the point of view of the right to defense. [...] 
The general stance [of the police] is that there is no reason to involve an organization 
independent from the police into the selection of lawyers.”61 
 Another aspect of this issue is highlighted by the following example. On the 
very ﬁrst day of the phase when cases were being taken up for the Program, a rather 
upset attorney paid a visit to the HHC. As it turned out, the attorney as well as several 
other colleagues based their law practice on frequent ex oﬃcio appointments from 
the Budapest 6–7th District Police Headquarters. Moreover, because attorneys often 
go to the police station in the evening as due to the geographic area covered by that 
station, a need for ex oﬃcio appointed defense counsels inevitably arises generally 
each night. However, in the Program, if a need for an appointed defense counsel 
arose, the proceeding police oﬃcer had to notify the HHC’s dispatcher service, which 
in turn arranged for an attorney for indigent defendants. This eﬀectively meant that 
during the period of taking up cases the well-established cooperation between the 
police station and the group of attorneys had to be suspended. 
When the HHC staﬀ member responded that the Committee had made an 
open call for tender for attorneys, thus she could have also applied for the Program, 
the attorney replied that she had seen the announcement in the Budapest Bar’s 
newsletter but she had had no intention of submitting an application as she is fully 
satisﬁed with the income she gains from ex oﬃcio appointments. 
This case directed attention to yet another dysfunction in the appointments 
by the investigating authorities: in the present system, attorneys who principally 
base their law practice on appointments may become ﬁnancially dependant on the 
member of the police corps who takes decisions on appointments. This reinforces 
doubts in the present system’s abilities to oﬀer eﬀective defense to defendants, 
which is a serious problem if we take into consideration the ﬁndings of the NPH 
survey: “in Budapest 12 district police stations regularly appoint the same counsels, 
most of whom are retired lawyers not running separate oﬃces any more. They have 
the advantage that they can be reached at any time of the day and they undertake 
appointments. It also happens frequently that young lawyers at the beginning of 
their careers indicate their willingness to take appointments in order to form a 
61 Equality of Arms, p. 40.
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clientele and get some routine. In Bács–Kiskun County there are some lawyers who 
‘reside’ at police station and their practices are based on appointments, but this is 
not characteristic. In Komárom the situation is diverse, but there are lawyers who 
also base their practice on appointments.”62 There is again a peculiar contradiction 
between the NPH survey’s result on the attendance of ex oﬃcio appointed counsels 
in ﬁrst interrogations (just to remind: in 14 out of the 23 regional units, less than 
50% of ﬁrst interrogations were held in the presence of the appointed counsel) and 
the general opinion of the police, according to which “the investigating authorities 
favor those lawyers in the practice of appointments, with regard to whom they can 
be sure that the given lawyer will undertake the appointment and will appear at the 
police station.”63
At the Closing Conference, dr. Ágnes Frech, Head of the Criminal Board 
of the Metropolitan Court stated that as the leader responsible for the distribution 
of cases among the judges, she can see that some investigating authorities always 
appoint one and the same lawyer, who is in fact very passive, never putting forth a 
motion, although the cases tried by her court are serious ones.
Furthermore, the passivity of ex oﬃcio appointed defense counsels as well 
as the lack of quality assurance in the system are pointed out by a response given to 
the HHC by the contact point at the Budapest 8th District Police Headquarters: 
“On several occasions we witnessed diﬀerences between the procedure, activity 
and professional preparedness of attorneys involved in the Program and ex oﬃcio 
appointed defense counsels. We even saw one example of a previously less active 
attorney who had been acting on ex oﬃcio appointments becoming more active due 
to his involvement in the Program.”
As implied by responses given to the questionnaire targeting attorneys, 
the level of activity of defense counsels is not equal at all times between ex oﬃcio 
appointments and cases undertaken in the framework of the Program. 18 (86%) 
out of the 21 defense counsels responding to the question felt that they are not 
working any diﬀerently in the Program than as ex oﬃcio defense counsels; several 
responding defense counsels stressed that they do not distinguish between ex oﬃcio 
appointments and cases handled based on a retainer in their general law practice 
62 Equality of Arms, p. 39.
63 Equality of Arms, p. 39.
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either. However, two defense counsels replied that they are able to perform more 
eﬀective work in the Program than in ex oﬃcio appointed cases.
“In comparison to the system of ex oﬃcio appointments, I am performing more 
eﬀective work in the Program, and can better prepare myself for the case due to 
reasons explained under point 1 [access to case ﬁle, opportunity to charge for 
preparing legal briefs].”
“As regards to cases undertaken in the framework of the Program, the work 
of the defense counsel cannot be compared to that of the ex oﬃcio defense 
counsel. The attorneys take part in investigative procedural actions in an active 
manner.”
The Program results in interesting experiences regarding budgetary functions 
as well. Due to the fragmented character of this function the actors in the ex oﬃcio 
appointment system themselves lack precise information about how much the ex 
oﬃcio appointed defense counsel may charge and to which organ. In September 2004 
the Budapest 6–7th District Police Headquarters sent a notiﬁcation to the HHC’s 
dispatcher service that at midnight a British citizen who did not speak Hungarian was 
about to be interrogated. An attorney involved in the Program arrived at the police 
station and was appointed by the investigative authority as an ex oﬃcio defense 
counsels, since the defendant’s ﬁnancial situation excluded him from the Program. 
At the end of the procedural action, the police determined that the hourly fee of the 
ex oﬃcio appointed defense counsel was HUF 1,300 plus VAT although this rate 
did not comply with the rate prescribed by law, which was HUF 3,000 plus VAT per 
hour, more than twice the rate determined by the police. (Interestingly legislation 
previously in force also did not contain this particular hourly rate, therefore it is 
unclear why the police used this sum to calculate the fees.)
The attorney called the attention of the detective preparing the fee statement 
to this problem, who stated that fees are determined based on instruction from the 
district police captain. Given the early hour of the morning, the attorney decided 
against trying to persuade the detective about the correct fee levels, but she informed 
the HHC about the case due to the general problem it illustrated. The HHC turned 
to the relevant contact point at the Budapest 6–7th District Police Headquarters 
about the particular case, which was contrary to law as well as to seek remedies for 
the possibly unlawful police practice. No reply was received ever since. 
The conclusions of the Program in this respect are supported by the results 
of the NPH survey. “In general it can be stated that the majority of the units comply 
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with the laws and establish the fee of the ex oﬃcio appointed counsel in accordance 
with the relevant provisions. At the same time Fejér County replied: ‘the counsels 
appearing at procedural actions billed us fees between HUF 2,000 and HUF 3,000.’ 
The Komárom investigation unit also presented a peculiar interpretation of the law: 
‘We pay the ex oﬃcio appointed counsels HUF 3,000 for the ﬁrst hour and HUF 
1,500 for every subsequent hour.’ [...] The Szekszárd Police Station replied to the 
question on hourly fees that they are ‘between HUF 1,000 and 9,000.’ To the same 
question, the Highway Police answered that the fees are ‘varied, between HUF 3,000 
and 4,000 on average.’ The listed examples show that there are problems in this 
regard at some of the police units.”64
 
4.2. Further results of the Program
As “by-products” the Program also revealed problems of criminal proceedings that are 
only indirectly related to the structural inconsistencies of the ex oﬃcio appointment 
system. The most important such instance was that due to the Program a crucial 
issue of interpretation of law on the police practice of appointment of defense 
counsels that is closely connected to the right to defense was brought to light. The 
cooperation agreement concluded between the HHC and the BPH stipulated that 
the police will take steps to ensure that the HHC’s dispatcher service would be 
notiﬁed at least three hours prior to the start of the interrogation. However, within 
a few days after the start of the period when cases were taken up in the Program, 
attorneys reported to the HHC that repeatedly the investigation authority would 
interrogate the suspect during the ﬁrst eight hours of short-term arrest, which would 
be followed taking the detainee into a 72-hour detention, and the dispatcher service 
would only receive notiﬁcation about the continued interrogation of the suspect who 
was already formally taken into 72-hour detention. Thus, defendants could only be 
provided with defense counsels by the time the substantial part of the interrogation 
had already taken place. 
Presuming that there must be a misunderstanding, the HHC contacted the 
contact point at the police station concerned, who informed the organization that 
according to the police’s interpretation a person who is held in short-term arrest, 
64 Equality of Arms, p. 38.
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then charged with a suspicion and interrogated, cannot be considered as held in 
detention, thus defense is not mandatory in such cases. Consequently, such persons 
are only covered by the Program from the moment when they are taken into a 
72-hour detention, which in turn only takes places after the interrogation. 
The legal situation and the problem signaled above are as follows. Although 
under Article 46 (b) of the CCP defense in mandatory if the defendant is detained, 
the CCP does not deﬁne the types of deprivation of liberty that constitute detention. 
Short-term arrest is regulated not by the CCP but Act XXXIV of 1994 on the Police 
(“the Police Act”), which provides that any person who may be suspected of a criminal 
oﬀense may be taken into short-term arrest for not more than 8 hours or 12 hours 
in exceptional cases.65 The Police Act provides that anyone who, based on an law or 
decision taken pursuant to law, is restricted in their right to freedom of movement 
and the free choice of their place of stay should be considered a detainee (person held 
in custody, pre-trial detention, public security detention, arrested and held in short-
term arrest, or forcibly taken before an authority).66 Nevertheless the legal position 
of the police on mandatory defense was that the terms and expressions used in the 
Police Act couldn’t be applied to the CCP, as the latter only regulates (criminal) 
detention and not short-term arrest. Consequently persons held in short-term arrest 
cannot be considered as detainees, therefore they are not entitled to an ex oﬃcio 
defense counsel until the police has ordered their 72-hour detention.
The Hungarian Helsinki Committee could not accept the interpretation 
advanced by the police. Article 126 Paragraph (5) of the CCP makes it clear that even 
short-term arrest constitutes detention when the law states that if the defendant is 
subjected to detention prior to being taken into a 72-hour detention (thus including 
short-term arrest), such detention should be calculated in the length of custody. 
Hence any person held in short-term arrest should be considered as a detainee, and 
in case a criminal procedure is started against him/her, the appointment of defense 
counsel is mandatory. 
Moreover, the police’s interpretation renders meaningless Article 48 Paragraph 
(1) of the CCP that provides that if the defendant is detained, the defense counsel 
should be appointed not later than before the ﬁrst interrogation. When the HHC 
referred to this provision, the police station replied that this provision applies to the 
ﬁrst interrogation held once the person has been taken into a 72-hour detention. 
65 Art. 33
66 Art. 97 Par. (1) (h)
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In addition to the fact that this interpretation is diﬃcult to argue logically, 
it is also extremely dangerous as (e.g. if the person held in short-term arrest makes 
statements confessing to the commission of a criminal oﬀense at the interrogation 
conducted before he is taken into a 72-hour detention and is taken into a 72-hour 
detention nonetheless) there may not be a need to conduct a follow-up interrogation 
while he is detained. Therefore in this scenario the investigation could be closed so 
that the ex oﬃcio appointed defense counsel (appointed after the 72-hour detention 
had been ordered) does not have an opportunity to take part at the defendant’s 
interrogation. Hence the rule set forth in Article 48 of the CCP cannot be enforced 
at all. 
The HHC turned to the Chief Prosecutor’s Oﬃce based on the aforemen-
tioned line of argumentation. The Chief Prosecutor’s Oﬃce agreed with the HHC 
in general and issued a circular to county prosecutors to ensure and monitor lawful 
practice – however, the Chief Prosecutor’s Oﬃce also put forward a problematic 
interpretation. According to this, if short-term arrest is followed by 72-hour detention, 
the length of short-term arrest should be calculated into the duration of the 72-hour 
detention. This means that the duration of short-term arrest also constitutes 
detention under the CCP, thus the participation of the defense counsel is mandatory 
already during the course of the short-term arrest. This interpretation is also contained 
in the Memorandum67 on certain questions related to the application of the CCP, 
which in Point 43 states “if short-term arrest under the Police Act is immediately 
followed by 72-hour detention (i.e. when the length of short-term arrest is part of 
the length of the 72-hour detention), defense is mandatory from the start of short-
term arrest.”
This solution, however, again fails to fully clarify the problem as it can 
happen that the detective would not know prior to the ﬁrst interrogation if the 
72-hour detention of the suspect would later become necessary. If the detective 
interrogates the suspect without appointing a defense counsel, and then based on the 
results of the interrogation decides to take the suspect into a 72-hour detention, the 
interrogation will become illegal retroactively and the defendant’s statements may not 
be used as evidence. On the contrary though if information comes to light during 
the interrogation that warrants the suspect’s 72-hour detention, the police oﬃcer 
may not decide against ordering custody for the above reason. However, it cannot 
67 Instruction no. Ig. 770/2003. of the Chief prosecutor’s Oﬃce
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be reasonably expected that in case of all oﬀenders who are taken into short-term 
arrest on the ground of a minor oﬀense, then released after the interrogation, the 
police would be obliged to appoint defense counsels, as obviously both the capacity 
of detectives and defense counsels is scarce and neither do the interests of justice 
so require.
When in connection with another case the HHC called attention to the 
contradiction in the interpretation, the Chief Prosecutor’s Oﬃce replied: “due to 
Article 126 Paragraph (5) of the CCP any detention preceding the 72-hour detention 
shall be taken into account when calculating the duration of 72-hour detention. 
Hence we conclude that detention that precedes 72-hour detention is in fact part 
of the 72-hour detention, which [...] makes the participation of the defense counsel 
mandatory. Undoubtedly, the aforementioned argumentation does not necessarily 
lead to the conclusion that if short-term arrest is not followed by 72-hour detention, 
then short-term arrest does not constitute detention as – even if for only a short 
period of time – the defendant is restricted in his/her right to eﬀectively defend 
him/herself. It is left to judicial practice to establish the correct interpretation of 
Article 46 (a) [due to the amendment that took place in the meantime: Article 46 
(b)] of the CCP.”
Based on the position of the Chief Prosecutor’s Oﬃce, the ﬁrst interrogation 
of a defendant had to be repeated in the course of the Program. In that case a man 
was interrogated in the Budapest 6–7th District Police Headquarters as a suspect 
on 22 November at 19:37 p.m. and taken into custody at 20:00 p.m. based on the 
statements he had made during the interrogation. The HHC’s dispatcher service 
was only notiﬁed at 22:07 p.m. Following the complaint by the HHC’s attorney, 
the head of the police headquarters’ criminal department found that as no defense 
counsel had been appointed before the detained defendant was interrogated, the 
interrogation was conducted in violation of the CCP’s provisions and ordered the 
repeated interrogation of the suspect.
The already quoted NPH survey also touches upon the problem of what 
types of deprivation of liberty constitute detention in the sense of the CCP. The 
results of the survey show that the Hungarian police practice may not be regarded 
as uniﬁed in this respect. “At the units of the Budapest Police Headquarters for 
instance ‘in those instances when during the short-term arrest or after the urgent 
investigative actions it became likely that the perpetrator will be taken into a 72-
hour detention, a counsel was appointed before the ﬁrst interrogation.’ Basically the 
same practice is followed by Baranya, Bács, Békés, Borsod, Csongrád, Győr, Heves, 
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Jász–Nagykun–Szolnok, Nógrád, Pest, Somogy, Szabolcs, Zala and the Highway 
Police and some police stations of Veszprém County.
A diﬀerent course is followed in Komárom County, where the defendant 
is interrogated during the short-term arrest, and only subsequently, a decision is 
made on his/her 72-hour detention and the appointment of a counsel. A counsel is 
appointed during the short-term arrest only if the oﬀense the suspect is charged with 
is punishable with imprisonment of ﬁve years or more.”68
Yet another approach is used in Vas ands Békés Counties. In Vas County, 
“the counsel is appointed and notiﬁed before the ﬁrst interrogation, whereas in cases 
when after the interrogation it becomes clear that a 72-hour detention needs to be 
ordered but no counsel was appointed and notiﬁed beforehand, these interrogations 
must be repeated after the appointment of the counsel.”69 In Békés County “if the 
necessity of ordering the 72-hour detention arises after the interrogation, but no 
counsel was appointed, within 24 hours a counsel is appointed and notiﬁed, and the 
interrogation is repeated.”70
There is a fourth type of practice followed by the National Investigation Oﬃce: 
“if the suspect is interrogated while in short-term arrest, no counsel is appointed 
since the law contains no such obligation. If during the interrogation we obtain 
information that makes a 72-hour detention necessary, we close the interrogation, 
order the detention, and appoint a counsel. After the appointment and notiﬁcation 
of the counsel, we continue the interrogation with obligatory attendance by the 
counsel.”71
This is the practice that the authors of the NPH survey ﬁnd the best, however, 
this course of action eliminates the safeguards which the CCP provision making the 
appointment mandatory before the interrogation aims to guarantee. After making 
a statement during the short-term arrest, the defendant’s position will deﬁnitely be 
weaker than it would have been if he/she had been assisted in his/her testimony by 
a lawyer.
The problem was solved by an amendment of the law, which takes the results 
of the program into account but will come into force only after the Program comes to 
a conclusion. Article 4 of Joint Decree 23/2003. (VI.24.) of the Minister of Interior 
68 Equality of Arms, p. 33.
69 Equality of Arms, p. 34.
70 Equality of Arms, p. 34.
71 Equality of Arms, p. 33.
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and the Minister of Justice on the Detailed Rules of Investigation Conducted by 
Organizations under the Minister of Interior will be amended as of 1 July 2007. In 
terms of the amendment, “a person taken into short-term arrest [on the basis of the 
Police Act], shall be entitled to the right of defense from the beginning of the short-
term arrest.” Article 6 of the Decree is also amended: “the suspect’s right to retain a 
lawyer shall be guaranteed from the beginning of the short-term arrest.” 
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5. Conclusions Drawn 
 from the Pogram
As we mentioned above, in order to provide an opportunity for all participants to form 
his/her opinion, we distributed questionnaire sheets to the participating attorneys, 
police bodies and to the defendants represented under the program as well. Below 
we will review the results of these, the conclusions of the round table held on 20 
April 2006 (hereafter: Round Table), the opinions voiced at the Closing Conference, 
as well as the HHC’s own conclusions. During the evaluation we focused on what 
diﬃculties may arise, and what solutions may be available for them if the Program 
was implemented on a countrywide level. 
5.1 Replies to the attorneys’ questionnaire
The questionnaire on the opinion of the lawyers was returned by 27 of the lawyers 
participating in the program. Hereby we will attempt to summarize their most 
important observations in such a way that occasionally we quote word by word from 
their answers. The questions are set in italic. 
1. In your opinion what are the advantages of the Program compared to the 
 ex oﬃcio appointment system?
24 (88%) out of the 27 attorneys answering the questionnaire thought that the 
program has certain advantages compared to the ex oﬃcio appointment system. Two 
lawyers have not experienced such an advantage, one respondent’s view was that 
taking the shortness of time into consideration, no valid answer can be given to this 
question. 
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The respondents enumerated a number of advantages. The majority highlighted 
that the presence of the defense counsel is ensured during the investigation phase.
 
“The duty service system has established the possibility in practice, to minimize 
the time period which the defendant has to spend without a defense counsel.”
“The program constituted a complete system (dispatcher service, etc.) which 
eﬀectively ensured the opportunity to provide defense instantly, within one to 
two hours.”
 “Contrary to the ex oﬃcio appointment system, here the defense counsel is 
present at every procedural action in all cases. However, I don’t see a substantial 
diﬀerence form a practical point of view.” 
“The defense counsel is eﬀectively present throughout the whole procedure at 
every procedural action, which is an obvious guarantee for the defendant.”
“Its only advantage in the investigation phase is that the ﬁrst interrogation does 
not take place until the attorney arrives.”
“I would highlight the following as an advantage of the Model Legal Aid 
Program: […] The […] eﬀective assurance of the defense counsel’s presence at 
all investigative, procedural actions.”
“The most important advantage is that the defense counsel is notiﬁed even 
about the ﬁrst interrogation, so he/she has the opportunity to take part in 
that. Ex oﬃcio appointment […] at many times commences only in a later 
phase of the procedure. […] The legal service of the colleagues acting under 
appointment is in many cases formal, and they only appear at procedural 
actions when it is mandatory. […] It is my conviction that in criminal cases the 
active participation of the defense counsel in the investigation phase is at least 
as important as in the court phase. Acting in the framework of the program we 
undertook to participate in all possible procedural actions, thus the defense was 
more eﬀective.”
“The defense counsel is present at the ﬁrst interrogation of the defendant, which 
in the given case may change the outcome of the criminal procedure.”
“Its primal advantage is that the defendant was provided with an appropriately 
trained defense counsel in every case and every time. (We know that later, in 
the court stage the testimony made during the ﬁrst interrogation is often of 
decisive signiﬁcance.)”
“In my opinion it has a signiﬁcance from the defendant’s point of view that the 
defense counsel arrives to the ﬁrst investigative action.”
“The attorneys participating in the program consider it as an obligation to 
contact the case oﬃcer and the defendant without delay, and to participate in 
every interrogation and court hearing, and to use their legal means distinctly.”
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They mentioned it as an advantage that the defense counsel is not appointed 
by the investigating authority (which is not really interested in eﬀective defense 
performance), but by an independent body, which may also serve as a solution for 
the problems arising from the defendants’ distrust against the appointed lawyers. 
“The Program eliminates one conﬂict of interest. […] The defendants somehow 
feel it as a conﬂict of interest that the same Authority strives to prove their guilt, 
and at the same time it chooses and appoints a defense counsel at its own 
discretion. They consider it to be a contradiction.” 
“It should be mentioned as a fundamental advantage of the program that the 
selection and appointment of the defense counsels is done independently from 
the investigating authority. This can eliminate the unfortunate practice that 
the investigating authorities work with a steady group of defense counsels 
who either do not even appear at procedural actions, or if they do appear, 
they do not put much of an eﬀort into defense […]. Naturally the present 
system operates under the principle that the defense counsel to be appointed 
during the investigation should not substantially “disturb” the work of the 
investigating authority in this otherwise most critical phase of the procedure. 
The program eliminates this malfunction of the system, for the appointing 
“authority” and the acting authority is separated from each other, thus the 
interest of the defense counsel is diﬀerent from the one in the present system. 
The attorneys acting under the police’s appointment in a countless number of 
cases have an indiﬀerent attitude during the procedure because this is what is 
expected by the appointing authority, and only if they act accordingly, will they 
get further appointments. In the case modeled by the program the distinctness 
of the appointing and acting bodies in itself decreases the abovementioned 
danger […].
Obviously if the appointing and the acting authority are separated form each 
other, the distrust which in many cases is present on the part of the defendants 
toward the defense counsels can fundamentally be decreased. How could a 
detainee, or a defendant suspected with a serious criminal oﬀense trust in an 
attorney, who is appointed by the authority whose task in the given case is to 
prove that the given person committed a crime. This distrust can be intensiﬁed 
by the defendant sensing that there is a long-lasting, or even colloquial relation 
between the defense counsel and the acting detective? And these are serious 
problems that need to be solved. The program’s answer seems to be pointing 
into the right direction.” 
Some respondents highlighted the eﬀectiveness resulting from the uniformity 
and centralized character of the system. 
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“The advantage of the Program is, that the duty service is operating according 
to a set schedule and order, therefore the appointment can be expected in 
advance. […] The higher degree of organization guaranteed by the Committee 
is by all means an advantage.”
“Another advantage of the program is that if the attorney is not available 
another attorney can be found quickly by the dispatchers. […] If the “single 
hand” system could be implemented […], the Program […] could relieve 
the investigation authorities and the courts, for it should not be their task to 
reconcile between the attorneys being unavailable at many times.”
“The agreement forced the […] police bodies to act instantly in all cases in 
accordance with the stipulations of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The above cannot always be stated about the general police practice conducted 
in appointment cases. 
Within the police there is no clear system that would regulate which police 
body appoints which attorney. No one is coordinating this, there is no method, 
control and supervision at all about who is appointed.”
Some respondents mentioned the positive impacts of the monitoring of 
the attorneys’ performance. (We shall come back to the controversial issue of the 
supervision of professional work in Section 4.)
“[The] advantage of the Program is that the participating attorneys do their job 
more fairly, more thoroughly than the appointed defense counsels.”
“Compared to appointed lawyers it is a plus by all means, that in this system the 
defense counsel hands in written submissions as well, which is rare in the case 
of appointed lawyers. Due to the reporting obligation, the defense counsels are 
more prepared, the defense technique is more carefully planned […]”
“Its main advantage is the monitoring of professional standards.”
“I would highlight the following as an advantage of the Model Legal Aid 
Program: […] Expectations concerning a higher degree of professionalism, and 
compliance with this expectation.” 
Many thought that the attorneys participating in the program were 
appreciated more by the authorities and/or the defendants than appointed counsels. 
As a possible reason for this, the respondents marked the formal procedural legal 
status of the HHC attorneys (they are acting as retained lawyers).  
“The police may take the defense counsel appointed under the program more 
seriously.”
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“Under the program the acting attorneys can perform defense like retained 
lawyers do, and in this framework their performance is more responsible and is 
of higher standards. The status of the attorneys participating in the program is 
higher, and the investigative bodies are more retained.”
“It […] can be stated that the investigative bodies participating in the system 
tried to provide the defense with all the necessary help.”
“There is a huge advantage of the program compared to the […] appointment 
system, for the attorney acting in the program’s framework provides defense 
for his/her clients in a retained lawyer status, which obliges them to do his/her 
best.” 
 “The advantage with regard to the client is that the defense counsel acts under 
a retainer, which makes the role of the defense counsel ‘more serious’ in the eyes 
of the authority, while at the same time the client feels too that […] he/she does 
not only have an appointed lawyer. Regarding the defense counsel, the same 
so-called ‘seriousness factors’ come into consideration related to the work with 
the authority.” 
The last group of advantages consists of the remarks on higher remuneration, 
and on those activities that are not covered in the appointed lawyers’ remuneration 
system, but are paid under the program.  
“Better pay allows more devoted work.”
“Compared to the appointment system, under the Program the attorney 
receives remuneration not only for the work performed at the court hearing or 
the police interrogation, but receives fee for the time spent on studying the case 
ﬁles and preparing submissions as well as the stamp duty for copying of the case 
ﬁles, and even the travel expenses and mailing costs are also reimbursed. It is also 
an advantage of the program that the hourly fee of the attorney is higher than 
that of the appointed defense counsel. Due to the above the defense counsel 
may perform a more eﬀective job under the program than in the appointment 
system.” 
“It was an additional advantage that due to their realistic ﬁnancial appreciation 
the attorneys participating in the program fulﬁlled their tasks with the same 
attention as if they were retained defense counsels.”
“I would highlight the following as an advantage of the Model Legal Aid 
Program: […] Keeping contacts with the clients beyond the procedural actions, 
and the fact that these consultations are remunerated even if they take place in 
the lawyer’s oﬃce.” 
“There is one single advantage compared to the appointment system, that the 
rate of the fees is fairly more favorable.”
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“The higher hourly fees and the reimbursement of night travels are also an 
evident advantage.”
“It is not negligible that the remuneration of the defense counsel is higher than 
the appointed lawyers’ fee.”
“Obviously it is also an advantage of the program that it applies a remuneration 
for the defense counsels which is higher than the present one, and a fair 
reimbursement of costs, for this is also an aspect of fundamental importance. It 
is an old truth that if somebody is paid better, it is justiﬁed to expect high quality 
professional work from him/her. The rate of remuneration is an important issue 
in that regard. If the rate is suitable, then perhaps defense counsels will not 
strive to get more and more appointments, but maybe their time and energy 
can be saved for fair and high quality professional work as well. 
“The remuneration of the defense counsel is higher than that of the appointed 
lawyers.”
“Higher fees are paid.”
2. In your opinion, what are the disadvantages of the Program compared to the 
 appointment system?
3. If in your view there are disadvantages of the Program, how would you eliminate 
 them?
19 out of the 27 respondents (70%) thought that the Program has certain disadvantages 
compared to the appointment system. Several of the problems indicated by the 
lawyers stem from the experimental nature of the Program, its ﬁnancial and time 
limits. After short-listing these, we will review the attorneys’ opinions regarding only 
those disadvantages (and possible solutions for eliminating them), which can arise 
in case of an eventual nationwide introduction of a system being similar to the one 
tested under the Program. 
One of the problems originating from the time limit of the Program and 
mentioned by several lawyers is that the Program’s scope does not extend to the 
second instance procedure. It is also a result of the experimental character of the 
Program that is not widely known among defendants and courts. If a system similar 
to the Program replaced the appointment system, this would obviously make the 
amendment of criminal procedural law necessary, in which case the mechanism for 
designating the defense counsel would be clear both for the authorities and for the 
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clients. This naturally would make the lengthy brieﬁng of the clients before the ﬁrst 
interrogation (mentioned as a problem by a number of respondents) unnecessary too. 
The solution held to be awkward by many, that the surveying of the indigence 
of defendants was the task of the attorney, was also made necessary by the experimental 
nature of the Program. The traditions of the Hungarian criminal procedural law 
make legal aid provided by appointed defense counsels conditional on not the 
ﬁnancial situation of the defendant, but on other speciﬁc characteristics (juvenile 
age, mental disorder, detention, severity of the punishment for the act committed, 
and so on), i.e. on the interest of justice, requiring that defense be provided to those 
defendants who are in a more defenseless situation than the average. Due to this 
reason, it is possible that even if the appointment system is reformed, the principle 
of indigence will not be an issue (and similarly to the present situation this aspect 
will only appear in the procedure in cases of personal cost exemption). Nevertheless, 
it seems certain that whatever system will be introduced in the future, surveying and 
checking indigence shall not be a task burdening the attorneys. 
The requirement of “duplicating” the ﬁles is also a consequence of the 
experimental nature of the Program. In order to evaluate the Program’s ﬁnal 
results, an exhaustive review of each case will be necessary, however, due to the ﬁle 
archiving obligations of attorneys and due to the fact that when HHC draws the 
ﬁnal conclusions of the Program some cases may still be in progress, it is unavoidable 
that the full documentation of the cases managed under the Program has to be at 
the disposal of the HHC. Forwarding ﬁles is also necessary for us to examine the 
possible methods for monitoring the quality of professional work; however, in a 
system operating on a national level it would indeed be unrealistic to expect the 
attorneys to forward all the documents of a particular case.
Beyond the above problems – mentioned by several respondents – there 
were some more speciﬁc objections raised only by few individuals. Such was the 
expectation (which again stemmed from the aims and experimental nature of the 
Program) that the participating attorneys should as much as possible avoid to have 
the work done by their trainee lawyers. Only one respondent raised as a problem the 
fact that some defendants, not fully understanding the functioning of the Program, 
thought that the defense counsel granted by the Program provides defense in all of 
their cases in progress. Another respondent raised the issue that keeping contact with 
detained defendants on a monthly basis means a disproportionate burden when the 
defendant is detained due to another case outside the seat of the attorney. 
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These three problems, which are at least partly independent from the 
experimental nature of the Program, and which many respondents referred to, are the 
operation of the duty system, the administrative workload burdening the attorneys, 
and the method of costs reimbursement. (When reviewing these issues, due to their 
relevance, we will also quote some of the answers given to questions no. 5. and 6.)
Many noted that undertaking the duty service is an obligation that poses a 
signiﬁcant burden on the attorneys, in exchange for which some kind of remuneration 
would be reasonable, with special regard to the fact that on duty days complying with 
other obligations may be diﬃcult. For the case of potential countrywide introduction 
of a similar system, several respondents noted that by creating appropriate groups 
and allocating duty days in a proportionate manner, it could be guaranteed that there 
is always an available attorney. 
“The duty service poses transportation problems at night, in wintertime.”
“It is possible that a duty system elaborated for every day of the year could be 
introduced as well. This schedule should be issued by the Bar once a year, and 
should be sent to the police, the prosecutor and the court. If someone had a 
conﬂicting obligation or was unable to fulﬁll the duty obligation due to any 
other acceptable reason, it should be reported to the Bar well in advance.
I do not know how many colleagues are on the list of ex oﬃcio appointed counsels, 
thus I cannot even estimate how many times per year I should be on duty or how 
many cases I should take as an appointed defense counsel in such a system.” 
“If the duty service system was introduced on a national level, many colleagues 
would have themselves removed from the appointed defense counsel list, for 
they would not be able to meet the requirement of constant availability on the 
duty day. But then a professional group dealing with only this activity could 
evolve.” 
“It is possible to establish a duty service system, but care should be taken to 
make sure that those who undertake duty or actual, substantial defense work 
on bank holidays or even national holidays, should be adequately remunerated 
even if this means that remuneration of those attorneys who work only on 
business days will be lower. In order to keep the fairness of assignments […] 
proportional distribution of appointments should be maintained in the future 
as well.”
“A duty fee should be introduced for duty service periods.”
“From the defense counsel’s point of view the small number of cases compared 
to the large number of duty days […] is a disadvantage. There is no extra 
remuneration to compensate duty service, although in the duty period no 
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other work can be done, so the income of those with only appointments would 
decrease.”
“The national implementation of the system could be done by establishing 
groups of attorneys beside each police headquarters, the number of attorneys 
in each group could be determined in proportion with the number of the 
residents of the area, or by using the data of local statistics on appointments; 
the attorneys would conclude a contract with the Ministry of Justice like we 
did with the HHC. […] The duty service system could be established but with 
a duty fee […].”
“The appointment system should be amended in such a way that appointed 
defense counsels too should provide defense on a duty-basis on Saturdays, 
Sundays, and other bank holidays, primarily in the pre-trial detention 
procedure, where the judge and the prosecutor are also on duty. The defense 
counsel appointed in the particular case would provide defense in the rest of 
the procedure, this way defense counsels would be relieved from unnecessary 
workload. Later, if this model was successful, this could be extended to the 
actions of investigative authorities on Saturdays and Sundays as well as after 
working hours, in a way that is similar to the system of the program of the 
Helsinki Committee, namely that on certain days the counsel is waiting for the 
call of a given investigating authority based on a duty schedule.”
“The duty service is a fundamental diﬃculty of the Program, because an 
attorney may undertake it on an occasional basis, but in the long run it cannot 
be solved, for in many cases the lawyer’s work schedule is tight already, which 
may be upset by an unexpected call and the related obligation to appear, and 
due to this problem the acting attorney may face an impossible task. […]
Obviously, if the number of participating lawyers is higher the duty service system 
means a more tolerable workload. In my opinion, colleagues undertaking to be 
available for appointments may be assigned into larger groups, and the schedule 
for who can be alarmed could be set in advance on an annual or quarterly basis. 
Probably, on the level of the capital or individual counties it can be estimated 
how many appointed defense counsels are needed monthly or quarterly, thus 
the number of the participants in the groups could be determined accordingly. 
If a suﬃcient number of attorneys is assigned to each group and these persons 
will know in advance in which periods they can expect to be appointed, then 
probably there always will be a defense counsel available for the appointing 
body. Naturally, I could also imagine that some kind of remuneration would 
be payable for standing by, which also could ensure that there will be defense 
counsels who undertake this stricter duty obligation.” 
“Such a system is workable with a smaller number of defense counsels, but it 
requires a dispatcher service, which in case of a larger number of lawyers would 
mean a signiﬁcant increase in costs. […] In the present system of the Program 
[this disadvantage] cannot be eliminated.”
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As it was outlined under Section 1., some respondents mentioned as an 
advantage that the hourly fees are higher than the remuneration of the appointed 
defense counsels, and also that certain activities that are not payable in the ex oﬃcio 
system (consultation with the defendant at large, drafting documents, night travel) 
are remunerated in the Program. At the same time several respondents regarded as a 
disadvantage the fact that certain costs were not payable in the Program. As a solution 
for this problem (also as a possible method for relieving the administrative burden 
that comes with the accounting based on hourly fees and itemized cost reporting) 
many raised the possibility of introducing a ﬂat-rate for costs. 
“In order to decrease the administration that poses a disproportionately huge 
encumbrance on lawyers, […] the application of ﬂat-rates already used in ex 
oﬃcio appointments may mean a solution.”
“Regarding the remuneration set within the framework of the Program, I think 
it should be improved too, as payment for waiting and consultations could not 
be requested in the system based on hourly fees.”
“That parking fees and mailing costs could not be reimbursed and very slow 
subsequent payment [constitute a disadvantage].”
“I feel that my work was not in proportion with the ignominiously low amount 
that was paid after the numerous reports I had to submit.”
“We should not spend a way too disproportionate amount of time on 
accounting and keeping the records of minor costs. Instead a ﬂat-rate should 
be added to the attorneys’ hourly fee set in percentages, the rate of which could 
now probably be determined. This for sure will not be absolutely ‘fair’, but this 
is totally accepted and workable in the everyday practice of attorneys.”
“I cannot accept [the fact] […] that the several hours spent for acquiring copies 
is not regarded as a useful activity.”
“The maximized time limit for certain issues […] is a disadvantage.” 
The administrative workload required under the program, which really 
exceeds what is usual in attorneys’ work is both the issue of payments and the 
problem of monitoring professional performance. Several respondents pointed out 
the reporting obligation itself, others its method, as one of the greatest disadvantages 
of the Program. Some suggestions were formed regarding how this obligation could 
be rationalized in the case of nationwide implementation. 
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“Maybe quarterly reporting would be realistic, because then there would be 
more time mainly in the court phase to get the documents.” 
“It would impose less encumbrance on the attorneys if reporting was done 
only in months when something actually happens in the case, or when actual 
legal work is performed in the interest of the defendant. […] The reporting 
obligation could embrace a longer period as well, e.g.: 1) From the start of the 
investigation to the presentation of the case ﬁles; 2) from the presentation of 
the case ﬁles to the submission of the bill of indictment; 3) from the scheduling 
of the ﬁrst court hearing to the ﬁrst instance verdict; 4) in the appeal procedure 
until the second instance verdict.”
“Taking into account the average length of criminal procedures, a report 
prepared every 3 months or biannually would be suﬃcient. The institution of 
reporting is good in itself, however it can only play its real role if it covers larger 
time intervals, or if the attorneys participating in the program were obliged to 
prepare a report only if there is a substantial progress in the given case.”
“Maybe the attorney should draft and submit a substantive report within x 
days following the closing of the given case (ﬁrst instance judgment), and 
simultaneously he/she could submit his/her request for fees and reimbursement 
as well. This is what the Board could review altogether, and then it would 
decide whether it accepts the report and for what amount the colleague could 
issue an invoice. 
If the dragging of the case caused a ﬁnancial diﬃculty to the colleagues, it 
should be made possible for the lawyer to request the fee during the procedure 
but in such cases he/she should report in detail about his/her activities until the 
time of the submission of the request.”
“I think the monthly reporting of events is unnecessary. I regard a longer period 
as viable.”
“I think that it is by no means appropriate that diﬀerent reports and statements 
must be prepared on a monthly basis. In my opinion it would be suﬃcient to 
report at the end of the case – i.e. the closing of the investigation –, and to 
break down participation to 30 minute-units is by no means necessary. Not to 
mention that the hourly fee is not paid for the time actually spent.”
“A signiﬁcant amount of paper and work could be saved if we accepted the 
system of payment voucher well-tried in the current appointment practice of 
the courts. On the voucher the number of hours spent, the amount of VAT and 
the fees for the hours are indicated. The voucher could be an attachment to the 
invoice. Obviously a uniﬁed form-sheet should be applied by the investigating 
bodies and the prison administration as well with regard to the personal visits. 
[…] A uniform legal regulation would be necessary. […] If there are 3–4 new 
cases per attorney, a quarterly report may be reasonable.”
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“If the Program was introduced on a national level, it would be suﬃcient 
to submit reports only in those months when there were actual substantial 
developments in the case.”
“[Reporting] would be suﬃcient after the closing of certain phases of each 
case.”
“I think written reports in biannual intervals would be suﬃcient […]; in the 
time between the reports consultations by phone, short statements would be 
adequate […]. These could be stored by data recording processes. The basis of 
invoicing could be the certiﬁcation of the authority on a uniform sheet, like the 
payment voucher today.”
“I could imagine a report prepared by the attorney not in accordance with a 
prepared form sheet, and only if a substantial event occurs in the procedure, 
not on a monthly basis. When I contact the client, and then at the closing of 
the investigation.”
“The attorney should write a report only after a substantial investigative or 
other procedural action occurred, the summary report should be submitted 
following the closing of the investigation, or the bringing of the ﬁrst instance 
judgment, based on certain elaborated aspects […]”
“ I feel it to be unnecessary and straining that a report has to be submitted even 
in those cases, where no substantive event occurred, therefore the case just came 
to a halt. If the number of cases is higher it may mean a more signiﬁcant burden 
on the defense counsel, who constantly ﬁghts with lack of time anyway. […]
With regard to the reports I would feel it suﬃcient to prepare a report only 
in case of substantial procedural actions, for the work of the defense counsel 
may be judged from these. It is questionable though whether in a ﬁnal system 
it would be necessary to attach detailed documentation to the reports. It 
seems that it would be suﬃcient to limit this obligation to certain parts of 
the documentation only, or to leave this out completely from the system. In 
the latter case it should obviously be made possible that the supervisory body 
obliges the defense counsel to attach documents in order to back up his/her 
report. Evidently the scope of documents depends on how intense supervision 
is to be performed over the defense counsels.”
“The report should be obligatory following the contact and at the closing of the 
given procedural phases only. Perhaps also in those months when a procedural 
action occurred.” 
There was an attorney who suggested the application of a solution that 
has proved to be workable in the (non-criminal) legal aid system operated by the 
Justice Oﬃce: namely that based on the characteristics of the particular case where 
the appointing body (which has to be separated from the investigating authority) 
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determines the expected number of hours at the time of the appointment, the client 
certiﬁes the usage of the hours permitted, the attorney issues the invoice based on the 
certiﬁcation of the client, and detailed reporting is done or diﬀerent documents are 
attached only if the lawyer requests the increase of the permitted number of hours, 
because more time is spent on the case than the previously determined timeframe.
“As it is known, there is the Justice Oﬃce, which already has a quite developed 
practice, from which the positive elements could be taken over. Such is, for 
example, that the oﬃce sets a certain number of hours at the time of the 
appointment. This naturally can be detailed further, e.g.: discussing the case, 
recording the facts: 2 or 3 hours; preparation: 1–2 hours; one court hearing: 
2 hours, which can be increased based on the protocol; consultation in the 
penitentiary institution, discussion: 2–3 hours. 
At the time of the appointment it should be considered how much time seems 
necessary for the diﬀerent activities. In practice, based on the reasoned request 
of the client and the attorney further hours can be permitted. Here we usually 
certify the amount of work with e.g. submissions, protocols, and thus later no 
such reports and certiﬁcations are necessary. […]
It is important to add the costs to the hourly fee: e.g. 500 HUF/hour […]. 
Based on the certiﬁcation of the client the attorney prepares the invoice within 
a given time. […]
At the time of the appointment the number of inevitably necessary hours has 
to be determined. I know that it is not easy to consider whether there is going 
to be a court hearing when the case is only in the police phase, but in the 
given case this does not pose a problem, since on the invoice the attorney shall 
indicate the hours used [from the permitted number of hours] along with the 
activity those hours were used for, and the potentially emerging questions can 
be cleared when handing over the invoice. Each activity (discussion, hearing, 
preparation, etc.) should be indicated already at the time of the appointment, 
and if these activities have really taken place during the procedure, they have to 
be indicated separately on the invoice.”
4. a) Do you have reservations regarding the system where an external body monitors 
  your professional activity? 
 b) Has your opinion changed about this issue during your participation in the 
  Program? What do you regard as an advantage and disadvantage of such a 
  supervised system? 
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This question divided the lawyers. From the 26 persons answering this question 14 
(54%) said that they have no reservations against such monitoring, 6 of them (23%) 
expressed some kind of aversion, while 6 (23%) gave an answer, from which it seemed 
that they consider the advantages and disadvantages to be of the same weight. 
Among those who replied as having no reservations against some kind of 
professional control, there were some who felt that such a system could even be 
distinctly useful. 
“I think the program is good and it is right that the activity of the attorneys 
is constantly monitored. This makes their activity considerably more planned 
and professional. Regular professional supervision and control is fair and good, 
I regard it as an appreciation of my professional work.” 
Others emphasize that it is a self-evident right for the person or organization 
paying the attorneys’ fee, to exercise some kind of supervision. 
“We consider a kind of external monitoring to be necessary during the work, 
since this is the only way in which the supervision of the adequate completion 
of the obligations encumbering the defense counsel can be performed.”
“In the retained defense counsel system too, there is a constant reporting 
obligation for the attorney towards the client.”
“An elaborated system can be certiﬁed and supervised only by monitoring, this 
is how its results can be evaluated.” 
Those who do not consider monitoring to be acceptable mainly base their 
views on the independence of attorneys and on the oﬀending nature of distrust, 
which in their view is also expressed in the administrative obligations imposed by the 
Program. In this latter regard many (including some of those who otherwise do not 
object to professional control) called attention to that detailed reporting should only 
be necessary in extreme cases. 
“In my view the system is over-administered, it gives the participants the 
impression that an external body is closely controlling whether there is excessive 
spending. There should be more trust towards the assigned colleagues, for 
excessive payment requests are easy to recognize for practicing lawyers. 
All the supervision which may infringe the independence of the attorney’s work 
is in my opinion unacceptable.”
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“[The] awkward administration […] does not only inﬂuence the work of the 
defense counsel, but gives ground to the suspicion that it is aimed at controlling 
the attorneys participating in the program, which may be insulting. […] I do 
not have reservations against an external body monitoring my activity, for I 
think that from a professional point of view it cannot really judge my work 
anyway, I rather feel that I have been supervised only in order to substantiate 
the necessity of payments.”
“There are legal obstacles to monitoring. […] A monitoring process is possible 
only if the Attorneys Act is amended accordingly. The consent of the Hungarian 
Bar Association is necessary for monitoring the attorneys’ work. […] Such a 
supervised system would be illegal […]”
“The administration should be decreased. There should be more trust in the 
integrity of the colleagues, perhaps in case of a strikingly high number of 
working hours they could be called to account on the reasons for the seemingly 
excessive numbers. […] Then if there are abuses, the conclusions must be 
drawn with regard to the lawyers concerned, but in connection with the other 
colleagues the presumption of innocence should be respected.”
“If it did not entail the existing and excessive reporting and administrative 
obligations, then actually I would not [have reservations], but the distrust is 
humiliating.”
Many respondents admitted that external supervision may have positive 
eﬀects on the standards of the professional work as well as to the activity of the 
defense counsel. Under Section 1., we have already quoted some opinions in this 
regard. When answering question no. 4, some respondents again highlighted this 
advantage of monitoring the defense counsels’ work. 
“The advantag[e of external control] is that this way the professional 
representation of the interests of the defendants is ensured. Its disadvantage is 
the excessive administrative obligation.”
“I can see so much advantage that the possible professional mistakes [of the 
lawyer] may be eliminated.”
“The advantage of a supervised system may be that the acting person is aware 
of the requirement that his/her work is to be performed precisely, responsibly, 
and therefore the standards of his/her work get higher.” 
“The advantage of a supervised system is that it incites everybody to a 
conscientious and professional work.”
“It is by all means an advantage of the system that the elimination of the possible 
professional mistakes may take place during the supervision.”
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“The advantage of supervision may be a constant incentive for the participants 
of the program to do their task more precisely and conscientiously, and to 
adopt not only the quantitative but the also qualitative approach during their 
work as defense counsels.”
“I would regard it as fair and good if an external body monitored the professional 
work of the attorneys. This by all means would motivate them to use their 
rights and fulﬁll the defense counsel’s tasks in all cases.”
An interesting viewpoint was raised by one of the lawyers, according to whom 
the supervision grants protection for the attorney against the unfounded complaints 
of the clients. 
“The advantage of a controlled system is that it can provide the lawyer with 
protection in cases when the client questions the diligent and high-quality 
professional work of the defense counsel.”
Even those who had no reservations concerning professional monitoring, 
pointed out as a drawback the disproportionate administrative burden entailed by 
such monitoring, while one lawyer considered the additional costs of monitoring, and 
another, the slowness of payments to be the most severe disadvantage of the system.
4. c) Is there a method for monitoring professional performance that is diﬀerent 
 from the one applied in the Program and would make the monitoring of the work 
 of ex oﬃcio appointed defense counsels possible without excessively limiting the 
 autonomy of attorneys?
With regard to this question a number of lawyers have claimed that although they 
have no fundamental reservations against external professional monitoring, they do 
not think that the work of ex oﬃcio appointed defense counsels could be controlled 
from the point of view of quality, which on the other hand does not mean that the 
possibility of a more formal type of monitoring focusing on the defense counsel’s 
participation in the procedure should be excluded.
“I think that it is not the quality of defense work that should be guaranteed. It 
is not possible to do. The level of performance of retained lawyers is also mixed. 
The monitoring should focus on whether the lawyer really takes part in the 
interrogations and court hearings.”
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“It is a crucial question. Ex oﬃcio appointed counsels are not ‘brought in’ the 
case by the trust of the client, but by the authority’s decision aimed at fulﬁlling 
a state obligation. And if somebody pays, he/she/it should have the right to 
exercise some kind of monitoring.
The question is obviously aimed at ﬁnding a method for monitoring the 
quality of the work of ex oﬃcio appointed defense counsels. I do not think 
that such monitoring would be possible. But the attitude of the lawyer could 
be controlled.
The system of fees could be used for this purpose, since when ﬁlling out the 
record of fees, the investigating authority (the court) at the same time certiﬁes 
the lawyer’s presence. [...] If the record of fees is compared to the list of all those 
procedural acts at which the lawyer could have been present in a particular case, 
it is easy to establish whether the lawyer fulﬁlled his/her obligations at least 
formally, by being there.
Naturally, the approach could be more than purely formal, but this segment of 
the system – i.e. its formal eﬃciency – should also be assessed. We all know that 
presence does not in itself reﬂect professional quality, but it could still mean a 
point of reference. [...]
This comparison could be the ﬁrst step to prove that the state takes its obligations 
seriously and does not simply ‘tick oﬀ’ this issue by spending some money on 
mandatory defense. It could also have an impact on the legal profession.”
“[I]f [professional control] means the monitoring of whether the professionally 
required minimum level of service is adequately provided, it may be justiﬁed, 
but in this case remuneration shall be allocated for maintaining contacts with 
the defendant outside the scope of procedural acts, independently from whether 
the defendant is detained or not.”
Others proposed random checks, or a combination of such checks with 
regularly repeated, comprehensive examinations.
“If the Program is introduced on a national level, the more thorough control of 
the professional board may be limited to severe cases, and cases in which such 
control is requested by either the client or the lawyer him/herself.”
“In my opinion, the improvement of the quality of the work of ex oﬃcio 
appointed defense counsels could be achieved through legislative changes, and 
random examinations performed by a professional body based on an elaborate 
methodology known to all the lawyers.” 
“If the appointing organ has an up-to-date register about who was appointed, 
when and for what case, then random checks or comprehensive subsequent 
examinations of a given period may ensure that everyone performs his/her 
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tasks at an appropriate quality level. It would be possible to adapt a solution 
similar to the one applied with regard to judges: at ﬁrst, every lawyer would 
be put on the list of ex oﬃcio defense counsels for a limited period of time, 
which would be followed by a comprehensive examination. In the framework 
of this examination the attorney could choose a certain number of cases, in 
which he/she acted as an appointed counsel, and the board performing the 
examination would have the right to choose the same number of cases. The 
attorney’s performance would be evaluated on the basis of the survey, and 
he/she would obtain the right to remain on the list for an indeterminate period 
of time, or would be removed from the list. Later on, the attorneys on the list 
could be checked randomly or in a comprehensive manner from time to time. 
The issues of conﬁdentiality and the lawyers’ autonomy could be solved if the 
monitoring body acted within an appropriate legislative framework.”
One of the lawyers emphasized that the only entity that could be authorized 
to exercise professional control is the bar association.
“The system of appointment should be modiﬁed. Lawyers should be appointed 
and monitored through the bar association. This requires the reform of the 
system of appointment and an increase in the fees. Furthermore, either the law 
should be amended or the police should be made to accept these changes. [...] I 
think that monitoring by the bar (maybe in combination with certain elements 
of the Program) would be a good solution. This would be an internal form of 
control, so it could positively inﬂuence the work done by attorneys.”
According to some attorneys, professional control should be exercised in 
the selection phase (with the addition that this would require a radical change in 
the prestige and remuneration of the work done by ex oﬃcio appointed defense 
counsels).
“It should be achieved that the provision of defense based on ex oﬃcio 
appointment is not seen as a burden but as professional acknowledgment. 
[... P]rofessional control should not mean the obligation to send reports – it 
should be exercised in the selection phase. What ought to be changed is the 
mentality that it is more than enough to formally provide defense. Of course 
some degree of monitoring would be required until we realize this objective.”
“A model similar to the Program would be good for the purposes of appointed 
defense work, but professional competence should also be required besides 
voluntary application, as it happened when the lawyers were selected for the 
Program. Appointed defense work could be seen as an honor for lawyers, but 
certain conditions must be set.”
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5. a) Do you regard the monthly reporting obligation of the Program as a disproportionate 
  administrative burden? 
 b) If yes, do you have an idea how the lawyers’ performance could be monitored 
  through a method that would be less demanding on the lawyers?
Out of the 25 persons answering this question, 12 (48%) regarded the reporting 
obligations as disproportionate, 5 lawyers (20%) said that it is a burden but not 
disproportionate, whereas 8 attorneys (32%) considered the reporting obligation to 
be acceptable. Since we have outlined the opinions on the administrative burden and 
the possibilities of performance monitoring above, here we would only like to refer 
to what has been already said.
6. Would you welcome if the ex oﬃcio appointment system would be replaced 
 nationally by a model similar to the one applied in the Program? If such a model 
 was introduced nationally, what problems may emerge in your view? (How 
 often could reports be required, could a professional monitoring body be set up, 
 would the operation of a dispatcher system be similar, is the means test used in 
 the Program applicable, and so on) Would you take part in such a system?
13 lawyers said that they would welcome the introduction of such a system, 2 persons 
said no, and 8 failed to take a clear stance on the issue. 11 lawyers said that they 
would participate in such a system (some of them with the addition that only if the 
modiﬁcations they proposed were taken into consideration).
Problems raised by the attorneys – besides the ones already outlined – were 
the following.
A number of lawyers mentioned that the solutions applied in the Program 
(duty system, monitoring of professional performance) would not be adaptable to 
the ex oﬃcio appointment system or would severely violate the interests of those 
lawyers who earn most of their living from ex oﬃcio appointments.
“I regard monitoring by a professional body to be acceptable, although it is 
clear that there would be a direct connection between the strictness of the 
control and the number of lawyers applying to be involved in the system.”
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“To run a system like this on a national level would require a huge apparatus, 
and – in light of their remuneration – the administrative obligations would put 
a disproportionate burden on ex oﬃcio appointed counsels.”
“It is obvious that such a duty system would mean a more even distribution of 
tasks for the legal profession as a whole, but it would deprive those colleagues 
who base their living on appointments from most of their income.”
“One of the most crucial diﬀerences between the ex oﬃcio appointment 
system and the Program is that one is based on a contract whereas the other is 
obligatory. I can hardly imagine such a reporting mechanism in a system like 
the ex oﬃcio appointment system.”
“On a national level the control of a professional body over attorneys would 
trigger a great outcry within the legal profession.”
“If the whole ex oﬃcio appointment system was replaced, monthly reporting 
and the copying of all the ﬁles would put a disproportionate burden on those 
colleagues whose practice consists mostly of ex oﬃcio appointments.”
“The way I see it is that for a lot of lawyers the manipulation of ex oﬃcio 
appointment fees is an important source of income. A lot of attorneys submit 
fee claims for tasks they have not performed. 
Furthermore, the present system of ex oﬃcio appointment is based on the close 
relationship (even friendship) between the appointing oﬃcer and the appointed 
lawyer, and it also must be mentioned that lawyers who appear at too many 
procedural acts or put forth too many motions are often excluded from further 
appointments.
The national introduction of such a system would lead to severe conﬂicts of 
interest.”
“I would deﬁnitely not welcome the replacement of the ex oﬃcio appointment 
system with a mechanism similar to the Program. One of the reasons is that 
there is no means test in the ex oﬃcio appointment system. [...I]f the laws 
on ex oﬃcio appointment were amended, only in that case could ex oﬃcio 
appointed defense counsels be requested to submit reports, especially because 
it is already a problem for them to participate in all procedural acts due to 
their wide-ranging obligations. It would mean a signiﬁcant step forward 
with regard to criminal procedures against juveniles if the law was amended 
to make sure that a juvenile may only be interrogated in the presence of the 
defense counsel. This of course would require lawyers acting in juvenile cases 
to have the infrastructure necessary for guaranteeing presence at interrogations 
– personally or through a substitute. Therefore, if we consider possibilities on 
a countrywide level, we come to the conclusion that appointments have to be 
sent to lawyers locally, from districts or areas close to their oﬃce or home.” 
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Others suggested that the deﬁciencies of the ex oﬃcio appointment system 
should be eliminated through alternative solutions that could be applied parallel 
or instead of the mechanism of the Program. The elements of the public defender 
model applied in common law countries also appeared among these ideas.
“I believe that the ex oﬃcio appointment system is not dysfunctional, and 
since the Program was only restricted to the police phase, it would be much 
better if the ex oﬃcio appointed counsels received a ﬁxed monthly amount they 
could base their living on, because this would enable them to organize their 
work more eﬃciently, they would not undertake too much, because this is what 
leads to the situation that they cannot appear at the police, since appearance 
before the court is mandatory. Everyone knows that that the lawyer has a more 
important role during the investigation, since not much can be done in the trial 
phase if the police has suﬃciently proved the oﬀense.”
“I do not consider the ex oﬃcio appointment system to be functional in its 
present form. A real solution would be the improvement of the professional 
and ﬁnancial conditions of this job, and there would be adequate professional 
control. [...]
The other solution could be ex oﬃcio appointed defense counsels organized 
into a separate profession (as civil servants or public employees), and receiving a 
salary from the state for their work. This version may raise problems in smaller 
settlements, but would deﬁnitely be feasible in Budapest.”
“I think that the idea to replace the ex oﬃcio appointment system with a 
system modeled by the Program is good and feasible. However, I would make 
it conditional on the introduction of the institution and status of ‘defense 
lawyers.’ Such lawyers would primarily do defense work. [...] This could make 
the control of a professional body workable, but this control would be exercised 
by the colleagues working in the system. If the number of cases rises, this 
control may become cumbersome and could require the setting up of a large 
apparatus.”
“I would only welcome [the countrywide introduction of a system similar to 
the of the Program] if the lawyers were employed by or permanently contracted 
to the Helsinki Committee, since if someone lives mainly from ex oﬃcio 
appointments, one or two cases per month will not secure his/her living.”
The last group of remarks comes from those who think that if the fees 
available for ex oﬃcio appointed counsels were similar to those paid by the HHC, 
the Program’s other elements could also be introduced on a national level.
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“In order to achieve that a high proportion of lawyers would be interested 
to participate in a national system – with special regard to the obligations 
stemming from a duty system – the level of fees paid in the Program should be 
applied on the national level as well.” 
“The introduction of a model similar to the Program would be desirable from a 
constitutional point of view as well, since in this case it would be justiﬁed to call 
on the lawyers to account for the quality of their work, which could improve 
the indigent citizens’ access to justice. The adequate remuneration of the work 
done could contribute to the moral acknowledgment of the job performed by 
ex oﬃcio appointed counsels who are at the moment looked down upon.”
“I would deﬁnitely welcome if the fees were increased to an acceptable level. 
This would enable those who are doing their job diligently to earn a decent 
living, and at the same time the moral ground for monitoring performance 
would be also created.”
7. Did you ﬁnd that some elements of your defense work were modiﬁed in the 
 framework of the Program, compared to when acting as an ex oﬃcio appointed 
 counsel? (Do you work diﬀerently? Is the attitude of the police, the prosecutor, the 
 court or the clients diﬀerent?) 
The opinions on attorneys’ work and the attitude of the authorities have already been 
quoted (see Sections 3.1. and 4.1.), therefore we only provide the answers concerning 
the behavior of clients. In this regard experiences seemed to be rather mixed. Out 
of the 20 attorneys replying to this question 4 (20%) said that the clients’ reactions 
were positive, 3 (15%) gave accounts of negative attitudes (mostly passivity), 5 (25%) 
described the reactions as varied, and 8 (40%) were of the opinion that clients did 
not see the diﬀerence between HHC lawyers and ex oﬃcio appointed counsels. This 
meant that the defendants were as distrustful as if the lawyers had been appointed 
counsels. Below, we are quoting some characteristic examples from each type of answer.
“The clients were very happy about the fair treatment they received, this is not 
what they are used to.”
“I have experienced passivity from the clients. Practically only I call them on 
the phone, never the other way round. There is one who is not available at all, 
he did not react to the letter in which I asked him to contact me […]. Only one 
case is in the trial phase, but there the defendant is more active.”
“Unfortunately the clients [...] are as distrustful as in ex oﬃcio appointment 
cases.”
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“The clients are biased against ex oﬃcio appointed counsels, but this can be 
changed if the lawyer’s attitude is appropriate. In the eyes of the clients there 
was not a clear distinction between HHC lawyers and ex oﬃcio appointed 
defense counsels.”
“The attitude of the clients depended upon how they were prepared by the 
authorities. Where they were informed that this is a professionally monitored 
system, the client knew that he/she would be in good hands. Where the 
dispatcher service was called because no one else was available, the client’s 
attitude was as if the lawyer was an ex oﬃcio appointed counsel.”
“Those clients who cared at all about their own case seemed to have more 
trust in me, but those who did not, remained indiﬀerent. Generally it can be 
said that the clients found my appearance strange at ﬁrst, and were therefore 
distrustful, but when it became clear that they would not have to pay for the 
defense, they soon accepted my services.”
5.2. Replies to the police questionnaire 
The answers given by the police organs involved in the Program are summarized in a 
structure similar to that of the above Section. With a view to the fact that the Program 
received only one notiﬁcation from the Department of Investigation of the BPH, 
this organ wrote in a letter that its personnel had not gained suﬃcient experience 
to provide a well-grounded evaluation of the Program. Accordingly, we received 
answers from the Department of Inquiry of the BPH (hereinafter: Department of 
Inquiry), and from the 6–7th District Police Headquarters, the 8th District Police 
Headquarters and the 13th District Police Headquarters.
1. What are the advantages of the Program compared to the ex oﬃcio system in 
 your opinion?
Three out of four police organs72 mentioned as an advantage of the Program that 
the defense counsel is present already at the ﬁrst interrogation and in this way 
the defendant’s right to defense is not infringed. According to the 6–7th District 
Police Headquarters the greatest advantage of the Program was that the dispatcher 
72 Department of Inquiry, 8th and 13th District Police Headquarters
H u n g a r i a n  H e l s i n k i  C o m m i t t e e      W i t h o u t  D e f e n s e
94
system “took over the burden of ﬁnding an appointed lawyer,” although this issue 
can otherwise be considered to be solved because “most of the lawyers who can be 
appointed are available any time of the day and if later they should have any other 
engagement they can arrange their own substitution.”
2. What are the disadvantages of the Program compared to the ex oﬃcio system in 
 your opinion?
3. If there are any disadvantages how would you eliminate them? 
According to the 6–7th and the 13th District Police Headquarters the Program has 
no disadvantages at all. (The 6–7th District Police Headquarters noted in its answer 
that certain ex oﬃcio lawyers made verbal complaints at the police organ that the 
hourly fee in the HHC’s Program is higher than the fee paid by the government.) 
In contrast, both the Department of Inquiry and the 8th District Police 
Headquarters mentioned the temporal consequences of the obligation to wait for the 
lawyer as the primary disadvantage of the Program.
“In relation to the lawyers appointed within the framework of the Program we 
experienced that they could arrive at the interrogation only after a long time 
– hours – following the notiﬁcation. This in certain cases slowed down the 
procedure, especially in case of urgent procedural actions or actions taken in the 
evening and at weekends. As a result, the number of unnecessary overtime hours 
– i.e. overtime not connected to real activities – increased signiﬁcantly.”73
“The duration of taking initial actions also increased signiﬁcantly as the 
interrogation of the defendants involved in the Program could not be 
commenced until the lawyer participating in the Program had arrived, while at 
the same time the investigating authority is only obliged to notify the lawyer 
and according to the CCP it is not forbidden to start the interrogation in the 
absence of the defense counsel.”74
It seems to be a certain kind of internal contradiction to hold on the one 
hand that the participation of the lawyers is an advantage, to regard it as a guarantee 
73 Department of Inquiry 
74 8th District Police Headquarters
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for the realization of the right to defense, and on the other hand to object to having to 
wait for the lawyer to arrive – which is otherwise understandable from organizational 
point of view. 
The 8th District Police Headquarters would resolve this problem by 
determining a certain term for the lawyer to arrive, stipulating that if this term has 
elapsed the interrogation could be commenced without the presence of the lawyer.
“In case defense is mandatory, the policeman on duty selects/appoints a 
lawyer from a list compiled in advance or calls the dispatcher system to select 
a lawyer. After that the resolution appointing the lawyer shall be forwarded 
to the round-the-clock dispatcher system with the time of the interrogation 
indicated. The interrogation starts one hour after the notiﬁcation no matter 
whether the lawyer is present or not, as it is regulated by the CCP in force. If 
the lawyer arrives before or during the interrogation he/she and the defendant 
should have the possibility for a consultation and for submitting the retainer. 
In the course of this procedure the interrogation would not be unnecessarily 
drawn out, especially in the night.”
The Department of Inquiry mentioned that a duty system of lawyers should 
have been applied in the Program. As it has been outlined in Section 2., a duty 
system did exist in the Program but the lawyers assigned for a given day were not 
always available. Therefore it took long for the dispatcher system to ﬁnd a lawyer. 
Had there been more lawyers involved, it is likely that the duty system would have 
operated more smoothly.
The 8th District Police Headquarters mentioned as a further disadvantage of 
the Program the extra burden of administration, noting the following: 
“I found it rather inconvenient having to keep several records and that even 
this did not convince the HHC that the defendants were informed about the 
possibility of participating in the Program by the policeman on duty and that 
they refused to participate in the Program voluntarily.”
4. Did you experience any kind of diﬀerence between the activity and professional 
 competence of the lawyers participating in the Program and ex oﬃcio lawyers?  
Three out of four police organs did not experience any kind of diﬀerence between 
the activity of the HHC lawyers and the ex oﬃcio lawyers. In contrast, as we have 
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referred to it above, by the experiences of the 8th District Police Headquarters there 
was at least one lawyer who acted rather passively as an ex oﬃcio appointed counsel 
and became more agile when working within the framework of the Program.
5. Did you experience any diﬀerence compared to the normal routine in the course 
 of investigating cases involved in the Program (e.g. did more defendants deny to 
 testify? Did the possibly more numerous motions of the lawyers prolong the 
 average time of the procedures, etc.) 
The judgment of the 8th District Police Headquarters diﬀered from the other 
participating police organs in this aspect as well. The latter did not experience any 
diﬀerence between the cases of the Program and other procedures, while the 8th 
District – besides noting that there was no diﬀerence in the number of denials to 
testify – wrote the following:
“In part of the cases of the Program, especially in cases during which the 
defendant was taken into pre-trial detention, the lawyers’ motions and 
complaints – which later proved to be unjustiﬁed – heavily prolonged the 
investigation, making it impossible to conclude the investigation within 
the legally prescribed timeframe. Lawyers having no experience in criminal 
procedure prolonged the procedure by submitting every week or every second 
week requests for release of the defendant, because in line with the rules in force 
the documents with perfectly the same content were continuously circulating 
between the prosecutor and the court. And the presentation of case ﬁles can 
only take place in possession of at least one copy of these documents.” 
Although the statement seems to be a bit curious since due to the tender 
applied when selecting the lawyers only those could take part in the Program who 
had experience in criminal law and can be appointed as ex oﬃcio lawyers as well, 
we have no information about any cases in which requests for release had been 
submitted so frequently (it can also be presumed that lawyers would have requested 
a fee for preparing these documents, so the HHC would have knowledge about such 
instances), but it can be concluded from the answer that the HHC lawyers were 
more active than appointed lawyers, submitting more complaints and motions.
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6. Would you prefer if the ex oﬃcio system was replaced by a system similar to the 
 Program? What kind of problems could arise by applying the system at a national 
 level? (Is the duty system workable, is the means test used in the Program 
 appropriate, what burden it would mean that the ﬁrst interrogation cannot start 
 until the arrival of the lawyer?)  
In the view of the 13th District Police Headquarters it is indiﬀerent whether the ex 
oﬃcio system or another system similar to the Program operates in the country. The 
Department of Inquiry drew attention to the fact that the late arrival of lawyers 
endangers the eﬃciency of the investigation, therefore it is inevitable to ﬁnd a way in 
which lawyers can arrive faster at the interrogations. 
It can be established on the basis of the 6–7th District Police Headquarters’ 
opinion that the dysfunctions of the ex oﬃcio system have no impact; therefore the 
reform does not seem to be inevitably necessary. 
“The ex oﬃcio system is satisfactory for my authority, but my authority 
is certainly open for a model similar to the Program. The ex oﬃcio lawyers 
appointed by my authority are available at any time of the day and by this I do 
not primarily mean contact via fax but the direct contact via telephone. The 
appointed lawyers provide for their substitution if necessary.”
According to the 8th District the round-the-clock duty system is useful 
(bearing in mind the one-hour restriction mentioned above), but at the same time 
the whole system should be placed under the supervision of the Bar Association.
“I would request the Bar Association for cooperation, in which case ideally 
lawyers with experience in criminal procedure would be involved in the 
Program. The Program would be working partly under the supervision of the 
Bar Association. The 24-hour duty system is to be preserved if channeled into 
the operation of the Bar. [...]
I would prefer if a system similar to the Program existed but only within 
the operation of the Bar, under the supervision of Bar oﬃcials. This way 
professionalism could be guaranteed. [...]
I think that the reform of the ex oﬃcio system is suﬃcient (24-hour duty 
system), because a lawyer who has taken an oath must fulﬁll his/her obligations 
in the same way no matter who pays for the work. 
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Furthermore, I note that the topic of ‘the ﬁrst interrogation may not be started 
until the lawyer arrives’ problem can be wrapped up as follows: the proceeding 
authority – taken into consideration the rights of the defendant and assuring 
enough time for the lawyer to arrive (in Budapest at night and in the weekend 
one hour should be enough) – has the right to start the interrogation in the set 
time, and this right is also guaranteed by the law [...].”
Further police views on the possible reform of the system are articulated 
by the NPH survey. Due to the strong thematic connection, it seems necessary to 
list these here, although the answers described below were not given to the HHC’s 
questionnaire, but to the questions posed by the authors of the NPH survey. 
To the NPH’s question, whether it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd a lawyer who could 
be appointed, the answer was negative with the addition that “there are problems 
in certain periods (at night, during the weekend, on banking holidays), when less 
lawyers are available. Therefore, a number of police units suggested that the bar 
associations should come up with a duty scheme that could make the appointment 
of the counsel easier in the problematic periods as well. In Szabolcs County, there 
are some investigating departments that appoint the lawyers on the basis of a so-
called ‘system of rotation’, i.e. they always call the next person on the list provided 
by the bar.”75
Most police units saw no reason for the comprehensive reform of the ex 
oﬃcio appointment system. This conclusion seems to be in contradiction with the 
problems pointed out by the NPH survey, namely the low percentage of appointed 
counsels attending ﬁrst interrogations and the diﬀerence between the level of 
performance of appointed and retained lawyers (see what has been said about 
the NPH survey’s results under Section 1.2.2.). In spite of this, the police units 
interviewed in the course of the NPH survey “almost unanimously claimed [...] that 
there is no need to change the time honored system of appointments. According to 
the majority of the respondents, if the lawyers were appointed by another entity, 
that would complicate the procedure, increase the administrative burdens, have a 
negative inﬂuence on the timing of the investigation and would therefore lead to 
processes that are disadvantageous from the point of view of the right to defense. [...] 
The general stance [of the police] is that there is no reason to involve an organization 
independent from the police into the selection of lawyers. On certain occasions, the 
75 Equality of Arms, p. 41.
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fair and eﬃcient handling of the case is guaranteed by the personal acquaintance 
[between the police oﬃcer and the lawyer], and an organization independent from 
the police could not take such factors into account.”76 (We have already referred to 
the potentially negative consequences of personal connections between the police 
and the lawyer under Section 4.1., therefore, we only wish to call attention again 
to the obvious contradiction between the above quoted police opinion and the fact 
that in the majority of the counties the attendance of appointed counsels at ﬁrst 
interrogations remains below 50%.)
Besides the above outlined general opinion, there were some police units 
which did not exclude that a change in the system may have positive consequences.
“Although – similar to most of the interviewed units – the National Investigation 
Oﬃce does not agree with giving the right of appointment to an independent 
organization, it pointed out that a positive eﬀect of such a measure would 
be that ‘the Police could not be charged with always appointing their own 
acquaintances as defense counsels.’ [...] 
Nógrád County raised the idea of creating a ‘body of defense counsels’ that 
would be available 24 hours a day and has the sole responsibility of providing 
defense and taking care of other matters related to defendants. They suggested 
that this body could be established in attachment to the courts of the county 
bar association. The same is raised by Pest County, namely that a network 
independent from the Police would be favorable, but only if it was accompanied 
by a permanent duty scheme of defense lawyers [...].”77
Certain police units believe that the eﬃciency of the system could be improved 
through an increased accountability of lawyers. “Only Baranya County is of the view 
that the present system of appointment is insuﬃcient, because some of the lawyers 
are reluctant to take criminal cases. They raise the possibility of establishing a system 
of ‘compulsory appointment’ so that an appointment could be made anytime and 
anywhere. The county unit also refers to the inadequacy of the work performed 
by ex oﬃcio appointed counsels, which they would try to redress by ‘appropriate 
sanctions’.”78
76 Equality of Arms, p. 42.
77 Equality of Arms, p. 42.
78 Equality of Arms, p. 42.
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The authors of the NPH survey would also approach the problems from 
the direction of defense: “In order to raise the eﬃciency of the work of appointed 
counsels [...] we suggest the creation of a system in which only lawyers meeting certain 
criteria may be included in the list of attorneys who can be appointed. This would 
be a system based on qualiﬁcations and experience: it would make the possession 
and constant improvement of a solid knowledge of criminal law compulsory for all 
attorneys who wish to work in this ﬁeld. Even the passing of a specialized exam may 
be required. The attorneys who are part of this system based on adequate quality 
assurance may be called ‘defense lawyers’.”79
Not wishing to deny that there are strong arguments supporting the setting 
up of such a system, we have to point out that this type of specialization could only be 
required if the fees of appointed lawyers would be at least close to the market prices. 
If that is not the case, the introduction of such a system would only be feasible if only 
these “defense lawyers” were allowed to provide retained defense as well. The same 
opinion was voiced by dr. János Bánáti, President of the Hungarian Bar Association 
at the Closing Conference.
5.3. Replies to the defendants’ questionnaires
In order to assess the eﬃciency of the model tested in the Program, it was obviously 
inevitable to gain information on the defendants’ opinions. To this end, the HHC 
sent a letter to the participating defendants asking them to visit the HHC’s oﬃce in 
order to ﬁll out the questionnaire prepared for them. Based on a special permission 
given by the National Penitentiary Administration, members of the HHC visited the 
detained defendants in the penitentiary institution in order to have their opinions 
asked. The interviews were conducted in Spring and Summer 2006.
This way, we managed to contact 22 out of the 121 defendants. 20 of them 
gave comprehensible answers to the questionnaires. The questions posed coincided 
to a great extent with those included in the 2003 questionnaire concerning ex oﬃcio 
appointed defense counsels (see Section 1.2.2.), therefore, the answers given by 
defendants participating in the Program will be compared to responses provided in 
the 2003 research.
79 Equality of Arms, p. 42.
C o n c l u s i o n s  D r a w n  f r o m  t h e  P r o g r a m
101
One of the most important conclusion of the 2003 research was that even 
among defendants who were able to retain a lawyer, only 40.2 percent managed to 
contact their defense counsel before the ﬁrst interrogation (with regard to defendants 
with an ex oﬃcio counsel, this ration was 23.6 percent). As opposed to this, in the 
Program every defendant had a lawyer present at his/her interrogation.
The next important issue is how active the lawyer is in the course of the 
investigation. This can be measured on two factors: (i) whether he/she is present 
at the investigative acts and (ii) whether he/she tries to inﬂuence the procedure by 
putting forth motions and comments.
All the 20 defendants participating in the Program said that their defense 
counsel had been present at the diﬀerent investigative acts. This is a much better 
result than that of the 2003 research in connection with the ex oﬃcio appointed 
defense counsels, in fact even better than the performance of retained lawyers as 
shown by that research.
Table 3: According to your knowledge, did the defense counsel take part at any procedural 
 action during the investigation?
Response Respondents who had 
ex oﬃcio defense 
counsels (234 persons) 
– 2003 research
Respondents who 
had retained defense 
counsels (220 persons) 
– 2003 research
Defendants participating 
in the Program 
(20 persons)
Person % Person % Person %
Yes 70 29,91 149 67,73 20 100
No 123 52,56 52 23,64 — —
Trainee attorney 
was present
3 1,28 6 2,73 — —
Does not 
remember
39 16,67 21 9,55 — —
In the 2003 research the same respondent could give several responses (e.g., sometimes the defense 
counsel and sometimes the trainee attorney participated at certain actions).
The Program’s results with regard to activities beyond simple presence were 
also better than those produced in 2003 in relation to ex oﬃcio appointed counsels. 
Compared to the responses related to retained lawyers in the 2003 research, the 
Program’s results are somewhat better, however, the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant 
statistically. This seems to support the conclusion that if there is some sort of control 
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(usually by the client who is able to withdraw the retainer, in the Program by the 
Board), this obviously inspires the lawyer to show a high level of activity. In the case 
of ex oﬃcio appointed defense counsels – where there is no such control mechanism 
– the results are signiﬁcantly worse.
Table 4:  According to your knowledge, did the defense counsel/trainee attorney make any 
 motions in the course of the procedure?
Response Respondents with 
ex oﬃcio defense 
counsels – 2003 
Respondents with 
retained defense 
counsels – 2003 
Defendants participating 
in the Program 
(20 persons)
Person % Person % Person %
Yes 92 38,17 171 77,73 17 85,00
No 100 41,49 30 13,64 2 10,00
Does not know, 
does not remember
49 20,33 19 8,64 1 5,00
Total 241 100,00 220 100,00 20 100,00
In the case of detained defendants the frequency of visits paid by the 
lawyer to the client is also of great importance. In the 2003 research out of the 494 
defendants responding to the questions concerning defense counsels, 261 had ex 
oﬃcio appointed counsels. Out of them, 181 (69%) met his/her lawyer in the course 
of the procedure. The number of defendants claiming that the counsel visited them 
on his/her own initiative was 51. This means 27% of the 181 defendants who met 
their lawyer, and 19% of all the defendants with ex oﬃcio appointed counsels. 24 
(13 or 9% respectively) said that the lawyer visited them upon their request. In 2003, 
out of the 233 defendants with retained lawyers, 216 met the counsel by the time of 
the interview. Out of them 105 (49%) said that the lawyer visited upon his/her own 
initiative, and the same number of respondents gave an account of a visit paid upon 
the defendant’s request. 
All 12 pre-trial detainees participating in the Program and responding to 
the questionnaire said that they had been visited by the lawyer provided by the 
HHC. This should be obvious, as in the agreement outlining the lawyers’ obligations 
in the framework of the Program, it is stated that they shall visit their detained 
clients with the necessary frequency but at least once a month. In fact, the answers 
given to the questionnaire show that only some of the participating counsels met 
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this requirement. Out of the 10 detained defendants responding to the question 
concerning the frequency of the visits, 4 claimed that their lawyer visited them once 
or more per month. One respondent gave account of one visit per two months, 
another one of one visit per four months. Two persons stated that by the date of the 
interview (i.e. in about one and a half years) there was only one visit, in one case 
this number was three, and one responding defendant said that he did not know the 
exact number but he felt that his lawyer visited very rarely.
The defendants’ general evaluation of the lawyers’ work in the investigation 
phase is summarized by the table below (only 19 persons responded to this question).






He/she works for the police* — —
Total 19 100
* This possibility was included in the questionnaire because during the 2003 research some 
defendants voiced such suspicions in connection with the ex oﬃcio appointed counsels.
The cases of altogether 11 defendants were in the court phase at the time of 
the interview. We posed the same questions to them in relation to this phase of the 
procedure. As the counsel’s presence is mandatory at the court hearings, conclusions 
concerning the lawyers’ level of activity could be drawn on the basis of the motions 
and comments made by the counsels before the court. Out of the 11 respondents 
8 (72%) said that the defense counsel made some kind of oral contribution to the 
procedure (question, motion, comment) and 4 (36%) claimed that the lawyer 
submitted written materials (petitions, motions) to the court. 4 persons said that 
they did not know whether any written contribution was made by the counsel, and 
only 2 persons said a deﬁnite ‘no’ to this question.
Those 9 defendants in the case of whom a ﬁrst instance decision had already 
been delivered at the time of the interview, gave the following responses in connection 
with the closing speeches made by the HHC lawyers.
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Table 6: What strategy did the counsel apply in the closing speech?
Response Person %
Requested an acquittal 3 33
Placed the emphasis on the mitigating 
circumstances
4 45
Did not question the charges in any way 1 11
Does not remember 1 11
Total 9 100
Out of the 9 respondents only 1 said that his counsel advised him to plead 
guilty. In the defendant’s view it was not fully reasonable in the given situation, 
however, in general he regarded the counsel’s work as excellent.
The defendants’ general evaluation of the lawyers’ work in the court phase is 
summarized by the table below 







The person who claimed that the HHC lawyer’s work was useless in the 
court phase is one of the two respondents who gave the same answer with regard to 
the lawyer’s performance with regard to the investigation phase. These defendants 
were reminded of their possibility to submit a complaint to the Board, which – if 
their complaint is well-founded – can provide them with another attorney taking 
part in the Program. (In the two and a half years of the Program, only two defendants 
resorted to this option – for more details see Section 5.4.).
Out of those 4 respondents who said that the HHC lawyer’s performance 
was useless or acceptable, one person identiﬁed the lack of regular contacts as the 
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reason for his dissatisfaction, while the other 3 said that their counsel did not pay 
enough attention to the case.
Since in the 2003 research we did not request the respondents to evaluate 
their lawyers in this way, in order to reach a certain degree of comparability, we 
asked those participating defendants who had been defended by ex oﬃcio appointed 
lawyers before to rate the performance of those earlier appointed counsels. Out of 
the 20 respondents 14 had previous experiences with appointed lawyers.
The respondents’ opinion of their former ex oﬃcio appointed counsels are 
summarized by Table 8 (not everyone responded to all questions).
Table 8: How would you rate the work done by your former ex officio appointed lawyer in the 
 investigation and court phase?
Response Investigation phase Court phase
Person % Person %
Excellent 2 19 2 20
Good 3 27 1 10
Acceptable 3 27 2 20
Useless 3 27 5 50
He/she works for the police — — — —
Total 11 100 10 100
If we compare these results with those included in Tables 4 and 6, we can 
see that a signiﬁcantly higher percentage of the defendants (53 and 46 percent in 
the investigation and the court phase respectively) considered the counsel provided 
by the Program to be excellent than the former ex oﬃcio appointed lawyer (19 
and 20 percent). Also signiﬁcantly more defendants said about their former ex 
oﬃcio appointed counsel that his/her work was useless (27 and 50 percent in the 
investigation and the court phase respectively) than about the HHC lawyers (11 and 
9 percent). 
We get a similar result if we only consider the HHC-related opinions of 
those participating defendants who had experiences with ex oﬃcio appointed 
lawyers earlier. Out of the 12 such defendants 6 (50%) said that the HHC lawyer 
did an excellent job in the investigation phase, and only 1 (8.3%) was of the opinion 
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that the performance of the counsel provided in the framework of the Program was 
useless (4 respondents rated the HHC lawyer’s work as good and 1 as acceptable). 
Out of the 12 defendants who formerly also had ex oﬃcio appointed counsels, 
the case of only 8 was already in the court phase at the time of the interview. Out 
of them 5 (63%) said that the HHC lawyer’s performance was excellent, 2 (25%) 
described the job done by the lawyer provided by the Program as good and 1 (12%) 
as acceptable. Out of these respondents no one was of the opinion that the HHC 
lawyer’s work was useless. 
Although the sample is very small, we may draw the conclusion that the 
defendants responding to the questionnaire had a much better opinion of the 
performance of the HHC lawyers than of the work done by former ex oﬃcio 
appointed defense counsels. 
5.4. Complaints in the Program
During the two and a half years of the Program’s operation two defendants submitted 
complaints to the Board concerning the performance of their lawyer.
The ﬁrst complaint was ﬁled in May 2006. In the particular case the ﬁrst 
interrogation took place on 11 October 2004. After this date the defendant was 
not informed about the case either by the authorities or by the attorney. Only in 
February 2006 did he learn that on 23 March 2005 the investigation had been 
accomplished and on 30 May 2005 the prosecutor pressed charges against him. 
The defendant acquired the case ﬁles and found out that the attorney had not been 
present at the “display of documentation” (the ﬁnal act of the investigation, during 
which the defendant and/or the lawyer is provided with the possibility of looking 
into all ﬁles of the case).
Although the defendant admitted that it was possible that the lawyer was 
also not informed about the display of documentation, he thought that the attorney 
ought to have tried to contact him during the one and a half years. Upon the HHC’s 
intervention, the lawyer consulted with the defendant on 20 February 2006, but this 
occasion did not convince the defendant about the lawyer’s commitment. On 9 May 
2006 he received a notiﬁcation that his ﬁrst court hearing was scheduled for 30 May 
2006. The following day he called the attorney, and asked him to discuss the case 
strategy in person. The lawyer answered that he could not meet him before 26 may, 
and that he was not sure that he would be able to be present at the hearing, but he 
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would do his best to be there. Following this conversation the defendant requested 
that the Board provided him with another lawyer, because he had no trust in the 
lawyer any more.
The Board requested the attorney to react to the complaint. He stated that 
he was not informed about either the display of documentation or the indictment, 
and this is why he was not present at the said procedural act and did not try to 
contact his client. He said that he had 6–700 cases per year, and therefore if the 
authorities do not notify him or the client does not contact him, he is not in the 
position to keep track of which cases progress in order and which do not. He called 
attention to the fact that never during those one and a half years did the client try 
to reach him in any way. With regard to the February meeting he claimed that the 
consultation had lasted for one and a half hours and that he had provided the client 
with all the necessary information. In relation to the hearing he admitted that due 
to his workload and other already scheduled court obligations it was possible that he 
would have to request a postponement of the hearing. However, in the light of the 
complaint, he agreed that due to the lack of trust the retainer should be terminated 
and the client should continue with another lawyer.
Since the authorities’ omission (the lack of proper notiﬁcations) was the 
primary cause of the problem and the client (who was not detained) did not try to 
contact the lawyer until he found out about the developments of the case, the Board 
did not regard the lawyer’s behavior as a breach of the contract he had concluded 
with the HHC. At the same time, due to the fact that the necessary trust between 
the parties was lacking, it agreed to the termination of the retainer and provided the 
complainant with a new lawyer.
The second complaint was submitted in July 2006 by a defendant who had 
been in detention since 20 October 2004. The essence of the complaint was that his 
lawyer had failed to appear at most investigative acts (interrogations) and to visit him 
in the penitentiary institution, although this would have been her obligation under 
the framework agreement concluded with the HHC. The client felt that the problem 
was urgent because his case came to the court phase. 
The HHC’s coordinator informed the lawyer about the complaint via 
telephone. She promised to immediately visit the defendant in the penitentiary and 
also to submit the documentation refuting the complainant’s claims concerning her 
absence from procedural acts. From the documents it became clear that with the 
exception of one interrogation (on the day of which she had an accident and was 
taken to hospital) the attorney was present at all procedural acts. Furthermore, after 
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the personal encounter the defendant withdrew his complaint. Consequently, the 
Board did not take any further measures. 
 
5.5. The court’s view on the Program 
The courts’ view on the Program will be outlined on the basis of the presentations 
given by dr. Zoltán Lomnici, President of the Hungarian Supreme Court at the 
Round Table and the Closing Conference.80
The President of the Supreme Court shares the HHC’s view on the fact that 
the eﬃcient operation of the ex oﬃcio appointment system depends on the eﬀective 
performance of four basic functions (management function, individual and general 
quality assurance and budgetary function). He also admits that “the need to ﬁnd a 
solution still prevails since the previous amendments of the legal provisions (increase 
of the hourly fees, free copies of the case ﬁles, increase of the number of free services) 
failed to make the system more eﬀective and because there are numerous examples in 
practice showing that the provision of defense during the investigation is still often 
just formal.”81
He thinks that “the Hungarian legal background in this regard is adequate, 
the law has a broad approach as to when the authorities are obliged to provide for 
defense. However, the legal framework does not always set out the safeguards clearly, 
thus causing uncertainty in the implementation.”82
Dr. Lomnici does not agree with the HHC’s presumption though, that there 
would be a conﬂict between the interests of the diﬀerent participants of the criminal 
proceeding: “I believe that the ex oﬃcio appointment system cannot be improved 
if the entities taking part in the procedure claim the problem to arise from their 
incompatible demands.”83 
Therefore he supposes that the dysfunctions of the system do not stem from 
the inherent conﬂicts but from the violation of the norms by the diﬀerent participants 
and the lack of proper control. “It is possible however, that even with a proper legal 
80 On 20 April and 30 November 2006. 
81 Dr. Lomnici’s lecture at the Round Table
82 Dr. Lomnici’s lecture at the Round Table
83 Dr. Lomnici’s lecture at the Round Table
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background, the individual goals of the participants of the procedure will distort 
the system in such way that it will not be able to fulﬁll its functions anymore.[...] 
It seems obvious [...] that the solution will not always be the amendment of legal 
provisions.[...] The evaluation of a system’s operation may not be based on the notion 
that some participants abuse the law, the system should not be formed on the basis of 
the extremes. The problem should be resolved through internal supervision which, 
in certain cases, could lead to disciplinary impeachment. When trying to point out 
the deﬁcient elements of the current framework of appointments, the expertise and 
knowledge of the persons acting on behalf of the diﬀerent authorities as well as their 
long developed working practice must be examined. It is possible, that even the 
overview of the given organization’s internal operation or the further training of its 
staﬀ itself can improve the eﬀectiveness.”84 
It has to be mentioned here that the empirical researches described above 
make it clear that during the investigation phase, dysfunction seems to be the 
“normal” course of action, since in most of the cases the appointed counsel does not 
contact his/her client and does not show up at the diﬀerent investigative acts. The 
NPH research has also pointed out that nationally the ratio of ﬁrst interrogations 
conducted in the presence of an appointed counsel is below 50%. This means that 
the problem’s roots go deeper than the individual responsibility of the participants 
of the procedure: the whole system is in a structural crisis, which can be improved 
by institutional control, but taking into account the extent of the problems, such 
control will not in itself be suﬃcient. 
The structural problems are closely related to the question of the participants’ 
conﬂicting interests. Obviously, this question does not arise as seriously with regard to 
the court phase as in connection with the relation of the investigating authority and 
the defense. After establishing a well-founded suspicion, the investigating authority 
conducts its investigation against a given person (the defendant) on the basis of a 
certain investigating concept. The aim of the defendant and his/her lawyer is to 
refute this concept, and sometimes to disable the investigation work as a whole (for 
example when the defendant makes a false confession, which is allowed by the CCP, 
unless the contents amount to false accusation of another party). The procedural 
positions of the two sides (the defendant and the investigating authority) are therefore 
fundamentally conﬂicting. 
84 Dr. Lomnici’s lecture at the Round Table
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The above does not mean that there cannot be a fair relationship between 
the participants, but it must be guaranteed that the investigating authorities do not 
exercise far too much power over the accused. The practice that it is the investigating 
authorities that choose the defendant’s counsel whose task is to assist the accused in 
refuting the concept of the investigation, leads to excessive power on the authorities’ 
side. The legal framework must be formed in a way that it always guarantees the 
realization of the legislative aim irrespective of the goodwill or malignity of those 
applying them. That is why the HHC still ﬁnds a structural reform necessary, the 
idea of which – by the way – is not rejected by the President of the Supreme Court.
The experiences of the Program conﬁrm those former opinions of professionals 
that it would be useful to assign the task of appointing counsels – and perhaps the 
settlement of accounts – to organizations diﬀerent from the proceeding authorities. 
“To the question who should perform these tasks, there are several alternative 
answers: the possible role of the bar associations was mentioned with regard to 
both functions. [...]
Or, as an another alternative, the participants of the Program proposed to 
empower the Justice Oﬃce to appoint the defense counsels. [...] 
As a third solution, the establishment of public defenders’ oﬃces could be 
raised. This institution would peculiarly combine the characteristics of legal 
aid by attorneys and state organs, but would successfully solve the questions of 
appointment, the even distribution of tasks among counsels and the problems 
of individual and general quality control. This oﬃce could function within 
the Justice Oﬃce or as a distinct institution absolutely separated from the 
authorities that take part in the criminal proceedings.”85 
The President of the Supreme Court also pointed out that the control of 
retained counsels may also be problematic, as the client is not always in the position 
to exercise professional control.
“To deﬁne the elements of quality assurance is certainly an elaborate and 
diﬃcult task, though in the case of retained lawyers we tend to believe that 
the discontented client can easily solve the problem himself by changing the 
counsel. 
In these cases both the selection and the individual quality control as well as the 
question of responsibility will be the matter between two parties. If the client is 
unsatisﬁed, he/she can simply switch his/her legal representative.
85 Dr. Lomnici’s lecture at the Round Table
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It is of fundamental importance that when the quality of defense is in question 
there should be no distinction between systems based on appointment or a 
retainer. [...]
The problem of quality assurance in the case of retained lawyers cannot be 
settled simply upon the principle of conﬁdence. People are usually unable to 
judge the performance of their attorneys even when the lawyer is paid according 
to the market prices.”86 
Certain aspects of this question were already pointed out in the 2003 HHC 
report: “eﬀective control over the performance of retained defense counsels can 
only be exercised by those defendant who, in case of dissatisfaction, can aﬀord to 
hire another attorney, regardless of payments already made. If legal fees are paid in 
advance, many families are no longer able to change the defense counsel.”87
Even though the raising of the issue is fully justiﬁed, we are of the opinion 
that it does not seem possible to interfere with the contractual freedom of the client 
and the lawyer with any form of quality assurance. In this context the bar associations’ 
disciplinary powers ought to be suﬃcient. With regard to disciplinary complaints of 
not so well-to-do families, it could be a solution to – in addition to the disciplinary 
ﬁnes – make the lawyers liable to pay back the fees to the client fully or in part.
On the other hand, in the case of ex oﬃcio appointed defense counsels, the 
state – as a quasi client – should be able to monitor the lawyers’ performance. In line 
with the independence of the legal profession, the state cannot perform such control 
directly. The solution for this issue could be the setting up of a board within the bar 
associations, as described in Section 6.
The President of the Supreme Court also touched upon the problematic 
question of fees.
“The question of appointment and the problems stemming therefrom are 
closely related to the issue of appropriate ﬁnancial support. […] 
It is very important to decide who should appoint the defense counsel, but this 
in itself does not resolve the problems arising from the diﬀerence of the fees 
paid by the authorities and private clients. A country’s economic situation will 
determine the amount of money that the state will be able to spend from its 
budget on its disadvantaged citizens and their right to access to justice.
86 Dr. Lomnici’s lecture at the Closing Conference
87 Presumption of Guilt, p. 144.
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It is not my job to represent the lawyers’ interests, but I have to say that 
eventually we cannot expect the self-suﬃcient lawyers to do unpaid jobs, in 
other words, they cannot be expected to ﬁnance from their other resources the 
function of ex oﬃcio appointment.”88
Regarding the same question, in his second presentation, dr. Lomnici was 
arguing for the voluntary nature of the ex oﬃcio appointments: “perhaps there is 
no country in this world where an appointed defense counsel would receive the 
same fee as the one who works for a private client. In other words, it could be said 
that appointments belong to a low paid category of work. And exactly this is the 
reason why the principle of voluntary application should be applied in ex oﬃcio 
appointment cases. At the same time, it should be the bar associations’ responsibility 
to ensure that these appointed counsels deliver on an acceptable quality level when 
doing their job.”89
In conclusion, the President of the Supreme Court stated that the courts 
are basically not against the structural reform if it does not impair their procedural 
interests and does not impose additional burdens on them.
“As opposed to what has been concluded by the coordinators of the Program, I 
do not attribute such importance to vesting an independent authority with the 
task of appointment. However, I would like to make it clear that in the judicial 
proceedings our main interest is to ensure that a judgment be delivered within 
reasonable time and to guarantee that the basic constitutional principles and 
the safeguards of the criminal proceedings are respected. Within this framework 
and in order to ensure these results, we would be willing to hand over the task 
of appointing the defense counsel and pay his/her fees. [...]
It is important to emphasize that the system of appointment should be 
transparent, simple and predictable. In this framework the courts are open to 
further surveys and the development of the system, but I have to emphasize that 
we can only support a system which (i) does not make the proceeding longer 
and does not hinder the conclusion of cases within a reasonable time, and 
(ii) does not increase the administrative burden of the courts. Furthermore, as 
I already indicated, we would be willing to hand over the task of appointment 
and settling the accounts.”90
88 Dr. Lomnici’s lecture at the Round Table
89 Dr. Lomnici’s lecture at the Round Table
90 Dr. Lomnici’s lecture at the Closing Conference
C o n c l u s i o n s  D r a w n  f r o m  t h e  P r o g r a m
113
5.6. The views of other key stakeholders on the conclusions 
 of the Program
Mrs. Anikó Varga, representative of the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Oﬃce stated at the 
Closing Conference that the prosecution is in favor of the defense counsel’s presence 
during the investigation. The defendant has the right to change his/her statement, 
but in order for the new statement to be taken into consideration he/she must be 
able to give a reason why he/she changed the earlier version. If the defense counsel is 
not present at the interrogation, the defendant may claim that he/she was pressured 
by the investigator or that the police oﬃcer paraphrased what he/she actually said. 
The prosecutor cannot refute such statements, if however the attorney is present at 
the interrogation, his/her signature on the record of the hearing is a proof that the 
hearing was lawful.
Another argument in favor of the counsel’s presence is that if the investigating 
authority fails to carry out some procedural act or to gather some evidence, the 
counsel can call attention to the omission, thus making the job of the prosecutor 
easier, who otherwise would have to send the ﬁle back for further investigation.
Mrs. Varga also pointed out that without contacting the defendant, the 
defense counsel cannot fulﬁll his/her other obligations prescribed by the CCP 
(informing the defendant about the lawful ways to defend him/herself and about 
his/her procedural rights, etc.). At the same time she stated that the legislator would 
have had the chance to make the counsel’s presence mandatory at interrogations and 
other procedural acts if that had been the intention.  
Numerous attorneys participating at the Closing Conference said that 
making the presence of the counsel mandatory at the interrogations was the most 
important change to achieve, because without this, the task of the defense counsel 
in the investigation phase would remain merely formal. Dr. János Bánáti, President 
of the Hungarian Bar Association emphasized that until the investigation plays 
such an important role in the ultimate judicial sentence, the rights of defense in the 
investigation phase should be almost identical with what the lawyer is authorized to 
do before the court. Unless this is so, lawyers may not be held responsible for not 
being present.
Dr. Ágnes Frech, Head of the Criminal Board of the Metropolitan Court 
did not agree that interrogations in the investigative phase should only be allowed 
in the presence of the defense counsel, since this would be disproportionate with the 
aim of crime detection and may open further possibilities for strategies aimed at the 
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protraction of the proceeding. At the same time she pointed out that courts could 
help to move the investigative practice in the direction of providing defense counsels 
with a real chance to appear if they attributed bigger weight to statements made in 
the presence of the lawyer than to confessions made without an attorney. 
She also raised the possibility that investigating authorities could be obliged 
by law to notify the bar association if the defense counsel fails to contact the defendant 
who has been in pre-trial detention for a long time. 
The majority of the participants of the Closing Conference agreed that 
it would be beneﬁcial if the function of appointment was taken over from the 
investigating authority by an authority that is not directly concerned by the criminal 
proceeding. There was also consensus that the most suitable organization would be 
the Legal Aid Service of the Justice Oﬃce, which is already responsible for operating 
the legal aid system in administrative and extrajudicial civil matters.
From among the counter arguments the following views are worth mentioning. 
Based on ﬁnancial reasons and potential conﬂicts of interest in determining the 
appointing authority, Mrs. Varga said that she saw no chance that such a change 
might take place in the near future. University professor and constitutional judge 
dr. Árpád Erdei warned that although the basic idea is good, it is Budapest-centered, 
while in a small town a well-functioning system is much more diﬃcult to organize. 
He also mentioned that US examples of public defender oﬃces show that if it is 
not the defendant who chooses the lawyer, the establishment of the necessary trust 
between the client and the lawyer will be diﬃcult even if the lawyer is appointed by 
an independent organization (a solution for this is oﬀered by the Dutch model, which 
is based on the free choice of the lawyer in criminal cases as well – for more detail 
see Section 6). Colonel Mihály Szabó, Head of the Department for Prevention at the 
National Police Headquarters, who represented the NPH at the Closing Conference 
repeated the conclusion of the NPH survey, according to which there is no need to 
change the present system.
Not even the police leadership is in full agreement with regard to this issue, 
which was shown by the comment of dr. Ernő Kiss, Commander of the Budapest 
13th District Police Headquarters, who said that the police should not insist on its 
right to appoint counsels. At the same time he warned that the timeliness of the 
investigations is an outstanding interest that has to be given priority by the Justice 
Oﬃce if it is to take over the appointment function.
Other participants however supported the idea. Dr. Ágnes Frech emphasized 
that the conﬂict of interests between the investigating authority and the defense 
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is undeniable. It does not exclude a fair relationship between the two sides, but it 
makes the reform of he structure necessary. She regards the expanding Justice Oﬃce 
to be suitable for the task, and thus no new institution should be established for the 
sole purpose of managing appointments.
The attorneys participating at the Closing Conference also supported the 
idea. Their main argument was that this could guarantee the even distribution of 
appointments. Conﬁrming the HHC’s conclusions on the too close cooperation 
between investigators and some lawyers, two attorneys claimed that although they 
are experienced criminal lawyers, they are almost never appointed in the investigation 
phase.
On behalf of the Hungarian Bar Association, dr. János Bánáti also drew 
attention to the problem of the uneven distribution of appointments, the lack of 
data on this distribution and the necessity of the reform of the system. “The (fair) 
distribution of appointments becomes ever more important. [Those who undertake 
appointments voluntarily] are interested in the fair distribution of appointments. The 
hopefully coming increase in the fees will make the cases (which will thus guarantee 
a still not too high but predictable income) ‘desirable’ for the attorneys, so these 
cases need to be distributed in a way that is not determined by personal relationships 
(e.g. between former colleagues). The fact that the lawyer is personally selected by 
the oﬃcer may bring into the relationship between the two sides certain elements 
that are not strictly connected to the criminal proceeding. This makes the systematic 
distribution of appointments even more important.”91 
Dr. Bánáti also ﬁnds the Justice Oﬃce suitable for the task.  
“I agree with all the people who say that the appointing authority shall be 
independent from the authority that brings a decision on the need to appoint a 
lawyer. The bar association seems like a logical option, however, this type of task 
does not suit the bar associations, and this would vest the bars with state tasks. 
This would entail the need to provide the bars with state funding, which on the 
other hand would make the relationship between the state authorities and the 
bars as public bodies complicated. Therefore, I believe that the bars do not need 
to be reformed for the sole purpose of performing this task, nor do we need to 
create a brand new organization to this end, since the legal aid service of the 
Ministry of Justice was set up last year and it has been constantly developing 
ever since. In my view, this organization is capable of performing a new task 
that is similar to the ones it has been performing, namely the distribution of 
91 Bánáti, p. 52.
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appointments. My recommendation would be that after the fees have been 
raised to HUF 5,000, the list of lawyers compiled by the bars would be sent to 
the county oﬃces of the legal aid service. The authorities participating in the 
criminal procedure would send the decisions on the need for appointment to 
these oﬃces through the fastest possible means of communication. The oﬃce 
would select the defense counsel on the basis of the principle of proportional 
distribution, and would notify both the defendant and the authority about 
the person and availability of the appointed counsel. Naturally, both the 
appointment and the notiﬁcation of the defendant and the authority would 
be done through the fastest possible means of communication. The oﬃce 
keeping the centralized register of defense counsels would also operate a duty 
scheme, which – after the necessary legislative amendments – may solve the 
long lasting problem of the absence of ex oﬃcio appointed lawyers from the 
ﬁrst interrogations of their clients. 
besides what is set forth above, the oﬃce would a) decide on the cost exemption 
of the defendant, thus taking over a burden from the authorities participating 
in the criminal proceeding; b) advance the necessary costs for the lawyer, such 
as the fee of the interpreter chosen by the counsel for consultation with the 
detained defendant [...].”92
The long-term introduction of this solution is also being considered by the 
Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement. Minister of Justice, dr. József Petrétei said 
the following at the Round Table held in April 2006.
“In October 2005, the Government adopted the impact assessment study on 
the ﬁrst year of the legal aid system and the schedule drafted for the extension 
of legal services. In this material the Ministry came to the conclusion that the 
right to defense is one of the most important ﬁelds of access to justice, and 
therefore in the long run it is necessary to integrate the ex oﬃcio appointment 
system into the legal aid service system, as that might provide a suitable 
ground for organizing this service in a more modern way ensuring higher 
quality. Naturally, the necessary amendments in the legal framework need to 
be adopted.
It is our declared objective to use the conclusions of the Program in our work 
aimed at the long-term development of the legal aid system. We wish to 
examine to what extent the legal aid system could meet the criteria set by the 
Program, how it could handle the problems raised by the Program, and what 
developments are necessary so that legal aid providers can provide criminal 
defense as well in the future.”
92 Bánáti, pp. 52–53.
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This standpoint was conﬁrmed by dr. Erika Plankó, who – as head of the 
Department for Legislation and Justice Services – represented the Ministry of Justice 
and Law Enforcement at the Closing Conference. She claimed that the document 
mentioned by dr. József Petrétei “serves as the basis of the legislation of the coming 
years, so what is included in it may probably be realized and undertaken as a plausible 
task.” She also warned that the support of the legal profession is insuﬃcient in itself 
without the necessary political will
On behalf of the Legal Aid Service of the Justice Oﬃce, dr. Pál Oswald spoke 
at the Closing Conference. He stated that the service is open for such a reform, and 
– if the necessary human and ﬁnancial resources are provided – they can perform the 
task of appointment and the related functions.
5.7. Conclusions based on the statistical analysis of the data of cases 
 and the defendants participating in the Program
The total number of the defendants remaining in the Program is 121. The low 
number does not make the application of the statistical method impossible, but 
the validity of the results is somewhat restricted. This number only slightly exceeds 
the upper threshold of a so called “small multitude”, the methodological aspects of 
which are discussed by the scientiﬁc literature. Multitudes between 3 and 99 belong 
to this category.
However, certain characteristic features may be established from the Program’s 
samples and conclusions may be drawn from the results. The question may be raised 
whether the data concerning the defendants participating in the Program show a 
pattern that is comparable to other groups, such as persons with a deviant behavior 
or – with certain restrictions – the complete Hungarian population. Comparing the 
data of participating defendants with those of the oﬀenders and convicted persons in 
the year 2005, some interesting conclusions may be drawn.
Starting the comparison with gender distribution, out of the defendants 
participating in the Program, 100 (82.64%) are males and 21 (17.36%) are females. 
This does not correspond to the gender distribution in the total population, but is 
close to the gender distribution of identiﬁed oﬀenders (The distribution of oﬀenders 
and convicted persons has changed in the past decade, but is all in all close to this. The 
proportion of women has in the past decade increased from 8–9 to 14–16 percent.)
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Table 9: Age and gender distribution of defendants participating in the Program
Age Male Female Total
Juvenile 27 17 44
19–20 6 — 6
21–30 24 2 26
31–40 26 — 26
Older than 40 17 2 19
Total 100 21 121
The age distribution shows a somewhat diﬀerent picture. Out of the 
participating defendants 44 (36.36%) are juvenile, which is much higher than the 
percentage of this age group among oﬀenders and convicts, which has been between 
7–11 percent in the past 15 years. This is probably due to the fact that since juvenile 
age is one of the grounds for mandatory defense, the ratio of juveniles among those 
in whose case defense is mandatory is as a matter of course higher than in the total 
population of oﬀenders and convicted persons. The Program’s pattern is a reﬂection 
of this phenomenon.
Interestingly, the age distribution also shows a diﬀerent picture if we only 
examine the data of adults. In this case the percentages are much closer to the 
proportions observable among adult oﬀenders and convicts of similar age.
The comparison was made in a way that – due to reasons not detailed here 
– the upper and lower thresholds of the age groups do not coincide with those applied 
in the usual statistical analysis of oﬀenders and convicted persons (the diﬀerence is 
one year). This however has no practical relevance from the point of view of the 
results’ validity.
 The percentage of participating defendants between 19–20 years of age, and 
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 Percentage of participating defendants older than 40 and oﬀenders and 




The dominant proportions of the age distribution are determined by the 
age distribution of the male defendants due to the high ratio of males within the 
whole multitude. (This dominance may also be observed in criminal statistics.) An 
interesting feature of the sample is that out of the 21 participating female defendants 
17 (!) are juveniles. Therefore, the age “distribution” of the remaining 4 adult women 
is not relevant from the point of view of the analysis, we only add here for the sake 
of completeness that 2 of them are in the 21–30 age group, while the other 2 are 
older than 40.
Table 10:   The distribution of participating defendants according to occupation 
Occupation Male Female Total
Student 25 15 40
Manual worker 27 — 27
Intellectual 4 1 5
Unemployed 29 2 31
Retired 6 — 6
Unknown 9 3 12
Total 100 21 121
The participating defendants’ distribution according to social status 
(or position in the societal distribution of labor) is obviously related to the high 
percentage of juveniles. This explains that almost one third of the 121 persons (in 
the male group 25 out of 100, in the female group 12 out of 21) are students. 
Their proportion is fully understandable in the light of the already mentioned age 
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distribution of women. The ratio of the other categories in the percentage of the total 






The percentages illustrate the long standing conclusion of several scientiﬁc 
analyses, namely that the problems concern the diﬀerent social groups with diﬀerent 
frequency. On the other hand, the high proportion of students does not primarily 
prove that this group has integration problems (although this may be part of the 
explanation), instead, it is a result of the speciﬁc age distribution of the sample. 
However, the proportions show similarities with data on deviant behaviors as 
provided by other sources.
Table 11:  The distribution of participating defendants according to the ground of defense
Ground of defense Male Female Total
Deaf, mute or blind 1 — 1
Mental disorder 6 — 6
Does not speak Hungarian 18 2 20
Detained* 44 2 46
Juvenile 27 17 44
Personal cost exemption 4 — 4
Total 100 21 121
* Those who are detained but also fall into any other mandatory defense category, were counted in 
the other category. The total number of detained defendants is 52.
The ground of defense means the reason why the HHC’s assistance became 
necessary in a certain case. If there are more than one grounds, the categorization 
took place on the basis of the most important one, in accordance with the principles 
of court and criminal statistics. Those who are detained but also fall into any other 
mandatory defense category, were counted in the other category. The number of 
these defendants is 6, as there are altogether 52 detained defendants, so detention is 
the sole reason for mandatory defense in 46 cases.
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The distribution of grounds for defense shows that detention is the most 
frequent reason for appointment, followed by juvenile age and the lack of a command 
of Hungarian. These data coincide with the results of the NPH survey, according to 
which “in most cases the young age or the detention of the defendant serves as 
the basis for appointing a counsel. 65% of all the appointments are based on these 
factors. With 1,059 instances [out of 3,582] detention in itself accounts for a large 
part of appointments.”93
The percentages in the Program are again determined by the distribution 
of male defendants. As their number is 100, the distribution by numbers coincides 
with the distribution by percentages. In the case of women, due to the speciﬁc age 
distribution (17 juveniles out of 21 defendants) the distribution is not relevant from 
a statistical point of view, we however wish to point out that 2 of the 4 adult women 
were entitled to mandatory defense due to the fact that they do not speak Hungarian, 
while the other two because of their detention.
Table 12: Distribution of the participating defendants according to the suspected criminal 
 offense in relation to the ground of defense
Criminal oﬀense Detained Other Total
Oﬀenses 
against property
Theft 16 25 41
Robbery 12 4 16
Vandalism — 4 4




Forgery of documents 1 4 5
Drug abuse 3 5 8




Bodily harm 7 2 9
Homicide 1 — 1
Oﬀenses against marriage, family, youth 
and sexual morals
1 5 6
Other 5 6 11
Total 52 69 121
93 Equality of Arms, p. 29.
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The number of defendants suspected of having committed an oﬀense against 
property was 70 (this means 57.85%), while in the case of 24 the suspicion was an 
oﬀense against the public order (19.83%). In comparison, among identiﬁed oﬀenders 
in 2005, the ratio of persons against whom a criminal proceeding was launched into 
oﬀenses against property and oﬀenses against public order was 38.40% and 27.4% 
respectively. In 2005, 69.96% of convicted juveniles and 37.19% of convicted adults 
were found guilty of oﬀenses against property. We have to mention though that 
among convicted adults, the percentages are signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the number 
of persons committing traﬃc oﬀenses. If we exclude them from the multitude, the 
distribution concerning “traditional” oﬀenses is not so much diﬀerent between 
juveniles and adults, the reason being that only few juveniles are convicted for traﬃc 
oﬀenses. 
Among perpetrators of oﬀenses against property, the proportion of those 
committing theft is the highest – with regard to both the defendants participating 
in the Program and the total population of oﬀenders. It needs to be pointed out 
however, that in the Program, the percentage of defendants accused of robbery is 
much higher than among oﬀenders or convicted persons in general. The percentages 
of persons accused of theft are the following.
participating defendants 58,57%
among perpetrators of oﬀenses 
against property (2005) 60,54%
among juveniles convicted for oﬀenses 
against property (2005) 72,05%
among juveniles convicted for oﬀenses 
against property (2005) 60,40%.
In the Program, the percentage of defendants accused of robbery was much 
higher than among – juvenile and adult – oﬀenders accused of crimes against property 
in 2005 or juveniles and adults convicted for crimes against property in that year. 
The percentages are the following:
 participating defendants 22,86%
 oﬀenders (2005) 3,46%
 juvenile convicts (2005) 11,84%
 adult convicts (2005) 3,30%.
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Table 13: The connection between occupation and the criminal offense in the case of 






































Theft 23 7 0 6 0 5 41
Robbery 1 6 1 4 1 3 16
Vandalism 1 1 0 0 1 1 4





2 0 1 2 0 0 5
Drug abuse 0 2 1 5 0 0 8




Bodily harm 1 3 1 2 0 2 9
Homicide 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Oﬀenses against marriage, 
family, youth and sexual morals
4 0 0 1 1 0 6
Other 2 4 0 3 2 0 11
Total 40 27 5 31 6 12 121
In spite of the low number of items, the data concerning occupation (and 
therefore the social status) show deﬁnite characteristics as a result of the detailed and 
unambiguous categorization. Out of the defendants accused of robbery 6 are manual 
workers and 4 are unemployed. This result shows a great degree of resemblance with 
the data of and the conclusions drawn from the uniﬁed police and prosecutorial 
statistics as well as with the judicial statistics: namely that the social characteristics of 
people convicted for robbery are the worst among the whole population of oﬀenders 
or convicted persons. 
The distribution of participating defendants accused of theft is equally typical: 
more than 50 percent of the students are accused of theft, and more than 50 percent 
of those who are accused of theft are students. This correlation between young age 
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and the types of oﬀenses committed has been discussed by the scientiﬁc literature 
in detail: it is a well-known fact that among juvenile delinquents the percentage 
of perpetrators committing crimes against property is the highest, and within this 
group theft is the most frequently committed oﬀense.
Within the category of crimes against public order, the internal distribution 
of the Program’s sample diverts from the usual criminal structure, in which the forgery 
of documents is much more frequent than drug abuse. This result of the Program is 
likely to be accidental and caused by the relatively small number of cases. The high 
proportion of unemployed persons accused of drug abuse may be explained by their 
psychological state caused by the uncertainty stemming from their situation.
Table 14: The connection between citizenship and the criminal offense in the case of 
 defendants participating in the Program
Criminal oﬀense Hungarian Foreigner Total
Oﬀenses against 
property
Theft 35 6 41
Robbery 16 0 16
Vandalism 2 2 4






Drug abuse 4 4 8




Bodily harm 7 2 9
Homicide 0 1 1
Oﬀenses against marriage, 
family, youth and sexual morals
6 0 6
Other 10 1 11
Total 97 24 121
When assessing the results based on citizenship and the oﬀense committed, 
special attention has to be paid on crimes against property, with special regard to 
theft and robbery: the results support the conclusion that may also be drawn from 
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the usual sources of criminal statistics, namely that it is not foreigners who pose the 
highest risk to the Hungarian public order.
Table 15: The connection between the ground of defense and the age of defendants 
 participating in the Program 
Ground of defense Juvenile 19–20 21–30 31–40 Older 
than 40
Total
Deaf, mute or blind 0 0 0 1 0 1
Mental disorder 0 0 1 5 0 6
Does not speak Hungarian 0 2 10 8 0 20
Detained 0 4 14 12 16 46
Juvenile 44 0 0 0 0 44
Personal cost exemption 0 0 1 0 3 4
Total 44 6 26 26 19 121
With regard to the connection between age and the ground of defense, we 
can say that the dominance of the age groups 21–30 and 31–40 among those who do 
not speak Hungarian, is related to the migration “habits”, the above-average mobility 
of these age groups.
To summarize the results, we can say that in spite of the relatively small 
number of cases, conclusions may be drawn from the data, which are also comparable 
to the nationwide data regarding deviant behaviors and people displaying such 
behaviors.
With regard to the data concerning the outcome of the cases (see Table 2 
under Section 3.3.), it can be said that due to the relatively small number of cases, 
it is not possible to draw far reaching conclusions regarding the eﬃciency of the 
lawyers’ work. If we still compare these results with the data of judicial statistics on 
completed cases, we can say that the outcome of the cases taken in the framework of 
the Program does not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from the usual legal consequences of similar 
oﬀenses. 
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5.8. Analysis of individual cases
During the Program, besides controlling the attorneys’ performance, the monitoring 
of individual cases also made it possible to examine certain issues emerging in the 
practice of criminal law. Below, we are summarizing a few cases that raised interesting 
problems of the application of criminal law provisions.
5.8.1.  Counting in time spent in pre-trial detention in petty oﬀense cases 
The case – which also provides further evidence concerning the diﬃculties of 
cooperating with the police – started one night when the dispatcher service notiﬁed 
the HHC’s lawyer about an interrogation that was scheduled for the next morning. 
When the lawyer arrived at the 8th District Police Headquarters, he 
discovered that the defendant’s ﬁrst interrogation had taken place on the previous 
day, three hours before the dispatcher service was notiﬁed (on the problem of 
interrogations during short term arrest, see Section 4.2.). Since the defendant 
felt sick after the interrogation and he was transferred from the headquarters, the 
scheduled interrogation (which would have been the continuation of the hearing 
that was held before the lawyers’ arrival) could not take place, and the lawyer was not 
in the position to have all the necessary Program documents ﬁlled out and the power 
of attorney signed by the defendant (therefore, the attorney sent by the HHC could 
not become the defendant’s retained lawyer from the point of view of the criminal 
procedure). To be able to contact the defendant later, the HHC lawyer handed over 
his business card to the detective investigating the case, and asked to be informed as 
soon as it was decided where (in which institution) the defendant would be placed 
after his health problem is solved. 
However, two days later, when the HHC’s attorney inquired about the 
developments, it turned out that in the meantime – despite the promise he made 
– the investigator appointed another lawyer for the defendant, and it was this new 
lawyer whom the investigating authority informed about the continuation of the 
interrogation and the court session held about the ordering of the defendant’s pre-
trial detention. Following an intervention by the HHC, the lawyer went to the police 
station to ﬁnally have the power of attorney signed. Although he managed to do so, 
a week later, when he tried to visit his client at the police jail, it turned out that the 
investigator had still not informed the jail personnel about the change of lawyer, so 
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the HHC attorney was denied access to his client. Only upon the lawyer’s strongly 
worded warning did the investigator ﬁnally fulﬁll his duty of notiﬁcation.
The defendant was kept in pre-trail detention for almost three months owing 
to the following oﬀense. He entered a bank, where – in preparation for the closing 
– the counters were roped oﬀ from the client zone with a cordon. Going around 
the cordon, the defendant stepped to one of the counters, grabbed a mobile phone 
that was left there by an earlier client, and left the bank. The damage caused was 
HUF 7,500 (EUR 30), but it was recovered since the arrested defendant returned 
the phone to the owner. Although the damage did not reach the level where theft 
is regarded as a criminal oﬀense (if the value of the stolen goods is below HUF 
10,000, theft is only a petty oﬀense), the prosecutor (and the police) qualiﬁed the 
act as a criminal oﬀense claiming that it was committed by entering a fenced area 
(which, under Hungarian law. qualiﬁes thefts even under the HUF 10,000 value 
limit as a criminal oﬀense). Therefore, the prosecutor motioned the court to impose 
imprisonment on the perpetrator. 
Already in the motion for terminating the pre-trial detention, the HHC 
lawyer pointed out that the qualiﬁcation of the oﬀense as a criminal act is unlawful, 
and it should be regarded as a petty oﬀense, since according to the consistent judicial 
practice, an area separated by a cordon the role of which is signalizing the separation 
but is not suitable for actually preventing entry, may not be regarded as a “fenced 
area” in the sense of the Penal Code. Therefore, the lawyer argued, the ordering of 
pre-trial detention is not lawful (no pre-trial detention is possible in petty oﬀense 
cases). Eleven days after the court received the lawyer’s motion, it terminated the 
pre-trial detention.
In its decision that became binding at the ﬁrst instance, in accordance with 
the argumentation of the HHC lawyer, the court acquitted the defendant from the 
criminal charges, but established his responsibility for the petty oﬀense of theft, and 
imposed a HUF 100,000 (EUR 400) ﬁne on him. The court ordered that the 85 
days spent in pre-trial detention shall be counted in the ﬁne (with a rate of HUF 
1,000 per day), so the defendant had to pay only HUF 15,000.
The decision is strongly questionable from the legal point of view. The court 
referred to Article 14 Paragraph (3) of Act LXIX of 1993 on Petty Oﬀenses (Petty 
Oﬀense Act) as the legal basis for counting in the time spent in pre-trial detention. 
This provision claims the following: “The full time of the petty oﬀense arrest, and 
the time of short-term arrest – if that exceeds four hours – shall be counted in petty 
oﬀense detention. When doing so every calendar day spent in a petty oﬀense arrest 
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shall equal one day of petty oﬀense detention. Short-term arrest exceeding four hours 
shall equal one day of petty oﬀense detention.”
Thus, the provision the court relied on does not in any way make it possible 
to count the time spent in pre-trial detention (which is a measure of penal law) in a 
petty oﬀense ﬁne (which is a punishment deﬁned in petty oﬀense law). Neither the 
Petty Oﬀense Act, nor Act IV of 1978 on the Penal Code (Penal Code) makes such 
a deduction transfer possible between the two legal ﬁelds.
The lawful (and undoubtedly more complex and time-consuming) solution 
would have been for the defendant to start after the acquittal a civil lawsuit against 
the Ministry of Justice for compensation for the time spent in pre-trial detention, 
based on Article 580 point II a9 of the CCP, which provides this possibility for 
people who are acquitted after being detained. Taking into consideration the judicial 
practice, it is also likely that the amount of compensation would have been at least 
HUF 100,000 higher than the petty oﬀense ﬁne imposed on the defendant. On the 
other hand, the defendant would by all probability not have been in the position to 
ﬁrst pay the ﬁne, and then retain a lawyer to represent him in the lawsuit against 
the Ministry, so without the court’s questionably lawful decision on counting in, he 
would have probably ended up in a petty oﬀense detention (imposed for not paying 
the ﬁne). Therefore, it is fully understandable that the HHC’s lawyer decided not to 
appeal against the decision.
The case however raises the necessity for the legislation to consider making 
counting in possible in similar cases. 
5.8.2. Ripping a box of cigarettes open as “violence against an object”
According to the accusation, the defendant participating in the Program attempted to 
steal cigarettes from a shop by ripping a cigarette box open, hiding the cigarettes in his 
clothing and trying to leave. At ﬁrst a petty oﬀense proceeding was launched against 
him, but then the method of taking the cigarettes (by ﬁrst ripping the box open) 
was qualiﬁed as “violence against an object”, due to which the defendant’s behavior 
was considered to be a criminal act (if theft below the HUF 10,000 value limit is 
committed this way, it qualiﬁes as a criminal oﬀense instead of a petty oﬀense). 
The prosecutor applied a reprimand (the mildest possible sanction in 
Hungarian penal law) and terminated the investigation, taking into consideration 
the fact that the defendant admitted the oﬀense and showed repentance, and that 
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his circumstances were otherwise decent and that the risk posed by the act to society 
is rather low.
The key question is of course whether ripping oﬀ a box of cigarettes really 
qualiﬁes as “violence against an object.” Despite the fact that the box was undoubtedly 
damaged, this conclusion does not seem well-founded, as the opening of the box is 
part of its normal use. “Violence against an object” can only be established if the 
damage is caused by the improper use of the given object, however, a cigarette can 
only be smoked if the box is opened beforehand.
It would lead to an absurd situation if taking out a cigarette from the box 
would constitute a criminal oﬀense, whereas taking the whole box (the price of which 
is way below the HUF 10,000 limit) would still remain a petty oﬀense.
5.8.3. Questions of the fast track procedure
On 12 January 2005, the dispatcher service notiﬁed the attorney that she had to 
appear at the 8th District Police Headquarters in a case launched against a detained 
defendant of Romanian citizenship, who did not speak Hungarian. The interrogation 
was properly held, the defendant suspected of forgery of an oﬃcial document was 
included in the Program. (He committed the forgery by providing his brother in 
law’s data in the course of an identity check by the police, because he returned to 
Hungary the eﬀect of an expulsion order.)
On 15 January 2005, the Central District Court of Pest ordered the 
defendant’s pre-trial detention. On 24 January, the HHC attorney wished to visit her 
client at the police station, but was informed that the defendant had been sentenced 
in a fast track procedure on 20 January (such a procedure is possible if the maximum 
punishment for the oﬀense is no more than 8 years of imprisonment, the case is 
simple, the evidence is at hand and the defendant was caught red-handed or admitted 
the oﬀense). The attorney asked the investigator why she had not been summoned to 
the trial. The investigator replied that he had given her a so-called “short notice”: on 
18 January he tried to call her on the phone, but she did not pick it up, so he left a 
message that her client’s case would be tried in a fast track procedure on 20 January 
2005, at 9.00 a.m. Since the attorney thought that this was not in line with the CCP, 
she asked the investigator for the prosecutor’s name, but the police oﬃcer refused to 
provide her with it. Finally, the attorney was able to ﬁnd out who the prosecutor in 
the case was by contacting the 8th District Prosecutor’s Oﬃce. 
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When she called him, the prosecutor allegedly said that although the 
judge was reluctant to hold the trial in the lawyer’s absence, he managed to get a 
substituting lawyer, and persuaded the judge to proceed with the case, so there were 
no legal obstacles preventing the continuation of the case. According to the lawyer, 
the prosecutor also said that he had been so insistent on the fast track procedure 
because this way he did not have to write a bill of indictment.
From the records of the trial it seems that after the opening of the trial the 
defendant waived the retained attorney and requested that a defense counsel would 
be appointed for him ex oﬃcio by the court. At this point the court appointed 
the substitute lawyer the prosecutor found. The new counsel – without any time 
for preparation of examining the ﬁles – requested the continuation of the trial. In 
the light of this, it shall come as no surprise that he did not in any way contest the 
facts and the qualiﬁcation as put forth by the prosecution, moreover, he agreed with 
the prosecutor concerning the necessity to impose a punishment on the defendant! 
The court’s decision – suspended imprisonment and expulsion – was not appealed 
against by either the prosecutor, or the defense counsel or the defendant, so it 
became binding.
The case raises numerous legal problems, the most important ones being 
the following.
Firstly, it is questionable whether a summoning performed in the above 
described manner may be regarded as fully appropriate. The CCP provides the 
prosecutor with the possibility of applying a so-called “short notice” (summoning by 
phone, fax, etc.) in fast track procedures. (Article 520). The CCP does not prescribe 
that the person issuing such a notice shall be obliged to make sure that the addressed 
person actually receives the summons. At the same time, in fast track procedures 
– exactly because of the fast track nature of the proceeding – the importance of the 
defense counsel’s participation is even greater than usually. Hence, it would have 
seemed reasonable to expect the investigator or the prosecutor to try to ﬁnd out 
whether the attorney had taken notice of the summons. In the concrete case there 
was only one attempt to reach the lawyer. On 18 January, the investigator left a 
message, but neither on the 19th nor on the 20th was the lawyer called to make sure 
that she knew about the trial.
Furthermore, with regard to fast track procedures the CCP prescribes [Article 
518 Paragraph (2)] that if the defendant is detained, the prosecutor shall see to it 
that he/she can consult his/her defense counsel before the trial. Since the records of 
the trial show that the defendant in the concrete case agreed to the appointment of 
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another counsel only after the opening of the trial, it seems likely that he had no 
chance to consult the substituting lawyer at the time prescribed by law, i.e. before 
the trial.
The right to defense also includes the requirement that the defense counsel 
shall be provided with the necessary time for preparing the defense. This is why 
Article 281 Paragraph (3) of the CCP sets out the following: if the summoned 
defense counsel fails to show up, the defendant may retain another counsel, or 
– if the counsel’s presence is obligatory – a counsel shall be appointed instead of 
the absent lawyer. The newly retained or appointed lawyer shall be provided with 
suﬃcient time for preparing. If this is not possible, the trial shall be postponed upon 
the absent counsel’s costs. It is obvious that in the present case the substituting lawyer 
did not have enough time to get prepared. It is of course partly his responsibility that 
– according to the records – he did not even ask for a pause so that he could look 
into the case ﬁles. The omission committed by the judge and the appointed counsel 
led to a violation of the eﬀective right to defense. 
With regard to the concrete case, the HHC ﬁled a complaint to the Budapest 
Chief Public Prosecutor’s Oﬃce. The Oﬃce regarded the complaint as ill-founded 
in all respects. Based on its investigation, the Oﬃce claimed that the court had been 
waiting for the HHC lawyer for half an hour before proceeding with the case. During 
this time the prosecutor tried to reach the lawyer several times on her mobile. Only 
after this did the judge ask the defendant whether he agreed to the appointment of a 
substituting counsel. According to the Oﬃce, the new lawyer had the time to inspect 
the case ﬁle, and only after he did so, was the trial continued. The Oﬃce concluded 
that the action of the prosecutor and the judge was fully lawful and professional, the 
defendant’s rights were not infringed in either the preparation phase or the hearing.
The oﬃcial record of the trial refutes this conclusion. According to the 
record, there was no 30-minute delay: the trial started at the scheduled time of 9.00 
o’clock, and the record was closed down at 9.40. This gives ground to two possible 
explanations: (a) it is not true that the prosecutor tried for half an hour to reach the 
HHC lawyer; (b) the whole trial – with interpretation from Hungarian to Romanian 
and back, and with the court wording and announcing the decision – took no more 
than 10 minutes. In the latter case the substituting counsel could obviously not have 
time for inspecting the ﬁles and getting prepared for the hearing.
In its decision 6/1998 (III.11.) – already referred to under Section 1.1. 
– the Constitutional Court declared: it is not suﬃcient if the right to defense is 
only formally guaranteed. In the broad interpretation of the right to defense, the 
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Constitutional Court relied on the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (Article 14) and the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 6), 
which prescribe that everyone charged with a criminal oﬀense has the minimum 
right to have adequate time and the facilities for the preparation of his defense.
In the case of Goddi v Italy 94 there was a hearing at which neither the 
applicant nor the legal aid lawyer who was acting for him in the appeal was present. 
The outcome was the imposition of heavier sentences than those imposed at ﬁrst 
instance. Although it was not established on the facts that the applicant’s absence was 
the state’s fault, the ECHR found that the appeals court (and therefore the Italian 
state) was responsible for the absence of his lawyer. 
In the ECHR’s view the error was not rectiﬁed by appointing a third lawyer 
on the day of the hearing. The lawyer who was designated on the spot as the oﬃcially-
appointed lawyer was acquainted neither with the case-ﬁle nor with his client. In 
addition, he did not have the requisite time to prepare himself. Hence, the applicant 
did not have the beneﬁt of a defense that was ‘practical and eﬀective’ as required by 
Article 6 (3) (c). 
Due to the fact that by the time the problem became known to the Board the 
defendant had already left the country, no further steps were taken in the case.
94 Application no. 8966/80, Judgment of 9 April 1984
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6. Recommendations for the Reform 
 of the Hungarian Ex Officio 
 Appointment System
Based on the Program’s experiences and the opinions received, the HHC also made 
an assessment on what problems the national introduction of such a system may 
raise and what the possible solutions may be. The results are presented in accordance 
with the functions underlined in Section 1.3.
6.1. Management function
The HHC still regards it to be of key importance that the task of selecting the defense 
counsel be performed independently from the investigating authority.
Although the Program’s dispatcher service proved to be very eﬃcient, to 
maintain such a system for the sole purpose of providing defendants with ex oﬃcio 
appointed counsels in criminal cases seems unrealistic due to the high costs that this 
would entail. 
According to our concept, the central unit of the system to be developed 
should be the Justice Oﬃce, which – in addition to its present tasks related to legal aid 
in non-criminal matters and probation issues – would also perform the function of 
appointing defense counsels. The schedule could be established for 3, 6 or 12 months 
in advance by the Justice Oﬃce, based on the average number of appointments and 
the number of lawyers in the given region. The Justice Oﬃce would maintain a 
round-the-clock dispatcher service to which the police would indicate the necessity 
of appointment. The attorneys shall undertake to be available on their duty day, and 
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the Justice Oﬃce would have to notify them in accordance with a pre-set algorithm 
ensuring the even distribution of appointments.
If this mechanism cannot be ﬁnanced due to its high costs, a solution may be 
that the police’s role in appointing the lawyer is maintained but in a way that it shall 
have no discretion in choosing the defense counsel, but shall notify the lawyers based 
on a previously set schedule. The system would be the same as the one described 
above with the diﬀerence that instead of notifying the dispatcher service of the 
Justice Oﬃce, the police would directly notify the lawyer based on a duty schedule 
that would still be determined by the Justice Oﬃce. (A similar method is applied in 
the Netherlands. Here the Legal Aid Boards determine the duty schedule for 3 or 6 
months in advance. Depending on which of the ﬁve Legal Aid Boards he/she belongs 
to, the on-duty solicitor shall be ready so that the police can notify him/her via fax 
or telephone if there is a client, or he/she has to phone the police station every three 
hours to ask whether he/she needs to visit the station. Another characteristic feature 
of the Dutch model is that the defendant has the right to choose his/her defense 
counsel. This means that the on-duty solicitor has to contact the client at the police 
station and shall carry out all the urgent tasks, but if the defendant wishes to have 
another lawyer provided by the legal aid system, the on-duty solicitor shall notify this 
other lawyer as soon as it is possible.95) 
As dr. Tamás Matusik, trainee judge at the Metropolitan Court raised at 
the Closing Conference, the appointment of liquidators and receivers in liquidation 
procedures raise structural problems that are similar to the issue of appointment 
performed by the investigating authority. Since liquidation procedures can concern 
signiﬁcant ﬁnancial interests, impartiality and also the pretence thereof need to be 
guaranteed in a systemic manner. To this end, Decree 14/2002. (VIII.1.) of the 
Minister of Justice on the Rules of Judicial Case Administration claims96 that the 
liquidator and the receiver shall be chosen through computer program. The program 
selects the liquidator and the receiver on a random basis. The defense counsel could 
also be appointed in this way, the computer program is already in place, with some 
amendments it could certainly be adapted to the purpose.
95 Presentation at the Closing Conference by Peter van den Biggelaar, Executive Director of the Legal Aid Board 
in ’s-Hertogenbosch
96 Art. 63 Par. (3)
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As it was described in Section 5.6., the idea that appointments should be done 
by the Justice Oﬃce is supported by the Hungarian Bar Association, the Ministry of 
Justice and Law Enforcement and – upon certain conditions – the Supreme Court. 
Furthermore, although the NPH does not regard it as necessary, certain police leaders 
also ﬁnd such a reform plan acceptable. The representative of the Legal Aid Service 
of the Justice Oﬃce said at the Closing Conference that the service is willing to take 
over the task if the conditions are guaranteed. We believe that the agreement of the 
stakeholders is very important for creating the necessary political support. 
Another conclusion concerning the appointment function is that the rules of 
notiﬁcation should also be changed. If the investigating authority sends a fax about 
the appointment, as it does at present, interrogations taking place during the night or 
in the weekend will continue to be performed in the absence of a defense counsel, as 
it may not be expected from the attorneys to stay in their oﬃces for 24 hours on their 
duty day. Therefore, there should be an obligation on the part of the investigating 
authority to also attempt to contact the appointed lawyers via telephone.
In order to create a balance between the defendant’s right to defense and the 
interests of the investigation, the suggestion of the 8th District Police Headquarters 
concerning the setting of a maximum time the investigating authority shall wait 
between notifying the lawyer and starting the interrogation seems to be an acceptable 
solution, as long as the time limit is realistic. This means that these time limits shall 
diﬀer according to location and time of the day, so the setting up of such a system 
requires further countrywide data collection.
6.2. Quality control
The Program’s system (in which the Model Legal Aid Board monitors the quality 
of the attorneys’ performance on a monthly basis) is very eﬃcient, however, it is 
not a feasible solution on a national level. Such close quality control is very time 
consuming (and therefore also expensive) plus it would put a severe administrative 
and reporting burden on the attorneys.
The monitoring of the quality of the work of ex oﬃcio appointed lawyers 
could be performed by a two-level system.
The ﬁrst level would be a more formal type of control, which does not require 
extensive knowledge of the ﬁeld. This would be based on monitoring whether the 
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ex oﬃcio appointed counsel participated in all (or most) of the procedural acts 
(interrogations, confrontations, presentation of the case ﬁles, court hearings) where 
his/her presence was possible. This type of control could be performed by employees 
of the Justice Oﬃce.
The second level of control would be performed by a professional board 
operated by the Bar Association and consisting of attorneys. Based on the solution 
suggested by dr. Balázs Rozgonyi, one of the lawyers participating in the Program, it 
would be possible that regular (e.g. annual) inspections could be performed in the 
following manner: both the attorney and the monitoring board could choose a set 
number of cases, where the attorney acted as an ex oﬃcio appointed defense counsel. 
The evaluation of the given lawyer’s performance would be based on the inspection 
of the ﬁles of these cases. If the board regards the performance unsatisfactory, the 
attorney would be removed from the list of lawyers who can be appointed. As we 
pointed out above, this sanction would only have a deterring eﬀect if only those 
lawyers could act as retained lawyers in criminal cases who are included in the list of 
ex oﬃcio defense counsels.
The disciplinary function of the Bar Association would remain as a third 
level for cases of outstanding negligence.
There should be a link between the two (three) levels. If during the inspection 
of the ﬁles the Justice Oﬃce detects that the lawyer was absent from the majority 
of the procedural acts, it could initiate the action of the monitoring board, or (in 
extreme cases) ﬁle a disciplinary complaint with the Bar Association.
With regard to the fears concerning the infringement of the independence 
of attorneys, the HHC ﬁnds the arguments set forth at the Closing Conference 
by dr. Tamás Matusik, trainee judge at the Metropolitan Court convincing and 
reassuring. He stated that although the principle of judicial independence is set out 
in both the Constitution and the laws on the judiciary, the evaluation of the work 
performed by judges is mandatory under the law.97 The evaluation is performed by 
other judges on the basis of cases that have been closed down, so the possibility of 
a violation of judicial independence does not arise. In our model, the assessment 
of the performance of attorneys would be conducted in a similar manner (by other 
attorneys and on the basis of cases that have been ﬁnished), so no threat of violating 
the independence of the legal profession would be in place.
97 Act LXVII of 1997 on the Status and Remuneration of Judges, Art. 47 Par. (1): The work of the judge shall be 
evaluated in the intervals and on the basis of conditions deﬁned by this law
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  R e f o r m  o f  t h e  H u n g a r i a n  E x  O f f i c i o  A p p o i n t m e n t  S y s t e m
137
It would mean an important step towards the performance of a general 
quality control function if the Justice Oﬃce was vested with the task of appointing 
and paying lawyers, and performing a formal control over the attorneys’ attendance 
at procedural acts. This would make it possible to create a data base from which the 
number and costs of cases as well as the percentage of attendance could easily be 
established. 
6.3. Budgetary function
The ﬁrst important principle should be that all payments within the system should 
be done by a single entity. The present solution (whereby payments are performed 
by both the investigating authority – through the Bar Association – and the courts) 
should be terminated, because it makes it impossible to gain reliable data about the 
real costs of the system. The single entity could be the Justice Oﬃce.
Payment based on an hourly fee and regular report of the work performed 
by the attorneys requires an enormous amount of administration. Furthermore, to 
monitor whether the reported number of hours is realistic, an extensive knowledge 
of the criminal practice is required. Therefore, to eﬃciently perform this task, highly 
qualiﬁed staﬀ would be needed, which would further increase the costs of the 
system.
Veriﬁcation of the hours by the authorities is not a fully satisfactory solution if 
we want to pay for activities not acknowledged in the present system (e.g. preparation 
for trial, writing petitions, consultation with defendants who are not detained).
Two solutions seem possible in this regard. The ﬁrst one is the Dutch 
solution, whereby a ﬁxed and generally deﬁned number of hours is attached to each 
case-type, and some additional hours can be required for “irregular” activities (for 
instance, travel exceeding 60 kilometers). An important element of the system is 
that the lawyer has the possibility to request payment based on the exact number of 
hours, provided that the hours spent on the individual case exceeds the triple of the 
number of hours ﬁxed for that particular case-type. 
To set up a typology of criminal cases based on which a lump sum could be 
deﬁned for each case type would require extensive data collection from the ﬁles of ex 
oﬃcio appointment cases already closed down. It also may not be easy to acquire the 
agreement of professional circles.
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Another solution is to combine the two systems. Procedural acts could be 
paid on the basis of the veriﬁcation of authorities, and at the end of the given case, the 
lawyer could ask for a lump sum to cover his/her additional activities (preparation, 
petitions, etc.). If the Justice Oﬃce has doubts about how realistic the sum is, it 
could require the lawyer to submit diﬀerent materials to substantiate the claim. 
Due to the fact that costs are also diﬃcult to verify (e.g. what percentage of 
a law ﬁrm’s telephone costs occurs in relation to a given case in a month), the lump 
sum solution seems to be a better one in this regard as well. Based on the example 
of the agreement between the Budapest Bar Association and the Budapest Police 
Headquarters (see under Section 1.3.), a 30 percent addition to the hourly fees, 
seems to be an acceptable compromise.
As dr. Pál Oswald said at the Closing Conference on behalf of the Legal 
Aid Service, the system of lump sums has proved to be successful in administrative 
and extra-judicial legal aid with regard to both the required number of hours and 
the reimbursement of costs. He said that the administrative burden related to this 
solution is also not unbearable.
In our view, the solutions outlined above would make the redressing of the 
most important structural problems of the ex oﬃcio appointment system possible 
even within the present organizational and ﬁnancial framework.  
At the same time we wish to draw attention to the data presented at the 
Closing Conference by the head of the Dutch expert delegation and Executive 
Director of the Legal Aid Board of ’s-Hertogenbosch, Peter van den Biggelaar. 
According to a report published by the European Commission for the Eﬃciency of 
Justice, in 2004 Hungary was in the 8th and 9th place among European countries 
with regard to the annual budget spent on the prosecution system and on all courts 
(without legal aid) respectively (per inhabitant as percentage of the per capita GDP), 
whereas with respect to (estimated data on) legal aid, the country was on the 32nd 
place, followed only by Azerbaijan, Malta, Greece and Armenia.98 
The reform of the system requires the elimination of this discrepancy in the 
budget of the justice system, especially because eﬀective legal aid can lead to shorter 
proceedings, and a decrease in the number and length of pre-trial detentions. This in 
turn can produce a saving in the justice budget that can create the resources for the 
setting up and operation of the new system.
98 European Judicial Systems, edition 2006 (2004 data). Council of Europe, 2006, Belgium, pp. 23, 27 and 31.
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The implementation of the Model Legal Aid Board Program required devoted work 
from a number of people to whom we would like to express our gratefulness.
 From the Hungarian Helsinki Committee
 Anikó Gál; 
dr. András Kádár; 
Dóra Németh; 
dr. Balázs Tóth; 
dr. Edina Vinnai.




 Members of the Board
 dr. Ákos Farkas (University of Miskolc); 
dr. Tamás Fekete (Budapest Bar Association); 
dr. Edit Juhász (Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement); 
dr. András Kádár (attorney at law); 
Ferenc Kőszeg (Hungarian Helsinki Committee); 
dr. Mihály Tóth (Pázmány Péter Catholic University); 
dr. László Zeke (attorney at law).
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 Members of the Dutch expert delegation
 Peter van den Biggelaar; 







dr. Ágnes Baki; 
dr. György Ágoston Benkő; 
dr. Ádám Békés; 
dr. Krisztina Blázy; 
dr. Nelly Borsai; 
dr. Ilona Buzás; 
dr. János Czövek; 
dr. Ibolya Csete; 
dr. Bernadette Deák; 
dr. József Dunai; 
dr. István Egyed; 
dr. Sára Éliás; 
dr. István Falcsik; 
dr. László Gál; 
dr. Anetta Gesztesi; 
dr. Annamária Halászné Hetesi; 
dr. Mária Róza Horváth; 
dr. Klára Illés; 
dr. Rita Kamarell; 
dr. Zoltán Kiss; 
dr. Éva Koczka; 
dr. Tibor Kovács; 
dr. Erzsébet Kőfalvi; 
dr. Gyöngyvér László; 
dr. Erika Makkainé Fóti; 
dr. Péter Margitics; 
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dr. András Medgyesi; 
dr. Klára Molnár;
dr. László Molnár; 
dr. István Nagy; 
dr. Viktor Nagy; 
dr. Ágnes Némethné Demeter; 
dr. Balázs Rozgonyi; 
dr. Katalin Sánta; 
dr. István Svéda; 
dr. Lajos Szendrői; 
dr. András Tinics.
 The personnel of the Police units participating in the Program
 Personnel of the 6–7th District Police Headquarters;
 The 8th District Police Headquarters;
 The 13th District Police Headquarters;
 The Department of Inquiry of the Budapest Police Headquarters; and
The Department of Investigation of the Budapest Police Headquarters.
 Members of the dispatcher service
 dr. Anett Csiki; 





 The speakers of the Round Table and the Closing Conference
 dr. János Bánáti (President of the Hungarian Bar Association); 
dr. Gergely Bárándy (Member of Parliament); 
dr. Árpád Erdei (constitutional judge); 
dr. Zoltán Lomnici (President of the Supreme Court); 
dr. József Petrétei (Minister of Justice and Law Enforcement); 
dr. Erika Plankó (Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement); 
Mihály Szabó (National Police Headquarters); 
dr. Anikó Varga (Chief Public Prosecutor’s Oﬃce).
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 We would also like to thank those who contributed to th successful imple-
mentation of the Program by meeting the Dutch experts, by adding their 
remarks at the Round Table and the Closing Conference or in any other 
way:
 dr. János Burai-Kovács (attorney at law); 
 László Csere (Commander of the National Prison Administration);
 Janneke Faber (Dutch Embassy in Hungary); 
 dr. Ágnes Frech (Metropolitan Court); 
 dr. Erzsébet Hatvany (Director of the Justice Oﬃce); 
 dr. László Kálmán (Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement); 
 dr. Ernő Kiss (Commander of the 13th District Police Headquarters); 
 dr. Tamás Matusik (Metropolitan Court); 
 dr. Pál Oswald (Legal Aid Service of the Justice Oﬃce); 
 dr. Péter Révész (Legal Aid Service of the Justice Oﬃce); 
 Nándor Terényi (interpreter); 
 dr. Piroska Vincze (Metropolitan Court); 
 Bianca Zylﬁu (Dutch Embassy in Hungary).


